






A Mission Statement for Mutual Funds in 
Shareholder Litigation 
Sean J. Griffith† & Dorothy S. Lund†† 
This Article analyzes the conduct of mutual funds in shareholder litigation. 
We begin by reviewing the basic forms of shareholder litigation and the benefits such 
claims might offer mutual fund investors. We then investigate, through an in-depth 
docket review, whether and how the ten largest mutual funds participate in share-
holder litigation. We find that although shareholder suits offer potential benefits, 
the largest mutual funds have essentially forfeited their use of litigation. This find-
ing is particularly striking given that index funds and other long-term oriented mu-
tual funds generally cannot sell their shares when they are dissatisfied with com-
pany performance, leaving them with only two levers in corporate governance—
voting and suing. Mutual funds vote, but they do not sue. 
We analyze potential explanations for the failure of mutual funds to litigate on 
behalf of their investors. Collective action problems and conflicts of interest raise 
significant obstacles to mutual fund participation in shareholder litigation. Yet, we 
argue, there are situations in which shareholder litigation could create value for 
mutual fund investors. We therefore turn to the normative question: How should 
mutual funds litigate on behalf of their investors? Answering this question allows 
us to articulate a mission statement for mutual funds in shareholder litigation. 
Our mission statement is grounded on the perspective of the broadly diversified 
“market investor.” The repeat-play incentives and broad diversification of many mu-
tual funds, index funds in particular, suggests that they could create value by 
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focusing principally on deterrence objectives. Mutual funds should bring share-
holder suits against portfolio companies when doing so would meaningfully en-
hance deterrence. They should also scrutinize the litigation brought by other share-
holders, objecting to outcomes that fail to promote meaningful deterrence. At the 
same time, mutual funds should focus on compensatory goals in litigation against 
nonportfolio defendants because extraportfolio claims do not raise circularity con-
cerns. In addition, mutual funds should consider whether litigation can be used to 
implement corporate governance reforms. Finally, in all cases, mutual funds should 
closely monitor litigation agency costs. We close by suggesting ways in which the 
incentives of mutual funds might be restructured to bring about these changes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate law creates three basic levers for investors to use 
in influencing the governance of the companies they own. They 
can vote.1 They can sell. And they can sue.2 Each of these remedies 
serves to align the interests of managers and investors. Because 
managers would prefer not to be replaced by a new slate of direc-
tors, not to suffer a share price decline from widespread investor 
selling, not to have the company sold to a hostile bidder, and not 
to be sued, they are more likely to work to maximize investor wel-
fare. That, at least, is the theory. 
Reality, however, is considerably more complex. In US public 
markets, the vast majority of company shares are held by institu-
tional intermediaries on behalf of investors. Mutual funds are 
among the most common institutional owners, holding about one-
third of the total US stock market.3 In particular, the “Big Three” 
fund families—BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard—own sig-
nificant blocks in virtually all publicly traded companies.4 This 
 
 1 Engagement is arguably a fourth pillar of governance, but we view this as a com-
ponent of voting because the effectiveness of the engagement is largely driven by the 
threat of voting against management. 
 2 William T. Allen and Reinier Kraakman, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of 
Business Organization 201–02 (Aspen 5th ed 2016). 
 3 2018 Investment Company Fact Book *40 fig 2.6 (Investment Company Institute, 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/UV9S-6C6B (providing data showing US mutual funds 
and other investment companies held 31 percent of all US corporate equities in 2017). 
 4 See Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk, and Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power 
of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New 
Financial Risk, 19 Bus & Polit 298, 313–14 (2017) (finding that the Big Three own the largest 
stakes in at least 40 percent of all US-listed companies and in approximately 88 percent of 
the S&P 500). See also Sarah Krouse, David Benoit, and Tom McGinty, Meet the New Cor-
porate Power Brokers: Passive Investors (Wall St J, Oct 24, 2016), online at https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-corporate-power-brokers-passive-investors-1477320101 
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gives them considerable authority over the governance of the com-
panies in which they invest.5 Yet many of these funds track the 
performance of an index, such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 
2000,6 rather than actively trading into and out of companies on 
the basis of their performance.7 As a result, these funds do not 
have the same set of governance tools. Because they are effec-
tively forced into the role of long-term holders of securities, they 
can access only two levers of corporate governance. They can vote, 
and they can sue. 
After a long period of inactivity in corporate governance, 
large mutual funds have begun to establish “stewardship” groups 
to guide their governance activities.8 The Big Three are especially 
vocal in promoting their stewardship practices. BlackRock, for ex-
ample, advertises that they “take corporate governance very seri-
ously.”9 State Street explains that its stewardship program “is de-
signed to have an impact” and that the fund family “actively 
 
(visited Apr 9, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). Some commentators have suggested 
that the term ought to be the “Big Four,” reflecting the growth of Fidelity, or the “Giant 
Three.” See, for example, Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 
99 BU L Rev 721, 741 (2019); Leo E. Strine Jr, Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Insti-
tutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Cor-
porate Political Spending, 97 Wash U L Rev *10–12 (forthcoming 2020), archived at 
https://perma.cc/SX7Y-JL7U. We will continue to use the “Big Three” terminology to refer 
to the largest mutual fund blockholders. 
 5 See Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let 
Shareholders Be Shareholders *32 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Law Work-
ing Paper No 467/2019, July 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/57YU-4Z9H (“Index funds 
and indexed ETFs managed by the ‘Big Three’ . . . have grown to be the largest investors 
in the capital markets and have become the presumptive ‘deciders’ of corporate law  
controversies.”). 
 6 In 2019, the amount of assets invested in passive funds surpassed that of active 
funds for the first time. See Dawn Lim, Index Funds Are the New Kings of Wall Street 
(Wall St J, Sept 18, 2019), online at https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the 
-new-kings-of-wall-street-11568799004 (visited May 8, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
For brevity, we will refer to exchange-traded funds (ETFs), index funds, and other pas-
sively managed mutual funds that seek to track the performance of an index as “index 
funds.” 
 7 On institutional investors’ preference for exit (selling) over voice (voting), see John 
C. Coffee Jr, Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 
Colum L Rev 1277, 1317–28 (1991) (arguing that in the absence of a controlling stake 
institutional investors prefer liquidity to control and therefore fail to monitor). 
 8 See Hortense Bioy, et al, Passive Fund Providers Take an Active Approach to In-
vestment Stewardship *15–20 (Morningstar, Dec 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/Q897-
9VMV (discussing research on how index managers carry out their investment steward-
ship responsibilities). 
 9 Madison Marriage, Passive Houses Insist They Do Care About Governance (Fin 
Times, Feb 5, 2017), online at https://www.ft.com/content/bd77d9b8-dd9f-11e6-86ac 
-f253db7791c6 (visited Feb 24, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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engage[s] with [ ] portfolio companies to promote [the] long-term 
value of [their] clients’ investments.”10 And Vanguard insists that 
it cares “deeply” about governance and is “good at it.”11 However, 
the exclusive focus of stewardship groups has been on voting.12 
Mutual funds tout the number of votes in which they have partic-
ipated and, increasingly, highlight their willingness to oppose 
management.13 A lively academic debate has arisen in response 
to these claims, with scholars also predominantly focused on vot-
ing.14 The potential for mutual funds to exert a governance role 
through litigation has been largely overlooked.15 
 
 10 Asset Stewardship (State Street Global Advisors), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
3ZKQ-N36K. 
 11 Bill McNabb, The Ultimate Long-Term Investors (Vanguard, July 6, 2017),  
archived at https://perma.cc/CH6X-3SMD. 
 12 Again, we are including “engagement”—that is, formal or informal communica-
tions between corporate managers and mutual fund investors—as a species of voting be-
cause the ability of mutual funds to be heard in these conversations ultimately depends 
upon their voting power. 
 13 See, for example, Investment Stewardship Report: 2018 Voting and Engagement 
Report *4–5 (BlackRock, Aug 31, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/59MW-9LFT (noting 
votes at over 17,000 shareholder meetings on over 158,000 proposals from July 1, 2017 to 
June 30, 2018); 2018 Investment Stewardship Annual Report *8 (Vanguard, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/FZJ8-2AKX (noting votes at over 19,000 meetings on over 168,000 pro-
posals during proxy year 2018). 
 14 See, for example, Lucian A. Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future 
of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Colum L Rev 2029, 2043–75 
(2019) (arguing that agency costs at mutual funds inhibit engaged stewardship); Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 
31 J Econ Persp 89, 95–104 (2017) (applying the agency cost problem to mutual fund in-
termediaries); Luca Enriques and Alessandro Romano, Institutional Investor Voting Be-
havior: A Network Theory Perspective, 2019 U Ill L Rev 223, 266–67 (arguing that network 
effects may lead to engaged stewardship); Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani, and Steven  
Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive 
Investors, 168 U Pa L Rev 17, 27–43 (2020) (arguing that competition between index and 
active funds for new investment creates an incentive for index funds to improve corporate 
governance); Sean J. Griffith and Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in 
Corporate Law, 99 BU L Rev 1151, 1172–86 (2019) (articulating a set of standard conflicts 
that may inhibit mutual funds from acting as loyal stewards); Sean J. Griffith, Opt-in 
Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation on Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 98 Tex L 
Rev *34–53 (forthcoming 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/5EA4-HT58 (arguing that 
mutual funds have incentives and information to vote intelligently in contests but not in 
other corporate governance settings); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Share-
holder Voting, 43 J Corp L 493, 506–20 (2018) (arguing that index and passive funds lack 
the incentive to vote intelligently); Rock and Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Govern-
ance at *36 (cited in note 5) (arguing that spillover effects allow index funds to act as 
engaged stewards). 
 15 An exception is Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, who observed that 
mutual funds tend not to serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions. See Bebchuk 
and Hirst, 119 Colum L Rev at 2114 (cited in note 14). We confirm this observation 
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In this Article, we focus on the third lever of corporate gov-
ernance—shareholder litigation—as a tool through which mutual 
funds might improve the performance of portfolio companies. 
Shareholder litigation has long served an important role in polic-
ing managerial misconduct.16 Unfortunately, shareholder suits 
also have a dark side. Because most shareholder litigation is rep-
resentative in nature, the lawyers controlling the litigation often 
use it to serve their own interests rather than those of the share-
holder beneficiaries, leading to the failure of shareholder suits to 
produce meaningful benefits. 
As “market investors”—holders of broadly diversified portfo-
lios—mutual funds are in an ideal position to use litigation to pro-
duce benefits for shareholders and to prevent lawyers from divert-
ing and destroying those benefits. Indeed, litigation may serve 
stewardship goals more effectively than voting. First, litigation 
can produce a direct monetary benefit to shareholders. Voting, by 
contrast, produces only indirect monetary benefits, as when an 
activist or an acquirer submits a proposal or a bid that has the 
effect of increasing shareholder value. Second, shareholder litiga-
tion can immediately target and thereby deter specific bad acts of 
management. Voting deters mismanagement more bluntly, and 
misconduct that does not lead to an activist intervention may be 
undeterred by voting alone. Third, unlike shareholder proposals 
that result, at best, in a nonbinding commitment to consider form-
ing a committee to study an issue of concern, shareholder suits 
can produce governance reforms that come with the force of a 
 
empirically. See Part II. Likewise, Professor David Webber has described how broadly di-
versified investors can benefit from using litigation as a form of shareholder activism. See 
David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment 
of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38 Del J 
Corp L 907, 932, 946 (2014). A third exception is Alexander Platt, who has studied the Big 
Three’s “enforcement” efforts, including litigation, and argues that there is an “enforce-
ment shortfall” that could be corrected with regulatory changes, including mandatory dis-
closure of litigation activity. See Alexander I. Platt, Index Fund Enforcement, 53 UC Davis 
L Rev 1453, 1460 (2020). 
 16 See James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder 
Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Secu-
rities Law, 6 Eur Co & Fin L Rev 164, 198–201 (2009) (finding that shareholder litigation 
may lead to strengthened corporate governance structures and may incentivize reduced 
executive compensation); C.N.V. Krishnan, et al, Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 18 J Corp Fin 1248, 1264 (2012) (finding that shareholder litigation “polices 
low-ball bids” and improves offer prices); Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas, The 
New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 Vand L Rev 
133, 142–43 (2004) (noting that derivative litigation has helped check and prevent mana-
gerial abuses). 
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court order. If the company does not implement the reforms as 
promised, it is in violation of the terms of its settlement, which 
shareholders can then enforce judicially. Voting, in other words, 
is no substitute for litigation. Voting and litigation should instead 
be viewed as complementary corporate governance mechanisms, 
with litigation in many ways the stronger of the two. 
We examine mutual fund participation in shareholder suits 
both theoretically and empirically. Our analysis begins by review-
ing the theoretical grounding of each of the major forms of share-
holder suits: (1) derivative suits, (2) state law direct and class 
claims, (3) appraisal actions, and (4) private securities litigation. 
Mutual funds are empowered to bring each of these suits on be-
half of their investors. Although some large institutional clients 
may not delegate the right to litigate on their behalf, most mutual 
fund investors, including all individual investors, allocate full 
ownership rights to the fund by default. This means that mutual 
funds always have the right to sue on behalf of at least some of 
their investors. Moreover, because mutual funds own more or less 
the entire market, they could bring litigation in virtually every 
instance of corporate or managerial misconduct. 
Next, we examine the actual conduct of mutual funds in 
shareholder litigation. To do so, we collected data on mutual fund 
participation in each of the forms of shareholder litigation noted 
above over a ten-year period. We found that the ten largest mu-
tual funds, including each of most vocal funds on corporate gov-
ernance, very rarely participate in shareholder litigation. Collec-
tively, these funds were involved in the filing of just eleven 
traditional shareholder suits over our sample period. However, 
these were often the same claims: the eleven suits involved only 
six different instances of managerial misconduct. All but one of 
these complaints alleged violations of the federal securities laws; 
we found a single appraisal suit and no instances of state law 
class or derivative litigation. The securities claims were typically 
not brought as class actions, but rather as individual actions sep-
arate from any class claims brought against the same corporate 
defendant. Moreover, none of our mutual funds served as lead 
plaintiff even a single time over our sample period. 
These results are striking standing alone, but for additional 
perspective, we gather evidence on the litigation activity of prom-
inent pension funds, hedge funds, and individual shareholder 
plaintiffs. Our evidence indicates that these other plaintiffs liti-
gate frequently. Although we do not claim to know the optimal 
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amount of litigation, the quantitative and qualitative differences 
between the litigation pursued by mutual funds and that of other 
institutional investors raises serious questions about the ability 
and incentives of mutual funds to act as faithful governance in-
termediaries for their investors. 
This is a serious issue. Nearly half of US households invest 
in mutual funds.17 In doing so, they entrust their governance 
rights to intermediaries. It is critically important that these in-
termediaries act to further investor interests when they make lit-
igation decisions. What our evidence suggests is that mutual 
funds are not discharging this obligation. Indeed, they may not be 
thinking about it at all. 
We survey a variety of possible explanations for mutual 
funds’ failure to participate more aggressively in shareholder lit-
igation. None is particularly compelling. The failure cannot be ex-
plained by substantive legal barriers or structural obstacles, both 
of which are limited and manageable. Nor can the failure be fully 
explained by the “circularity” problem that arises when share-
holders are on “both sides of the v,” as both plaintiff and defend-
ant.18 Although mutual funds own the market and are therefore 
likely to be on both sides in many suits, they may still benefit from 
systemic deterrence and governance benefits won through share-
holder suits. Moreover, not all shareholder recoveries are funded 
by defendant corporations also owned by shareholder plaintiffs. 
Agency costs and conflicts of interest present serious obsta-
cles. Mutual funds likely do not want to offend the corporations 
that funnel them 401(k) and other advisory business by filing law-
suits against them. Furthermore, because the benefits of share-
holder litigation must often be shared with a class that includes 
their competitors, mutual funds may see little advantage in liti-
gating.19 However, these incentives do not apply to all forms of 
shareholder litigation. Corporate defendants in their last period, 
facing bankruptcy or acquisition, are not a likely source of future 
 
 17 2018 Investment Company Fact Book at *142 fig 7.1 (cited in note 3) (showing that 
44.5 percent of US households owned mutual funds in 2017). 
 18 See text accompanying notes 109–14. 
 19 These incentive problems have most often been discussed by others in the context 
of shareholder voting. See, for example, Bebchuk and Hirst, 119 Colum L Rev at 2060–62 
(cited in note 14); Lund, 43 J Corp L at 506–23 (cited in note 14). Like us, Webber has 
raised the specter of agency costs in the context of litigation. In his study of shareholder 
derivative suits and class actions filed in Delaware between 2003 and 2009, he found that 
mutual funds served as lead plaintiffs only seven times and posits that agency costs may 
explain this low number. See Webber, 38 Del J Corp L at 940–43 (cited in note 15). 
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advisory business. Moreover, not all shareholder suits lead to pro 
rata recoveries. Mutual funds are typically large enough block-
holders to litigate on their own. 
It may be that the failure to litigate reveals mutual funds’ 
motivations in stewardship generally. Stewardship ought to in-
volve litigation as well as voting, yet mutual funds pursue stew-
ardship through voting only, perhaps because mutual fund voting 
is a subject of regulatory attention while litigation is not.20 But 
this suggests something about voting, too. Take away the regula-
tory impetus and mutual funds might neither litigate nor vote. 
Mutual fund representatives deny this. In both public state-
ments and private conversations, they maintain that governance 
is deeply important to them. Perhaps, then, the problem is not 
one of incentives, but of awareness or expertise. We therefore of-
fer an account of how mutual funds could benefit their investors 
using “stewardship litigation.” Focusing on the long-term per-
spective of the market investor, we argue that mutual funds 
ought to pursue extraportfolio litigation for compensation and in-
traportfolio claims for deterrence. They also ought to consider 
whether litigation can be used to implement corporate govern-
ance reforms. At the same time, recognizing that litigation often 
creates more costs than benefits, we argue that mutual funds can 
add value by exerting an oversight role over shareholder litiga-
tion across the portfolio and intervening to minimize litigation 
agency costs. These proposals form the core of our “mission state-
ment” for mutual funds in shareholder litigation. 
Our mission statement would be simple and relatively inex-
pensive for mutual funds to implement. The main difference is 
one of perspective. Engagement with shareholder litigation, 
whether in a participatory or an oversight role, is an important 
component of stewardship and ought to be viewed as such. Insofar 
as there are agency cost barriers in the way, we suggest ways in 
which pressure from investors or regulators may overcome these 
obstacles. 
 
 20 Of course, the fact that mutual funds vote their shares does not necessarily mean 
that they vote them well, and recent scrutiny of their voting practices has led to some 
embarrassing revelations. See, for example, Asjylyn Loder, Funds Don’t Always Vote for 
Policies They Publicly Back (Wall St J, Apr 2, 2019), online at https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/funds-dont-always-vote-for-policies-they-publicly-back-11554206401 (visited Apr 
18, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). Not only that, mutual funds often fail to support 
their public positions by bringing shareholder proposals themselves. Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Hirst, 31 J Econ Persp at 101 (cited in note 14). 
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From this Introduction, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I 
reviews the basic theory underlying shareholder litigation though 
an examination of prototypical shareholder suits. Part II contains 
our empirical study of mutual fund participation in shareholder 
litigation. As a point of comparison, it looks at the litigation rec-
ord of other institutional investors—pension funds and hedge 
funds—as well as individual shareholder plaintiffs. Part III con-
siders various potential explanations for our findings. Part IV 
provides our normative analysis of how mutual funds should con-
ceive of their role in shareholder litigation and tackles the ques-
tion of implementation. 
I.  SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
Before we can assign a role to mutual funds in shareholder 
litigation, we must first develop an understanding of what share-
holder litigation is for. As noted above, litigation is one of the tra-
ditional levers of corporate governance. But what can sharehold-
ers expect to accomplish by suing the companies they own? And 
what are typical outcomes of shareholder suits? The answers to 
these questions will guide the analysis of whether and when mu-
tual funds should instigate litigation on behalf of their investors. 
But answering them requires an account of shareholder litigation 
generally. This Part offers that account, first reviewing main-
stream theories of shareholder litigation, then evaluating para-
digmatic forms of shareholder suits in practice. 
A. Shareholder Litigation in Theory 
Shareholder suits do not exist in isolation. Rather, they  
are part of the broader ecosystem of corporate law as a whole,  
in which agency costs are a fundamental concern.21 By severing 
ownership and control, the corporate form creates incentives  
for manager-agents to defect from the interests of their 
 
 21 See Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 
J Fin 737, 738 (1997) (describing the core corporate governance problem as “how investors 
get the managers to give them back their money”). See also Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton, 
and Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 Colum 
L Rev 1803, 1809 (2008) (“The key focus of U.S. corporate law and corporate governance 
systems is what is referred to as an agency problem: an organizational concern that arises 
when the owners—in a corporation, the shareholders—are not the managers who are in 
control.”). 
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shareholder-principals.22 These defections range from mild (shirk-
ing) to severe (theft).23 Corporate governance mechanisms are de-
signed to contain agency costs.24 Intracorporate litigation—that 
is, investors’ suits to enforce their rights as such—can thus be 
understood as a basic tool for shareholders to use in seeking to 
minimize managerial agency costs.25 
Shareholder litigation targets agency costs in three ways.26 
First, the prospect of shareholder claims may deter managerial 
misconduct. According to the deterrence rationale, the risk of per-
sonal liability for misconduct may incentivize managers to adhere 
to shareholders’ best interests. Even if they are not personally li-
able, managers may suffer personal consequences from corporate 
liability—for example, reduced compensation or diminished ca-
reer prospects—that may also effectively deter misconduct. Sec-
ond, successful shareholder suits may compensate investors for 
losses resulting from managerial agency costs. The compensation 
rationale for shareholder litigation suggests that such suits are 
necessary to make investors whole from severe managerial mis-
conduct, such as theft or fraud.27 Third and finally, shareholder 
suits may result in specific governance reforms designed to re-
duce agency costs going forward.28 Shareholder suits may result 
in the judicial invalidation of a particular governance provision, 
 
 22 See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 327–28 (1976). 
 23 Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, 
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U Pa L Rev 1619, 1662 (2001). 
 24 See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Mar-
kets, Relational Contracting 305 (Free Press 1985) (explaining that a board of directors 
elected by shareholders is “a governance structure that holders of equity recognize as a 
safeguard against expropriation and egregious mismanagement”). 
 25 See In re Riverbed Technology, Inc Stockholders Litigation, 2015 WL 5458041, *1 
(Del Chanc): 
As a bench judge in a court of equity, much of what I do involves problems of . . . 
agency: insuring that those acting for the benefit of others perform with fidelity, 
rather than doing what comes naturally to men and women—pursuing their own 
interests, sometimes in ways that conflict with the interests of their principals. 
The other two basic tools available to shareholders, as already noted, are the voting and 
selling of shares. See note 2 and accompanying text. 
 26 See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical  
Analysis, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev 1749, 1807 (2010). 
 27 See Amanda Marie Rose, The Shifting Raison d’Être of the Rule 10b-5 Private 
Right of Action, in Sean Griffith, et al, eds, Research Handbook on Representative Share-
holder Litigation 39, 48 (Edward Elgar 2018) (“[T]he essence of corrective justice theory is 
that a wrongdoer is made to make whole their victim.”). 
 28 See, for example, Erickson, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1816–25 (cited in note 26). 
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such as a poison pill,29 or they may result in settlements in which 
the company adopts specific governance reforms aimed at better 
aligning the incentives of shareholders and managers. We will re-
fer to this objective, sometimes described as “corporate therapeu-
tics,” as the “governance rationale” for shareholder litigation.30 
Most shareholder suits are brought in a representative capac-
ity in which a single shareholder or group of shareholders asserts 
a claim on behalf of a larger class, often all shareholders as such.31 
This is not because individual shareholders cannot bring their 
own claims. Often they can.32 It is simply that individual actions 
are often inefficient. The costs of litigating an individual claim 
may exceed the value of the shareholder’s proportional share of 
the recovery. If all shareholders are economically disinclined to 
sue, there may be less litigation than all shareholders, on the 
whole, would prefer. The representative action thus solves a col-
lective action problem in order to preserve litigation as a con-
straint on managerial agency costs. 
But representative actions come with costs of their own. Rep-
resentative shareholder suits, like other forms of representative 
actions, are typically controlled by a contingency-fee lawyer serv-
ing a quasi-regulatory role with a purely nominal client.33 Such 
suits invert the ordinary lawyer-client relationship, with lawyers 
 
 29 See, for example, Moran v Household International, Inc, 500 A2d 1346, 1348–49 
(Del 1985) (shareholder suit challenging adoption of poison pill); Unocal Corp v Mesa Pe-
troleum Co, 493 A2d 946, 958 (Del 1985) (shareholder suit challenging the application of 
takeover defenses and setting the standard for such challenges going forward); Revlon, Inc 
v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, 506 A2d 173, 175 (Del 1986) (shareholder suit 
challenging the use of takeover defenses in the context of an acquisition). More recently, 
shareholder suits have challenged the application of defensive tactics to activist interven-
tions. See, for example, Kallick v Sandridge Energy, Inc, 68 A3d 242, 261 (Del Chanc 2013) 
(scrutinizing defensive tactics in the context of an activist’s proxy challenge); Oral Argu-
ment on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and Rulings of the Court, Pontiac General Em-
ployees Retirement System v Ballantine, No 9789-VCL (Del Chanc filed Oct 14, 2014) 
(available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 6388645) (finding a potential breach of fiduciary duty 
in a board’s use of a debt covenant as a defense against activism). 
 30 See George D. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The “Salvage” Factor in Counsel Fee 
Awards, 69 Harv L Rev 658, 662–63 (1956) (coining the idea of a “therapeutic” settlement). 
 31 See generally Griffith, et al, eds, Research Handbook on Representative Share-
holder Litigation (cited in note 27) (compiling recent scholarship on representative share-
holder litigation). 
 32 See Part I.B (discussing class fiduciary claims and private securities claims). 
 33 See John C. Coffee Jr, Entrepreneurial Litigation: Its Rise, Fall, and Future 2 
(Harvard 2015) (“[T]he private [class action] attorney is taking on a public role and acting 
as a quasi-public servant. . . . [T]his attorney is a private actor, wielding a degree of public 
power, but motivated by powerful economic incentives, and yet subject to only limited  
accountability.”). 
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hiring clients, rather than clients hiring lawyers.34 Lawyers ad-
vertise for clients on investor websites35 or cultivate client rela-
tionships with institutional investors, often pension funds.36 Hav-
ing found a client, the lawyers are in control.37 Individual 
investors are rationally indifferent to the conduct of the claim,38 
and institutional investor plaintiffs appear to be similarly disen-
gaged.39 These circumstances are ripe for the now-familiar phe-
nomenon of “litigation agency costs,” in which the attorney’s  
personal incentives depart from those of their supposed clients, 
leading to claims that shareholders would prefer not to press  
and resolutions that benefit attorneys at the expense of the  
shareholders.40 
Mutual fund plaintiffs need not sue in a representative ca-
pacity. Mutual funds are the largest shareholders of most public 
companies and may prefer, as a result, to litigate in an individual 
rather than representative capacity.41 Even so, mutual funds 
 
 34 See id at 1 (“[I]n group litigation in the United States, the lawyer often appears to 
be hiring the client, rather than the client hiring the lawyer.”). 
 35 See Sean J. Griffith, Innovation in Disclosure-Based Shareholder Suits, 69 Case 
W Res L Rev 927, 929 (2019). 
 36 See Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and  
Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U Pa L Rev 755, 770 (2009) (noting 
that “[l]arge plaintiffs’ law firms continuously monitor the portfolios of institutional inves-
tors, seeking to keep them apprised of potential claims”). 
 37 See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 1–2 (cited in note 33) (noting the “laws 
and practices that give attorneys in the United States a unique level of control over their 
clients in group litigation”). 
 38 Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law 389–94 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1986) (discuss-
ing a phenomenon where each shareholder’s stake in the corporation is too small to justify 
the cost in terms of time and attention of actively engaging in corporate affairs). 
 39 Institutional plaintiffs were once proffered as a solution to this problem. See Elliot 
J. Weiss and John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional 
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L J 2053, 2121–
23 (1995) (discussing the promise of institutional lead plaintiffs). But this solution seems 
to have failed. See Part III. 
 40 See John C. Coffee Jr, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in 
Shareholder Litigation, 48 L & Contemp Probs 5, 23 (1985) (identifying the problem); 
Thompson and Thomas, 57 Vand L Rev at 135 (cited in note 16) (arguing that “just as with 
derivative suits and securities fraud class actions, good policy must balance the positive 
managerial agency cost reducing effects of these acquisition-oriented shareholder  
suits against their litigation agency costs”). See also Randall S. Thomas and Robert B. 
Thompson, Empirical Studies of Representative Litigation, in Claire A. Hill and Brett H. 
McDonnell, eds, Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law 152, 154–57  
(Edward Elgar 2012) (summarizing recent empirical work on the scope of the problem of 
litigation agency costs). 
 41 See Fichtner, Heemskerk, and Garcia-Bernardo, 19 Bus & Polit at 313–14 (cited 
in note 4). 
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remain subject to litigation agency costs. Because litigation is 
costly, in the form of both the direct costs of attorneys’ fees and 
the indirect costs of the time and attention necessary to evaluate 
and oversee the litigation effort, prospective mutual fund plain-
tiffs may prefer to leave it to others, free-riding on the class-wide 
benefits they achieve. Litigation agency costs are a relevant con-
sideration any time mutual funds leave claims to others. Moreo-
ver, as market investors, mutual funds are affected by every rep-
resentative shareholder suit, whether or not they bring their own 
claims. Litigation agency costs therefore affect mutual funds 
much as they do other investors. 
Litigation agency costs limit the ability of shareholders to use 
litigation to mitigate managerial agency costs. The question thus 
becomes how effectively shareholder suits mitigate managerial 
agency costs—achieving deterrence, compensation, or governance 
enhancements—in the face of litigation agency costs. We now 
turn to the various forms of shareholders suits with these ques-
tions in mind. 
B. Shareholder Litigation in Practice 
Shareholder litigation comes in various forms, each with the 
potential to mitigate managerial agency costs, and each with the 
potential to generate litigation agency costs. This Section reviews 
four basic forms of shareholder suits. The first two, derivative and 
direct suits, are different procedural means of enforcing state law 
fiduciary duties and, as such, are closely focused on mitigating 
managerial agency costs.42 The third, appraisal, is a narrowly cir-
cumscribed right under state law invoked solely to increase the 
price paid in mergers and acquisitions transactions. The fourth, 
private securities litigation, is a creature of federal rather than 
state law and is aimed broadly at assuring that transactions in 
corporate shares are not affected by fraud or misinformation. Our 
 
 42 Fiduciary duty is essentially connected to agency cost minimization. According to 
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel: 
The fiduciary principle is an alternative to elaborate promises and extra moni-
toring. It replaces prior supervision with deterrence, much as criminal law uses 
penalties for bank robbery rather than pat-down searches of everyone entering 
banks. . . . Such rules preserve the gains resulting from the separation of man-
agement from risk bearing while limiting the ability of managers to give priority 
to their own interests over those of investors. 
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
92 (Harvard 1991). 
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aim is to develop an understanding of the commonalities as well 
as the differences between these paradigmatic forms of claims, 
specifically as to how they affect the ability of shareholders to po-
lice managerial agency costs though litigation. 
1. Derivative suits. 
The derivative suit is the oldest form of representative litiga-
tion in the corporate law context.43 In a derivative suit, an indi-
vidual shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation to seek re-
dress for some harm done to the corporation itself.44 The 
shareholder alleges that the board is compelled by fiduciary duty 
to seek redress for the harm, often caused by a form of managerial 
misfeasance or malfeasance.45 Because the derivative suit is filed 
on behalf of the corporation, there are several opportunities for 
the corporation to regain control of the claim.46 Provided the 
 
 43 Some commentators have suggested that, in addition to being old, it is obsolete. 
See Geoffrey Parsons Miller, The Law of Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance 
471 (Wolters Kluwer 2d ed 2017) (referring to the derivative suit as a “platypus of the 
law”). Nevertheless, derivative suits are still regularly filed. See Erickson, 51 Wm & Mary 
L Rev at 1760–1807 (cited in note 26) (studying characteristics of 141 derivative suits filed 
on behalf of public companies in the mid-2000s). 
 44 The defining feature of the derivative suit is that the underlying harm has been 
done to the corporation, not the shareholder directly, and therefore it is the corporation 
that would receive any recovery. See Tooley v Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc, 845 A2d 
1031, 1033 (Del 2004) (stating that the standard “must turn solely on the following ques-
tions: (1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, indi-
vidually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the cor-
poration or the stockholders, individually)?”). The shareholder suit is, in the first instance, 
a request that the corporation seek redress itself. See Aronson v Lewis, 473 A2d 805, 811 
(Del 1984) (“The nature of the action is two-fold. First, it is the equivalent of a suit by the 
shareholders to compel the corporation to sue. Second, it is a suit by the corporation, as-
serted by the shareholders on its behalf, against those liable to it.”). 
 45 Kamen v Kemper Financial Services, Inc, 500 US 90, 95 (1991) (“[T]he purpose of 
the derivative action [is] to place in the hands of the individual shareholder a means to 
protect the interests of the corporation from the misfeasance and malfeasance of ‘faithless 
directors and managers.’”), quoting Cohen v Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp, 337 US 541, 
548 (1949). See also Taormina v Taormina Corp, 78 A2d 473, 475 (Del Chanc 1951): 
[W]henever a corporation possesses a cause of action which it [ ] refuses to assert 
. . . equity will permit a stockholder to sue in his own name for the benefit of the 
corporation solely for the purpose of preventing injustice when it is apparent 
that the corporation’s rights would not be protected otherwise. 
 46 These include, for example, the demand requirement and the formation of special 
litigation committees. Del Chanc Rule 23.1(a) (requiring that the plaintiff “allege with 
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff 
desires from the directors . . . and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action 
or for not making the effort”). See also Minor Myers, The Decisions of Corporate Special 
Litigation Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 Ind L J 1309, 1317–20 & tbl 1 
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corporation does not retake control, however, the shareholder 
may press the claim on behalf of the corporation to a resolution, 
in which case any monetary recovery is paid into the corporation, 
not directly to the shareholder.47 
Empirical studies of derivative suits have consistently found 
that monetary recoveries in derivative suits are rare.48 But rare 
does not mean never, and meaningful financial recoveries do oc-
cur—including, for example, a $139 million settlement in 2013 
involving News Corp, a $275 million settlement in 2014 involving 
Activision Blizzard, and a $137.5 million settlement in 2015 in-
volving Freeport-McMoRan.49 Payments made by individual di-
rectors and officers to resolve derivative suits upon a finding of 
personal responsibility cannot be indemnified by the corpora-
tion.50 They can, however, be insured and are typically covered 
under the corporation’s Directors and Officers (D&O) policy.51 In-
sured recoveries will not have a direct deterrent effect on mana-
gerial misconduct.52 
 
(2009) (studying the operation of special litigation committees between 1993 and 2006 and 
finding that committees pursue claims 10 percent of the time, settle 30 percent of the time, 
and seek dismissal 60 percent of the time). 
 47 Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Lit-
igation, 84 Notre Dame L Rev 75, 81 (2008) (“In a derivative suit, the corporation is the 
functional plaintiff—the real party in interest. . . . Any recovery in a derivative suit is 
returned to the corporation. As a result, shareholders . . . do not receive any direct finan-
cial benefit.”) (citations omitted). 
 48 See, for example, Franklin S. Wood, Survey and Report Regarding Stockholders’ 
Derivative Suits 1, 6–7 (NY Chamber of Commerce 1944) (finding that typical settlements 
in derivative suits between 1932 and 1942 amounted to less than 3 percent of damages 
alleged in the underlying complaint); Erickson, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1799 (cited in 
note 26) (finding that 13 of 141 public company derivative suits sampled from the mid-
2000s resulted in a monetary payment); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litiga-
tion Without Foundation?, 7 J L Econ & Org 55, 58, 61 n 12 (1991) (finding that 21 percent 
of derivative suits in a sample period from the late 1960s through 1987 ended in monetary 
recovery). 
 49 See Jessica Erickson, The (Un)changing Derivative Suit, in Griffith, et al, eds, Re-
search Handbook on Representative Shareholder Litigation 58, 65 (cited in note 27); Daniel 
Fischer, News Corp. Pays Itself $139 Million for Phone-Hacking Scandal—Minus Legal 
Fees (Forbes, Apr 22, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/DP4E-UKEH. 
 50 See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 145(a)–(b). 
 51 See 8 Del Code Ann § 145(g). See also Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, Ensuring 
Corporate Misconduct: How Liability Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation 46–
47 (Chicago 2010) (noting that although corporate payments made in connection with de-
rivative suits may generally not be indemnified, they are typically covered under “Side A” 
of a D&O insurance policy). 
 52 See Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins, and Michael Klausner, Outside Director 
Liability: A Policy Analysis, 162 J Inst & Theoretical Econ 5, 11–12, 16–17 (2006). 
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Governance reforms are a much more likely outcome of deriv-
ative litigation than monetary relief. Empirical studies suggest 
that derivative suits are more than two times more likely to settle 
for nonpecuniary relief than they are to settle for money.53 These 
reforms are qualitative and therefore difficult to assess empiri-
cally, but the authors of the leading studies have expressed skep-
ticism, noting that such reforms are typically “inconsequential” or 
“cosmetic,”54 frequently amounting to the rote application of a 
common set of governance reforms—such as increased board in-
dependence or attendance requirements at board meetings—of-
ten without any clear connection to the alleged problems that led 
to the litigation.55 This is not a uniform conclusion, however. In  
a study of derivative suits filed in the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery in 1999 and 2000, Professors Robert Thomas and Randall 
Thompson found that although the claims often resulted in non-
monetary relief, the settlements nevertheless returned “very real 
gains” to the shareholders.56 As a recent example, consider the 
derivative litigation filed against Twenty-First Century Fox in 
the wake of the decades-long patterns of sexual misconduct in-
volving former CEO Roger Ailes as well as news anchor Bill 
O’Reilly. Rather than contesting the plaintiffs’ claims, Twenty-
First Century Fox promptly entered into a settlement in which it 
agreed to dedicate $90 million to improving corporate governance 
at the company and also establish a “Workplace Professionalism 
and Inclusion Council” tasked with strengthening sexual harass-
ment reporting and training, and helping to recruit and promote 
the advancement of women and minorities at the company.57 The 
derivative suit also proved uniquely well-suited to addressing the 
problem of stock-option backdating in the mid-2000s, when 
 
 53 See Erickson, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1798–99 (cited in note 26) (finding that 17 
of 141 suits studied settled for nonpecuniary relief); Romano, 7 J L Econ & Org at 60–61 
n 10 (cited in note 48) (finding nonpecuniary relief two times more often than monetary 
relief in settlements of executive compensation and self-dealing suits). 
 54 Romano, 7 J L Econ & Org at 63 (cited in note 48). 
 55 See Erickson, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1808 (cited in note 26). 
 56 See Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of 
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 Vand L Rev 1747, 1778–79 (2004). 
 57 See Daniel Hemel and Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 
118 Colum L Rev 1583, 1622 (2018), citing Exhibit A to Stipulation & Agreement of Set-
tlement, Compromise, & Release, City of Monroe Employees’ Retirement System v  
Murdoch, No 2017-0833-AGB, *3, 10–11 (Del Chanc filed Nov 20, 2017); Emily Steel, Fox 
Establishes Workplace Culture Panel After Harassment Scandal (NY Times, Nov 20, 
2017), archived at https://perma.cc/2R45-GVMX. 
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companies manipulated the date of the option grant to their exec-
utives in order to increase their value.58 The derivative suits that 
followed in the wake of this scandal frequently resulted in the re-
pricing of these options to benefit the corporation.59 
Nevertheless, in many cases the governance reforms and 
other benefits that seem to be won by derivative suit plaintiffs 
may in fact be won by prosecutors, regulators, or other claimants. 
This is because derivative suits are frequently brought in the 
wake of other actions, a phenomenon known as the “tag-along” 
derivative suit.60 For example, nearly half of all securities class 
actions filed between 2005 and 2008 were accompanied by a tag-
along derivative suit,61 and government investigations of corpo-
rate compliance failures are also frequently followed by derivative 
litigation.62 Why do derivative plaintiffs bother filing claims when 
a prosecutor, regulator, or class action claimant (sometimes all 
three) has already targeted the same underlying misconduct? It 
is not because their results are better. They are worse.63 It is more 
 
 58 See Ross D. Fuerman, Securities Class Actions Compared to Derivative Lawsuits: 
Evidence from the Stock Option Backdating Litigation on Their Relative Disciplining of 
Fraudster Executives, 8 J Forensic & Investigative Accounting 198, 204–07 (2016) (com-
paring the results of derivative suits to the results of class actions in responding to the 
option backdating crisis). 
 59 See Erickson, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1802–03 (cited in note 26) (finding that 
40 percent of stock option suits resulted in a financial benefit, compared to 2 percent of 
non–stock option suits). 
 60 See Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis, 
97 Iowa L Rev 49, 61 (2011) (finding that almost 95 percent of derivative suits sampled 
were accompanied by at least one parallel lawsuit or government investigation and that 
over 80 percent were accompanied by two or more parallel lawsuits or government inves-
tigations with a median of four different types of litigation arising out of the same under-
lying event). 
 61 See Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, and A.C. Pritchard, Piling On? An Empir-
ical Study of Parallel Derivative Suits, 14 J Empirical Legal Stud 653, 661 (2017). 
 62 See, for example, In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc Delaware Derivative Litigation, 2016 
WL 2908344, *5 (Del Chanc) (discussing derivative suit following in wake of a Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and investigation of Wal-Mart which has already resulted 
in substantial reform of Wal-Mart’s corporate compliance program); Ben W. Heineman Jr, 
Who’s Responsible for the Walmart Mexico Scandal? (Harvard Bus Rev, May 15, 2014), 
archived at https://perma.cc/R6ZF-SZ2L. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Col-
lateral Shareholder Litigation Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 
Ohio St L J 1217, 1228–39 (2012) (examining recent shareholder litigation based on com-
pany behavior that violates the FCPA). 
 63 Choi, Erickson, and Pritchard, 14 J Empirical Legal Stud at 673–76 (cited in note 
61) (finding that parallel suits are more likely to obtain lower monetary recoveries for their 
clients and are more likely to settle for nonpecuniary relief); Erickson, 97 Iowa L Rev at 
80 (cited in note 60); Erickson, The (Un)changing Derivative Suit at 63 (cited in note 49) 
(“[I]n the hierarchy of corporate lawsuits, shareholder derivative suits may well be at the 
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likely because the representative nature of the derivative suit en-
ables another attorney to extract a fee.64 
In sum, although they may provide compensatory relief to the 
corporation and thereby its shareholders for an agent’s misfea-
sance or malfeasance, derivative suits rarely result in monetary 
recoveries. Moreover, because they are insurable, when monetary 
recoveries do occur, they are unlikely to deter corporate manag-
ers. Derivative suits do often produce governance reforms, which 
may positively benefit the corporation. However, the indicia of lit-
igation agency costs are high, suggesting that the real goal of the 
governance reforms may be to justify the payment of attorneys’ 
fees. 
2. State law direct and class claims. 
Like derivative suits, state law direct claims invoke fiduciary 
duty to allege managerial malfeasance, but in the case of direct 
claims, the harm falls directly upon the shareholder and is not 
derivative of a primary injury to the corporation.65 Claims involv-
ing shareholder voting rights or acquisitions, in which shares will 
be cancelled or merged, are paradigmatically direct.66 Direct 
claims, especially those involving mergers and acquisitions, are 
frequently brought on a representative basis as class actions.67 
Also like derivative suits, shareholder class actions can 
achieve compensatory, deterrence, or governance objectives. Most 
merger claims plead a sufficient basis for both monetary and 
 
bottom.”); Westbrook, 73 Ohio St L J at 1229 (cited in note 62) (finding that “few [deriva-
tive] suits survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss”). 
 64 Even in the absence of a settlement, lawyers may be able to claim that their liti-
gation effort created a “corporate benefit” thereby entitling them to a fee paid by the cor-
poration. See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Liti-
gation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 BC L Rev 1, 22–25 (2015). See also Erickson, 
The (Un)changing Derivative Suit at 64 (cited in note 49) (“The empirical evidence sug-
gests that attorneys are often using derivative suits not to uncover new types of miscon-
duct or to advance new theories of liability, but rather to obtain a share of the attorneys’ 
fees.”). 
 65 See note 44 and accompanying text (distinguishing derivative and direct suits). 
 66 See Gatz v Ponsoldt, 925 A2d 1265, 1277 (Del 2007) (holding the shareholders’ 
claim to be direct “because the Recapitalization constituted an expropriation of voting 
power and economic value from [the company’s] public stockholders, and a transfer of that 
voting power and economic value to [the defendants]”). 
 67 See Thompson and Thomas, 57 Vand L Rev at 152–56 (cited in note 16) (identify-
ing frequent filings and low-value settlements as key indicia of litigation agency costs). 
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nonmonetary relief.68 Nevertheless, the vast majority of such 
cases are settled for nonpecuniary relief, specifically supple-
mental disclosures, providing no demonstrable benefit for share-
holders.69 More recently, the pattern has been to end such suits 
not through settlement, but through the payment of a “mootness 
fee.”70 In this situation, the defendant issues corrective disclo-
sures, thereby mooting the claim and entitling the defendant to 
dismissal, but at the same time entitling the plaintiffs’ attorney 
to a fee under the corporate benefit doctrine.71 The amount of the 
fee can be adjudicated, but it is more frequently agreed between 
plaintiffs and the defendant.72 The virtue of this procedure, from 
the plaintiffs’ perspective, is that it allows the litigants to avoid 
recent rulings, in Delaware and other jurisdictions, hostile to dis-
closure settlements.73 Because the mootness fee is not a class 
 
 68 Merger class actions typically allege that process defects have led to an inadequate 
deal price, thus creating a basis for damages. Most merger claims also allege defects of 
disclosure that can be remedied by nonpecuniary relief in the form of corrective disclo-
sures. See, for example, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, and Steven Davidoff Solomon, Con-
fronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Pro-
posal for Reform, 93 Tex L Rev 557, 572 (2015). 
 69 Id at 559 (“[Deal litigation] lawsuits rarely result in a monetary recovery for the 
plaintiff class. Rather, the vast majority end in settlement or dismissal. In most settled 
cases, the only relief provided . . . consists of supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy 
statement.”), citing Robert M. Daines and Olga Koumrian, Shareholder Litigation Involv-
ing Mergers and Acquisitions *6 fig 7 (Cornerstone Research, 2013), archived at 
https://perma.cc/TRL8-QNTK. See also Ann Woolner, Phil Milford, and Rodney Yap, When 
Merger Suits Enrich Only Lawyers (Bloomberg, Feb 16, 2012), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/32HY-A22M. 
 70 Griffith, 69 Case W Res L Rev at 948 (cited in note 35). 
 71 As explained by the Delaware Supreme Court: 
Under the “mootness” exception, a court may award attorneys’ fees where the 
fee applicant demonstrates that: (1) the litigation was meritorious when filed, 
(2) the action rendering the litigation moot produced the same or a similar ben-
efit sought by the litigation, and (3) there was a causal relationship between the 
litigation and the action taken producing the benefit. 
Dover Historical Society, Inc v City of Dover Planning Commission, 902 A2d 1084, 1092 
(Del 2006). 
 72 The mootness award was cited by the Court of Chancery as the preferred method 
for resolving disclosure-based claims because of the potential for adversarial fee litigation 
to enable the court to value the benefit on an informed basis. See In re Trulia, Inc Stock-
holder Litigation, 129 A3d 884, 897–98 (Del Chanc 2016) (referring to mootness dismissals 
as the “preferred scenario,” and noting that “[i]n the mootness fee scenario, the parties 
also have the option to resolve the fee application privately without obtaining Court ap-
proval”). Parties have tended to settle fee disputes in order to avoid additional adversarial 
process. Matthew D. Cain, et al, The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 Vand L Rev 
603, 623 (2018) (finding sharply increasing rates of mootness settlements). 
 73 The leading case is Trulia, 129 A3d at 898: 
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settlement and is therefore not binding upon absent members of 
the class, it need not be presented in a fairness hearing.74 Moot-
ness dismissals thus bypass judicial review, making it easier for 
lawyers to get paid.75 
As this discussion suggests, merger class actions exhibit a 
high degree of litigation agency costs. They are filed automati-
cally in the wake of most deals.76 They overwhelmingly result in 
nonpecuniary relief, typically supplemental disclosures. The re-
lief is of no apparent value to shareholders.77 Yet the attorneys 
are paid, either for disclosure settlements or mootness fees.78 
 
[P]ractitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be met 
with continued disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures ad-
dress a plainly material misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter 
of the proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing more 
than disclosure claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning the sale process, if 
the record shows that such claims have been investigated sufficiently. 
Cases in other jurisdictions following Trulia include: In re Walgreen Co Stockholder Liti-
gation, 832 F3d 718, 725 (7th Cir 2016); Order After Hearing on September 29, 2017, 
Bushansky v Alliance Fiber Optics Products, Inc, No 16-CV-294245, *9 (Cal Sup filed Oct 
2, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/3K3A-Q52R (adopting Trulia standard under  
California law); Griffith v Quality Distribution, Inc, 2018 WL 3403537, *7 (Fla App) 
(adopting Trulia standard). See also Statement of Reasons, Vergiev v Aguero, No L-2276-
15, *6–7 (NJ Super filed June 6, 2016) (Vergiev Statement of Reasons), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/5XMM-RZ4X (rejecting settlement and adopting Trulia). 
 74 See William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory 
Approaches, 53 UCLA L Rev 1435, 1452–67 (2006) (arguing that fairness hearings require 
a combination of adversarial and regulatory approaches). 
 75 Mootness settlements require, at most, notice to the class. See, for example,  
Swomley v Schlecht, 2015 WL 1186126, *1–2 (Del Chanc) (setting forth class notice proce-
dure for mootness fee, after defendants mooted certain disclosure claims and successfully 
moved to dismiss rest of case); In re Zalicus, Inc Stockholders Litigation, 2015 WL 226109, 
*1–2 (Del Chanc) (supporting private mootness fee resolution procedure while requiring 
that adequate notice be provided to stockholders); In re Astex Pharmaceuticals, Inc Stock-
holders Litigation, 2014 WL 4180342, *1–2 (Del Chanc) (same). 
 76 By 2009, shareholder claims were brought against close to 90 percent of all third-
party mergers, a number that held until 2016. After a brief interlude in the wake of Trulia, 
the percentage of filings has climbed again. Stefan Boettrich and Svetlana Starykh, Recent 
Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2018 Full-Year Review *5–6 (NERA, Jan 29, 
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/BWU6-ME72; Securities Class Action Filings: 2017 
Year In Review, *2, 13 (Cornerstone Research, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/J24F 
-7YDT (highlighting the growth in federal class action filings involving mergers and ac-
quisitions post-Trulia). 
 77 Fisch, Griffith, and Solomon, 93 Tex L Rev at 600–01 (cited in note 68). 
 78 The average plaintiffs’ attorney’s fee for disclosure settlements had recently been 
$500,000. Id at 568. For mootness settlements, the recent range seems to be from $50,000 
to $450,000, with an average of $185,285. See Exhibit 1 to Response to Order, Sehrgosha 
v Kindred Healthcare, Inc, No 18-0230-RGA (D Del filed Sept 19, 2018). 
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Again, we are not claiming that merger litigation never 
achieves meaningful relief for shareholders. There are examples 
of cases in which merger class actions have resulted in substan-
tial monetary recoveries.79 And there are other cases in which 
state-law direct claims have been brought to enjoin defective 
transaction processes—often involving the preferential treatment 
of bidders—the result of which has been to open the process to 
competitive bidding and thus higher deal values for target share-
holders.80 Moreover, such cases may have an ex ante deterrent 
effect on transaction planners, leading them to structure deals to 
avoid injunction risk. But the recent history of such claims more 
closely resembles a mass of nonmeritorious claims of no apparent 
value to anyone other than the attorneys involved. 
3. Appraisal claims. 
Shareholder suits for appraisal have a narrower focus than 
fiduciary duty claims filed as direct or derivative suits. As de-
scribed by the Delaware Supreme Court: in an appraisal suit, “the 
only litigable issue is the determination of the value of the ap-
praisal petitioners’ shares on the date of the merger, the only 
party defendant is the surviving corporation and the only relief 
available is a judgment against the surviving corporation for the 
fair value of the dissenters’ shares.”81 Appraisal suits are also nar-
row in that not all merger transactions will qualify for the ap-
praisal remedy. In Delaware, for example, appraisal is available 
in cash deals, but not in transactions where target shareholders 
receive publicly traded equity in exchange for their shares.82 Ap-
praisal suits, in other words, serve a narrowly defined compensa-
tory goal—making whole dissenting shareholders who have re-
ceived less than fair value in a particular type of transaction. 
 
 79 See Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of 
Disclosure Settlements, 40 Del J Corp L 877, 905–06 (2016) (compiling a list of fifteen mer-
ger cases resolved between 1997 and 2011 in which shareholder plaintiffs recovered a com-
mon fund for target shareholders greater than or equal to $40 million). 
 80 See, for example, Paramount Communications Inc v QVC Network Inc, 637 A2d 
34, 46–47 (Del 1994); Mills Acquisition Co v MacMillan, Inc, 559 A2d 1261, 1284–87 (Del 
1989); Revlon, 506 A2d at 182–83. 
 81 Cede & Co v Technicolor, Inc, 542 A2d 1182, 1187 (Del 1988). 
 82 8 Del Code Ann § 262(b). The availability of appraisal to specific transactions var-
ies from state to state. For scholarship debating the purpose underlying various state ap-
praisal statutes, see, for example, Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate 
Law, 1983 Am Bar Found Rsrch J 875, 877–84; Hideki Kanda and Saul Levmore, The 
Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L Rev 429, 434–61 (1985). 
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Appraisal claims are also distinguishable from other forms of 
shareholder litigation because they cannot be brought as class or 
derivative actions.83 They appear to be nonrepresentative. On 
closer inspection, however, this distinction breaks down.84 Ap-
praisal actions contain procedures for connecting dissenters and 
ultimately coordinating their efforts under a single lead counsel 
with fiduciary duties to represent the interests of dissenting 
shareholders as a class.85 However, unlike class actions, there is 
no mechanism by which lead counsel can force all dissenting 
shareholders into a settlement. Settlements in appraisal actions 
must be presented to all dissenters, each of whom has the option 
of participating in the settlement or intervening to continue the 
proceeding.86 Also unlike class actions, there is no shifting of at-
torneys’ fees to the defendant.87 Appraisal petitioners pay their 
own attorneys’ fees and bear their own litigation costs, apportion-
ing them among dissenters, but generally not shifting them to the 
corporation itself.88 This distinction has important implications 
for the question of litigation agency costs, suggesting that ap-
praisal actions are likely to be pursued only when the claimants 
determine that the benefits of an action exceed its costs, in 
 
 83 Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 
U Pa L Rev 785, 799 (2003), citing 8 Del Code Ann § 262(a) (noting that “the Delaware 
corporate statute does not authorize a class appraisal procedure”). 
 84 See generally Minor Myers, Appraisal as Representative Litigation, in Griffith, et 
al, eds, Research Handbook on Representative Shareholder Litigation 254, 254–68 (cited 
in note 27) (examining the ways in which appraisal actions may be seen as a form of rep-
resentative litigation). 
 85 Id at 256–58 (describing procedures for consolidating appraisal actions and com-
piling cases). 
 86 See Edgerly v Hechinger, 1998 WL 671241, *4 (Del Chanc) (noting that nonsettling 
petitions must be “given notice . . . and an opportunity to intervene” to continue to press 
the appraisal proceeding); Raynor v LTV Aerospace Corp, 317 A2d 43, 47 (Del Chanc 1974) 
(holding that “dissenting stockholders shall be entitled to participate equally with the 
plaintiffs in any settlement of this consolidated appraisal action”). 
 87 See, for example, M.G. Bancorporation, Inc v Le Beau, 737 A2d 513, 527 (Del 1999) 
(stating that appraisal petitioners “‘should bear the burden of paying [their] own expert 
witnesses and attorneys,’ unless some equitable exception applies”), quoting Technicolor, 
684 A2d at 301. 
 88 See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 262(j): 
Upon application of a stockholder, the Court may order all or a portion of the 
expenses incurred by any stockholder in connection with the appraisal proceed-
ing, including, without limitation, reasonable attorney’s fees and the fees and 
expenses of experts, to be charged pro rata against the value of all the shares 
entitled to an appraisal. 
1172 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1149 
 
contrast to class actions and derivative suits that may be pursued 
for attorneys’ fees irrespective of the benefit to the putative 
class.89 
Recent empirical studies support the notion that litigation 
agency costs are lower in appraisal actions than they are for class 
action merger litigation. Professors Charles Korsmo and Minor 
Myers have found that while class action merger litigation is 
strongly associated with nonmerit factors, such as deal size, ap-
praisal claims are related to legally relevant criteria, including 
abnormally low deal premiums and insider participation in the 
transaction.90 Recent work by other researchers has confirmed 
these findings.91 Moreover, the availability of appraisal seems to 
improve rather than impair the operation of the merger market. 
Professors Audra Boone, Brian Broughman, and Antonio Macias 
find a correlation between stronger appraisal rights and higher 
acquisition premiums, and they find no evidence that acquirers 
hold back deal value to deal with the risk of appraisal.92 The risk 
of an appraisal proceeding ex post appears to incentivize transac-
tion planners to implement auction-based transaction structures 
ex ante, providing a potential benefit to all target shareholders in 
 
 89 See Myers, Appraisal as Representative Litigation at 262 (cited in note 84) (“The 
fee award [in class actions] is crucial to the operation of the liability system. By contrast, 
in appraisal, the stockholder is making a decision to dissent after taking into account the 
costs of the proceeding.”). 
 90 See Charles R. Korsmo and Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of 
Public Company M&A, 92 Wash U L Rev 1551, 1585, 1603 (2015), citing Charles R. 
Korsmo and Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits 
Matter?, 75 Ohio St L J 829, 874 (2014). See also Korsmo and Myers, 75 Ohio St L J at 
847–48 (cited in note 90). 
 91 See Wei Jiang, et al, Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 
J L & Econ 697, 727 (2016) (stating that “petitioners seem to target deals with character-
istics that are most likely to be tainted by conflicts of interest, such as going-private deals, 
minority squeeze outs, and short-form M&A with low premiums”). See also Jonathan  
Kalodimos and Clark Lundberg, Shareholder Rights in Mergers and Acquisitions: Are Ap-
praisal Rights Being Abused?, 22 Fin Rsrch Let 53, 54–57 (2017) (confirming that lower 
premiums are more likely to lead to appraisal actions). 
 92 See Audra Boone, Brian Broughman, and Antonio J. Macias, Merger Negotiations 
in the Shadow of Judicial Appraisal, 62 J L & Econ 281, 283 (2019) (finding that  
“Delaware targets receive higher acquisition premiums . . . following events that 
strengthen the appraisal remedy”). The authors also find that the bidding of appraisal 
arbitrageurs post-announcement effectively eliminates the post-announcement spread, 
enabling shareholders to obtain the deal price without having to wait for the transaction 
to close. See id at 303–04. 
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the form of a higher merger price.93 These results have also been 
confirmed by other researchers.94 
In this way, although appraisal actions are designed to ac-
complish a narrower compensatory end than class action merger 
litigation, they may ultimately have a greater effect on the target 
managers than fiduciary duty lawsuits. If this is so, it is likely 
because appraisal actions involve engaged plaintiffs—often spe-
cialized hedge funds—who bear their own litigation costs and 
therefore have incentives to pursue claims only when the mone-
tary benefit exceeds the cost of litigation.95 Appraisal claims, in 
other words, succeed when merger class actions fail because they 
control litigation agency costs. 
4. Private securities litigation. 
Finally, shareholders may bring private securities claims. 
Although they involve a variety of potential causes of action and 
a variety of potential defendants,96 their essential basis is misin-
formation—fraud, misstatements, or omissions—provided in con-
nection with transactions in corporate securities.97 Securities 
claims based on misinformation may seem distinct from corporate 
law claims based on misconduct, but there is an essential link be-
tween the two. When corporate managers engage in misconduct, 
they typically also conceal it. These misstatements or omissions 
 
 93 Id at 284 (summarizing their findings as suggesting that “bidders protect them-
selves against threat of appraisal, not through contractual terms that would allow a bidder 
to walk away from the deal . . . but rather by increasing their up-front bids and improving 
the price-setting process”). 
 94 See Scott Callahan, Darius Palia, and Eric Talley, Appraisal Arbitrage and Share-
holder Value, 3 J L Fin & Acct 147, 181–82 (2018). 
 95 On the role of appraisal arbitrage hedge funds, see Korsmo and Myers, 92 Wash 
U L Rev at 1573 n 85 (cited in note 90). 
 96 For example, private securities litigation may be brought under § 11 of the Secu-
rities Act for misstatements or omissions made in a registration statement, 15 USC 
§ 77k(a); under § 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act for violations of the offering process, 15 USC 
§ 77l(a)(1); under § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act for misstatements and omissions made 
in the prospectus, 15 USC § 77l(a)(2); and under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act for misstate-
ments and omissions made in securities transactions generally, 15 USC § 78j(b). Potential 
defendants include the corporate issuers, responsible officers and directors, accountants, 
lawyers, and underwriters. These are statutorily defined under some causes of action. See, 
for example, 15 USC § 77k. But the same defendants are potentially vulnerable under 
other causes of action as well, often as aiders and abettors of the primary violation. See, 
for example, Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v Scientific-Atlanta, Inc, 552 US 148, 
158 (2008). 
 97 See Louis Loss, Joel Seligman, and Troy Paredes, 1 Securities Regulation 4–8, 
304–14 (Wolters Kluwer 6th ed 2019). 
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thus transform what might otherwise be only a state-law  
derivative or direct claim into a federal securities claim, making 
securities claims a catchall means of targeting managerial  
misconduct.98 
Private securities litigation can be brought in class action 
form, and securities class actions make up nearly half of all class 
actions filed in federal courts.99 The quintessential securities class 
action is the 10b-5 claim, alleging a material misrepresentation 
(or omission) in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties.100 Pleaded as a “fraud on the market” claim, which encom-
passes all trading in a company’s shares prior to the correction of 
a public misstatement, 10b-5 can reach effectively all forms of cor-
porate misconduct.101 As a result, securities filings alleging  
violations of Rule 10b-5 predominate other forms of private secu-
rities litigation, typically at a rate of more than ten to one.102 
 
 98 See Robert B. Thompson and Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Gov-
ernance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 Vand L Rev 859, 861 (2003) (arguing that outside 
of the contexts of self-dealing and acquisitions, “corporate governance . . . has passed to 
federal law and in particular to shareholder litigation under Rule 10b-5”). For a lighter 
take on the same point, see Matt Levine, Everything Everywhere Is Securities Fraud 
(Bloomberg, June 26, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/F5BP-TM9B. 
 99 John C. Coffee Jr, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence 
and Its Implementation, 106 Colum L Rev 1534, 1539 (2006) (showing that at least 47 per-
cent of all class actions pending between 2002 and 2004 were securities actions). 
 100 Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful, among 
other things, to “make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security.” 17 CFR § 240.10b-5. A private right of action does not exist in rule or 
statute but was judicially created first in 1946 and finally blessed by the US Supreme 
Court in 1971. See Superintendent of Insurance v Bankers Life & Casualty Co, 404 US 6, 
13 n 9 (1971); Kardon v National Gypsum Co, 69 F Supp 512, 513–14 (ED Pa 1946) (rec-
ognizing a private right of action under Rule 10b-5). 
 101 Levine, Everything Everywhere Is Securities Fraud (cited in note 98) (compiling 
disparate examples of corporate misconduct pleaded as securities fraud class actions). The 
fraud on the market claim, like the private right of action, is a judicial creation. See  
Halliburton Co v Erica P. John Fund, Inc, 573 US 258, 274–77 (2014) (recognizing the 
fraud on the market class action as established precedent); Basic Inc v Levinson, 485 US 
224, 241–42 (1988), quoting Peil v Speiser, 806 F2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir 1986) (creating 
the fraud on the market class action). 
 102 Boettrich and Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation at *5 
(cited in note 76); Securities Class Action Filings at *9 fig 8 (cited in note 76). The exception 
to this claim is the recent proliferation of securities class actions under Rule 14a, alleging 
defective disclosures in connection with M&A transactions. After years of amounting to no 
more than a small minority of all securities claims, merger objection suits increased 
sharply in 2016 and in 2017 outnumbered even 10b-5 claims. See Boettrich and Starykh, 
Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation at *5 (cited in note 76) (reporting 204 
merger objection cases in 2017 compared to 193 10b-5 filings). See also Securities Class 
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Furthermore, recoveries in securities class actions vastly exceed 
typical recoveries under state fiduciary duty claims. Average se-
curities settlements are in the tens of millions of dollars. In 2017, 
for example, the average securities class action settlement was 
$25 million, down from $73 million in 2016.103 Fiduciary duty 
suits, recall, most often result in no money at all (except for the 
lawyers).104 
Given their ability, properly pleaded, to reach most forms of 
corporate misconduct and their greater potential to result in 
meaningful monetary recoveries, private securities claims would 
seem to promise generally greater potential to control managerial 
agency costs than state fiduciary duty claims. Nevertheless, there 
are considerable indicia of litigation agency costs in securities 
cases as well. As in the case of merger class actions, corporate 
defendants fund the full cost of all claims that are not dismissed, 
paying not only the settlement amount but also the plaintiffs’ at-
torneys’ fees.105 Furthermore, there are strong pressures on both 
sides to settle,106 which securities class action claims typically do, 
often for “pennies on the dollar”—that is, a few cents in settle-
ment proceeds for every dollar claimed in investor loss.107 The fact 
that recoveries are a small portion of claimed damages is often 
used to claim that securities class actions do not achieve their 
compensatory objectives.108 
 
Action Filings at *9 fig 8 (cited in 76). This is a direct result of the migration of merger 
objection suits to federal court in the wake of Delaware’s crackdown on disclosure-only 
settlements. See Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions 
Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in Steven D. Solomon  
and Randall S. Thomas, eds, The Corporate Contract in Changing Times 292, 293  
(Chicago 2019). 
 103 See Boettrich and Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation at 
*28 (cited in note 76). These averages are strongly influenced by a small number of very 
large settlements. Median settlements were $6 million in 2017 and $9 million in 2016.  
Id at *30. 
 104 See Parts I.B.1–2. 
 105 See 15 USC § 78u-4(a)(4) (allowing awards of costs and fees in private securities 
litigation). 
 106 Amanda M. Rose, The “Reasonable Investor” of Federal Securities Law: Insights 
from Tort Law’s “Reasonable Person” & Suggested Reforms, 43 J Corp L 77, 81, 85–86, 93–
94 (2017) (emphasizing defendants’ incentives to settle even weak cases given the unpre-
dictability of juries combined with the uncertainty of certain liability elements). 
 107 See Boettrich and Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation at 
*34–35 (cited in note 76). 
 108 See, for example, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities 
Fraud Class Actions, 66 Md L Rev 348, 371–73 (2007). 
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The more profound objection to the compensation rationale, 
however, is that given that it is the corporation that pays, it is the 
shareholders themselves that fund their own settlements.109 This 
“circularity” critique of the compensation rationale operates on 
two levels simultaneously.110 Not only will some portion of the 
class—those who do not sell out of the company entirely—fund 
the class recovery in the lawsuit itself,111 but also diversified 
shareholders—because they are as likely to be buyers as they are 
to be sellers—will fund the vast majority of such recoveries across 
their portfolio over time.112 Shareholders will, in other words, be 
paying themselves.113 Were it not for the amounts they must also 
pay plaintiffs’ and defense counsel, the result would be more or 
less a wash.114 Given those amounts, however, shareholders’ com-
pensatory goals are unlikely to be well served through class action 
securities litigation. 
But securities litigation may still serve deterrence goals. The 
securities class action may have a role to play in forcing managers 
to internalize the costs of their own misconduct.115 Managers who 
fear personal liability, of course, may hesitate to engage in mis-
conduct. However, in this context it is worth noting that personal 
 
 109 See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 
38 Ariz L Rev 639, 648–49 (1996); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation  
Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 
10b-5, 108 Colum L Rev 1301, 1323 & n 101 (2008). 
 110 See Rose, Shifting Raison d’Être at 47 (cited in note 27) (explaining that the “cir-
cularity exists at the micro and macro level”). 
 111 See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 Ariz L Rev 
497, 509–10 (1997). 
 112 See Coffee, 106 Colum L Rev at 1546–47 & n 42 (cited in note 99). 
 113 The circularity critique is not limited to securities class actions and may apply to 
state-law claims, especially derivative suits as well. Indeed, concerns about circularity ex-
plain why state law forbids corporations from indemnifying directors and officers for 
amounts paid to resolve derivative suits. In such a case indemnification would essentially 
amount to a payment from the corporation to the manager to pay back an amount paid by 
the manager to the corporation. But state law does allow such settlements to be insured, 
and as a result, corporations fund their settlements largely through proceeds. See text 
accompanying notes 50–51. 
 114 See Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal  
Markets, 78 Va L Rev 623, 668–69 (1992). 
 115 The scholarly literature suggests, however, that damages calculations may be mis-
calibrated for serving this end. See, for example, Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking 
Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan L Rev 1487, 1493–500 (1996); Frank H. 
Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U Chi L Rev 
611, 635, 642–44 (1985). 
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liability in private securities litigation is vanishingly rare.116 Man-
agers are typically indemnified by the corporation for any per-
sonal liabilities arising in connection from securities suits, and 
corporations are typically insured under a D&O policy not only 
for their indemnification obligations to manager-defendants but 
also for any liabilities arising from having been named as a code-
fendant in the suit.117 As a result, any deterrent effect of securities 
class actions depends entirely upon the D&O insurer, and studies 
show that although insurers seek to distinguish between good 
and bad insurance risks, there is not necessarily a large marginal 
difference between the premiums paid by well-governed firms, on 
the one hand, and poorly governed firms, on the other.118 If this is 
so, the effect of insurance is to substantially weaken the deterrence 
potential of securities class actions.119 
II.  MUTUAL FUND PLAINTIFFS 
Mutual funds, as already noted, hold approximately one-
third of the US equity market and, as such, are positioned to play 
a major role in corporate governance.120 Governance power ac-
crues to the mutual fund family—the larger entity that organizes 
and sells interests in funds—under their contracts with investors. 
Take, as an example, an equity mutual fund offered by Fidelity 
Investments, an asset manager that manages a large family of 
mutual funds. Fidelity first assembles the fund’s portfolio by pur-
chasing securities and then sells fund shares to investors. Fidelity 
will also utilize an investment adviser (which is usually a related 
entity) to oversee the day-to-day operations of the mutual fund.121 
 
 116 Black, Cheffins, and Klausner, 162 J Inst & Theoretical Econ at 9–10 (cited in 
note 52). 
 117 Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: 
The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 Georgetown L J 1795, 1802 (2007) (distin-
guishing between Side B coverage for corporate indemnification obligations and Side C 
coverage for corporate liabilities as a named defendant). 
 118 Consider Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: 
Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U Chi L Rev 487, 
534 (2007). 
 119 For an analysis finding a similar conclusion, see Coffee, 106 Colum L Rev  
at 1536 (cited in note 99) (“[C]ompensation [is] unobtainable and deterrence [is] deeply 
compromised by a variety of inconsistent legal doctrines that pull the punch of private 
enforcement.”). 
 120 See text accompanying notes 3–5. 
 121 See William A. Birdthistle, Empire of the Fund: The Way We Save Now 45–49  
(Oxford 2016); John Morley and Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Govern-
ance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 Yale L J 84, 91–96 (2010). 
1178 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1149 
 
Pursuant to the investment contract, the right to cast the portfo-
lio’s shareholder votes, as well as bring shareholder suits, is held 
by the investment adviser.122 
When it comes to shareholder voting, most of the large mu-
tual fund families require the investment adviser to follow the 
recommendation of the fund family’s corporate governance 
group.123 But what about litigation? How and when do mutual 
funds pursue shareholder litigation? How does the conduct of mu-
tual funds in shareholder litigation compare to other institutional 
intermediaries, such as pension and hedge funds? And how does 
it compare to the efforts of individual shareholder plaintiffs? 
These are empirical questions, and the sections that follow en-
deavor to answer them empirically. 
A. Mutual Fund Participation in Shareholder Litigation 
In order to develop data on whether and how mutual funds 
engage in shareholder litigation, we searched court dockets for 
shareholder litigation involving the largest mutual funds. We ran 
our docket searches in Bloomberg Law, an online service that col-
lects docket information from all federal courts as well as promi-
nent state courts. We searched within the Bloomberg Law data-
base of all federal district court dockets because securities claims 
are typically filed in federal district courts, and we searched 
within the Delaware Court of Chancery dockets because much 
 
 122 See Form of Investment Advisory Agreement ¶ 4 (Law Insider, July 25, 2014), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/H84B-PFTE (providing that the fund’s investment adviser “may 
vote, exercise consents and exercise all other rights appertaining to such securities and 
other assets on behalf of the Fund”). See also Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy 
Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies: Final Rule, 68 Fed 
Reg 6564, 6565 (2003), codified at 17 CFR §§ 239, 249, 270, 274 (describing how mutual 
funds are the beneficial owner of the fund’s securities, and thus the votes accrue to the 
investment adviser); Jonathan D. Glater, Suits Contend Mutual Funds Fail to Collect in 
Settlements (NY Times, Jan 19, 2005), archived at https://perma.cc/YG6F-9JE3: 
Individual investors in mutual funds may not file a claim for a piece of the pie 
from a settlement with a company whose shares the fund owns. The mutual fund 
owns the shares on behalf of those investors, and so the right to file a claim 
belongs to the fund. 
Types of Investors (Broadridge), archived at https://perma.cc/QK4M-MMGR (“Mutual fund 
managers vote on behalf of all of their customers, and, as an individual investor with a 
limited number of shares, you can’t influence how the fund votes.”). A small fraction of 
institutional investors that invest in mutual funds retain their governance rights. See 
notes 248–51 and accompanying text. 
 123 See Bioy, et al, Passive Fund Providers at *22 (cited in note 8); Griffith and Lund, 
99 BU L Rev at 1170–71 (cited in note 14). 
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corporate fiduciary duty and appraisal litigation is brought in 
that court. 
We limited our searches to the litigation activity of the ten 
largest mutual funds over a ten-year period: January 2009 
through year-end 2018. We ranked the largest mutual fund fam-
ilies by the amount of assets under management invested in eq-
uity strategies.124 Because we are interested in shareholder litiga-
tion, we sought to capture the litigation activity of the asset 
managers with the largest equity shareholdings; however, this 
meant that certain large asset managers that primarily offer 
bond funds, such as PIMCO, did not make our top-ten list. We 
searched under various permutations of the names of the follow-
ing ten mutual fund companies: Vanguard, BlackRock, State 
Street, Fidelity, Capital Group, T. Rowe Price, Dimensional Fund 
Advisors, BNY Mellon Investment Management, JP Morgan  
Asset Management, and Invesco. As summarized in Table 1, be-
low, the combined assets under management of these ten mutual 
fund companies is a staggering $24 trillion. 
  
 
 124 We collected this information from annual and quarterly reports whenever possi-
ble. For the asset managers that did not report this figure, we were often able to estimate 
it by summing the amount of assets in different funds (and we assumed that multi-asset 
funds were composed of 60 percent equities and 40 percent bonds). Some asset managers 
did not report even that information, and in those cases, we contacted the asset managers 
directly. 
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TABLE 1: THE TOP 10 US ASSET MANAGERS 
BY EQUITY ASSETS UNDER MANAGEMENT (AUM) 
DECEMBER 2018 






Vanguard 3,200 5,200 
BlackRock 3,030 5,980 
State Street 1,544 2,500 
Fidelity 1,337 2,530 
Capital Group 1,113 1,462 
T. Rowe Price 539 962 
BNY Mellon Investment 
Management 
415 1,700 
Dimensional Fund  
Advisors  
395 576 
JP Morgan Asset  
Management 
384 1,980 
Invesco 381 888 
 
By searching under various name permutations, we hoped to 
capture instances in which a fund family might use alternative 
business names as well as situations in which lawsuits are 
brought by individual funds rather than the entity itself—the 
BlackRock Global Allocation Fund, for example, rather than 
BlackRock Advisors. Likewise, by searching for the fund name in 
any party capacity, we sought to capture litigation in which the 
funds participated without necessarily serving as lead plaintiff. 
After weeding out unrelated suits—predominantly contract and 
employment claims—we were left with a total of nineteen suits 
involving these funds as investors. 
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TABLE 2: PARTICIPATION OF MUTUAL FUNDS 
IN SHAREHOLDER SUITS 
2009–2018 




Vanguard 2 2 
BlackRock 9 4 
State Street 1 1 
Fidelity 0 0 
Capital Group 0 0 
T. Rowe Price 4 3 
BNY Mellon Investment 
Management 
0 0 
Dimensional Fund  
Advisors 
2 1 
JP Morgan Asset  
Management 
1 0 
Invesco 0 0 
Total 19 11 
 
Table 2 summarizes the total number of shareholder com-
plaints filed by our group of mutual funds over a ten-year period. 
The first column includes all shareholder complaints filed by the 
relevant funds. However, many of these cases included in the col-
umn are not traditional shareholder suits. For example, 
BlackRock brought several cases alleging misconduct in connec-
tion with the sale of residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS) in which the funds had invested. Although these cases 
were brought as derivative suits against the banks as trustees 
and also contained federal securities law allegations, they are not 
traditional shareholder suits brought against a corporation or its 
managers.125 There are five such RMBS cases in the table. Exclud-
ing them reduces the total number of claims brought by 
BlackRock to four. 
 
 125 As defined above, a traditional securities suit involves an investor suing a corpo-
rate issuer for misconduct or misinformation. See text accompanying note 97. In the RMBS 
suits, investors sued the banks that packaged and securitized their mortgage loans. Be-
cause these suits do not involve a corporate issuer as the defendant, we treat them as 
distinct from traditional shareholder suits. 
1182 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1149 
 
Furthermore, many of the cases in the table were brought by 
different funds against the same defendants. Three funds  
(Dimensional, State Street, and Vanguard) brought 10b-5 cases 
against Petrobras.126 Two funds (BlackRock and T. Rowe Price) 
brought 10b-5 cases against Countrywide. Two funds (BlackRock 
and Vanguard) brought 10b-5 cases against American Realty/ 
VEREIT. Two funds (BlackRock and T. Rowe Price) brought 10b-
5 cases against Valeant. Interestingly, BlackRock is also named 
as a plaintiff along with one other fund, T. Rowe Price, in an ear-
lier class action complaint against Valeant. Finally, our docket 
search found a single appraisal action, the infamous Dell ap-
praisal case in which T. Rowe Price petitioned for appraisal in 
Michael Dell’s management buyout but ultimately failed to per-
fect its appraisal rights due to an administrative error.127 
In sum, over a ten-year period, the largest mutual funds in 
the United States, in whom the management of trillions of dollars 
of investor wealth is entrusted, brought only eleven traditional 
shareholder suits, based on only six different episodes of manage-
rial misconduct.128 All but one of these claims allege violations of 
Rule 10b-5 of the federal securities laws. Although we did find ex-
amples of contract litigation in state courts, apart from T. Rowe 
Price’s appraisal claim in Dell, we found not a single claim, deriv-
ative or direct, brought under state corporate law. Furthermore, 
the vast majority of claims in our sample are not representative 
actions. The only class actions in the table above are complaints 
filed against Petrobras and Valeant, and in each of those cases, 
the funds involved later filed their own complaints.129 In no cases 
did these mutual funds serve as lead plaintiffs. When the funds 
 
 126 Dimensional is also named in an earlier securities action against Petrobras. See 
Individual Plaintiffs’ Joint Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss the Individual Action Complaints, In re Petrobras Securities Litigation, No 14-cv-
09662 (JSR), *1 (SDNY filed Sept 18, 2015). 
 127 See In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc, 2015 Del Ch LEXIS 184, *1 & n 1. We discuss this 
case in more detail below. See text accompanying notes 193–97. 
 128 There were, in other words, only five defendants. The cases we found include the 
same set of allegations filed more than once against Countrywide, Petrobras, Valeant, and 
VEREIT. 
 129 Dimensional filed a separate action after being named in the class action against 
Petrobras, and BlackRock filed a separate action after being named in the class action 
against Valeant. See Parts II.A.2 and II.A.5. Likewise, T. Rowe Price filed a separate com-
plaint in the Valeant class action. See Michael Rapoport, T. Rowe Price Sues Valeant,  
Alleging ‘Fraudulent Scheme’ (Wall St J, Aug 18, 2016), online at https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/t-rowe-price-sues-valeant-alleging-fraudulent-scheme-1471532680 
(visited Feb 24, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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in our sample chose to litigate, they opted out of the class and 
pursued the claims on their own. 
In the sections that follow, we describe the basic facts and 
procedural history underlying the five 10b-5 lawsuits we found in 
our sample. These cases demonstrate at a minimum that mutual 
funds could participate actively in shareholder litigation if they 
chose to do so. The puzzle remains as to why they do so little of it. 
1. Countrywide. 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the beleaguered mort-
gage issuer Countrywide Financial faced litigation from dozens of 
plaintiffs, which eventually included three mutual fund families. 
The vast majority of Countrywide’s earnings had come from its 
mortgage-related operations, which included originating, pur-
chasing, servicing, and investing in mortgages.130 During the 
years leading up to the financial crisis, Countrywide had lowered 
its mortgage underwriting standards significantly and shifted 
into risky products without disclosing these business practice 
modifications to investors.131 Accordingly, when the crisis hit, 
Countrywide posted massive losses and was hastily sold to Bank 
of America in early 2008.132 But even before the company was sold, 
in August 2007, investors brought a class action suit against 
Countrywide in the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California alleging securities law violations for false 
and misleading statements and omissions regarding its lending 
standards and the quality of its loans.133 The consolidated com-
plaint was 416 pages and contained 21 claims of securities fraud 
against 50 defendants.134 
Bank of America settled the class action suit in May 2010 for 
$624 million.135 But thirty-three investors, including BlackRock 
and T. Rowe Price, were unhappy with the settlement and opted 
 
 130 In re Countrywide Financial Corp Securities Litigation, 588 F Supp 2d 1132, 1144 
(CD Cal 2008). 
 131 Id at 1145–46, 1150, 1153–54. 
 132 See Laurie Kulikowski, Countrywide Losses Mount (TheStreet, Jan 29, 2008),  
archived at https://perma.cc/WVP4-WA7V (reporting that Countrywide reported losses of 
$704 million in 2007); Gretchen Morgenson and Eric Dash, Bank of America to Buy  
Countrywide (NY Times, Jan 11, 2008), archived at https://perma.cc/TA8B-3S5L. 
 133 Countrywide, 588 F Supp 2d at 1145–50. 
 134 Id at 1142. 
 135 Jonathan Stempel, BofA’s Countrywide in $624 Million Lawsuit Settlement  
(Reuters, May 7, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/S9YF-LA3Y. 
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out so that they could file their own lawsuit.136 By July 2011, these 
mutual fund families joined a group of thirteen investors in order 
to sue Bank of America and Countrywide in district court, again 
pursuing securities fraud claims arising out of Countrywide’s 
mortgage lending practices.137 Those claims were settled confiden-
tially in November 2011.138 
2. Petrobras. 
Once the fifth-largest company in the world by market  
capitalization, Brazilian oil and gas giant Petrobras suffered a  
fall from grace (and a precipitous stock price decline) after the 
Brazilian government uncovered a complex corruption scheme in 
2015.139 In 2010, Petrobras began expanding its production capac-
ity by acquiring and constructing new facilities. But rampant cor-
ruption and bribery within Petrobras led the company to substan-
tially overpay for these projects.140 After the government 
investigation uncovered details of the corruption scheme, which 
involved thousands of employees and cost the company at least 
$28 billion,141 Petrobras’s stock price declined precipitously. By 
March 2015, the company’s common stock price had fallen by 
80 percent.142 
By January 2015, Petrobras investors began filing suits un-
der § 10(b) of the Exchange Act in the Southern District of New 
York.143 The plaintiffs alleged that the company’s financial 
 
 136 David Benoit, Calpers, BlackRock, Others Reject $600M Countrywide Settlement 
(American Banker, Feb 28, 2011), online at https://www.americanbanker.com/ 
news/calpers-blackrock-others-reject-600m-countrywide-settlement (visited Feb 24, 2020) 
(Perma archive unavailable). This forced the class action settlement to include a provision 
that would allow Countrywide to set aside $22.5 million of the original amount to pay the 
investors who rejected the agreement. Id. 
 137 Barry B. Burr, Investors Sue Bank of America, Countrywide (Pensions & Invest-
ments, July 29, 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/XAB9-UP5W. 
 138 Evan Weinberger, BofA Reaches Deal with Countrywide Settlement Holdouts 
(Law360, Nov 22, 2011), online at https://www.law360.com/articles/288007/bofa-reaches 
-deal-with-countrywide-settlement-holdouts (visited Feb 24, 2020) (Perma archive 
unavailable). 
 139 See In re Petrobras Securities Litigation, 116 F Supp 3d 368, 373–74 (SDNY 2015). 
See also Zack Beauchamp, Brazil’s Petrobras Scandal, Explained (Vox, Mar 18, 2016), 
archived at https://perma.cc/563F-RELP. 
 140 See Petrobras, 116 F Supp 3d at 374. 
 141 Beagan Wilcox Volz, More Fund Managers Sue Scandal-Hit Petrobras (Fin Times, 
Oct 24, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/BX69-JNWF). 
 142 Petrobras, 116 F Supp 3d at 375. 
 143 Id at 375–76. 
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statements were false and misleading because recorded payments 
were inflated due to large bribes and overcharges. The plaintiffs 
also alleged that the company made false and misleading state-
ments about the integrity of the company’s management and the 
effectiveness of its compliance program.144 
In February 2015, the court consolidated the claims against 
Petrobras and appointed Universities Superannuation Scheme 
Ltd, a UK pension scheme for university employees, as the lead 
plaintiff.145 But in the subsequent months, mutual funds began to 
file their own actions. By September 2015, mutual funds owned 
by Vanguard, Dimensional, State Street, and at least ten other 
fund families had all sued Petrobras, alleging § 10(b) violations.146 
These funds declined to join the consolidated class action, and in-
stead opted to pursue their own claims. The sheer number of opt-
out plaintiffs, as well as their size and importance, led one observer 
to call Petrobras “the watershed case for opt-out plaintiffs.”147 
By opting out, the mutual funds received several benefits. For 
one, they settled their claims and were paid much more quickly 
than the class action plaintiffs: Dimensional and State Street set-
tled their lawsuits in November 2016,148 as did Vanguard in June 
2017.149 Pursuant to the settlements, the funds recovered “hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in direct settlement payments.”150  
By contrast, the class action settlement was not announced until 
January 2018, and claimants will have to wait years for the set-
tlement administration process to take place before their claims 
are paid. And although the terms of the direct settlements  
are confidential, the mutual funds likely did better than they 
would have under the class action settlement, under which a 
$2.95 billion payment is expected to result in only $1.33 per 
 
 144 See id at 375. 
 145 Id at 373. 
 146 Beagan Wilcox Volz, Lord Abbett, Russell Funds Join Line of Petrobras Plaintiffs 
(Ignites, Sept 30, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/TQS4-95VV. 
 147 Volz, More Fund Managers Sue Scandal-Hit Petrobras (cited note in 141). 
 148 Petrobras Reaches Agreement with Investors to Settle Eleven Individual Securities 
Actions in the United States (Petrobras, Nov 23, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
BKX9-XUYF. 
 149 Paul Kiernan, Brazil’s Petrobras Settles Lawsuit with Shareholder Vanguard 
(Wall St J, June 19, 2017), online at https://www.wsj.com/articles/brazils-petrobras 
-settles-shareholder-lawsuit-with-vanguard-1497909907 (visited Apr 18, 2020) (Perma ar-
chive unavailable). 
 150 Marissa Parker and Joseph T. Kelleher, Funds as Plaintiffs: A New Set of Ques-
tions (Mondaq, Apr 24, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/634L-U242. 
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share.151 For Vanguard, which as of September 2018 had only 
5,483,191 Petrobras shares, that would have meant an expected 
recovery of approximately $7.29 million.152 Further supporting 
that conclusion is the fact that Petrobras raised the financial  
provision allocated for shareholder settlements from $372 to  
$445 million after the announcement of the settlement with  
Vanguard.153 
3. American Realty/VEREIT. 
Before 2014, American Realty Capital Properties was known 
for managing a $30 billion real estate portfolio that included hun-
dreds of Red Lobster locations and a large portfolio of single- 
tenant homes.154 In October 2014, the real estate investment trust 
admitted to the SEC that it overstated income from its operations. 
Correcting the error “erased roughly a third of [American  
Realty’s] value at the time.”155 On the same day as the announce-
ment, three American Realty executives—including the CEO and 
COO—stepped down.156 By October, the FBI had opened a crimi-
nal probe,157 which ultimately led to an eighteen-month prison 
sentence for the REIT’s CFO.158 
In the wake of the scandal, the company rebranded as 
VEREIT and replaced its board. But this did not deter plaintiffs 
from filing multiple class action complaints in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York in January 
 
 151 Exhibit I-B-1 to Declaration of Jeremy A. Lieberman in Support of Plaintiffs’ Un-
opposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, In re Petrobras Se-
curities Litigation, No 14-cv-9662 (JSR), *3–4 (SDNY filed Feb 1, 2018). See also Brendan 
Pierson, Petrobras to Pay $2.95 Billion to Settle U.S. Corruption Lawsuit (Reuters, Jan 3, 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/5ZZH-BS2K (reporting that the settlement was 
smaller than many analysts expected). 
 152 Form 13F (Vanguard Group, Sept 30, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/QM74 
-L6UE. 
 153 Kiernan, Brazil’s Petrobras Settles Lawsuit (cited in note 149). 
 154 Chris Matthews, Accounting Scandal at American Realty Capital Claims More 
Victims (Fortune, Dec 15, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/BQ9F-J2XT. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See id. 
 157 Emily Flitter, Exclusive: American Realty Capital Facing Criminal Probe over Ac-
counting (Reuters, Oct 31, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/5A2G-8XZ5. 
 158 Christian Bautista, VEREIT Pays $85M to Settle Accounting Scandal Class-Action 
Suits (Real Deal, Oct 2, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/LYJ4-X2KE. The sentence was 
eventually reduced to a $160,000 fine and a lifetime ban from the securities industry. Id. 
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2015.159 The plaintiffs alleged that the REIT violated federal se-
curities laws by making false and misleading statements, by mis-
representing the company’s business prospects, and by engaging 
in fraud.160 The complaints were consolidated and the TIAA-
CREF was named lead plaintiff.161 However, BlackRock main-
tained a separate securities action in the SDNY.162 One other fund 
family—Vanguard, which had a 13 percent stake in the REIT163 
and had alleged that its investors had “lost billions” due to the 
fraud164—filed a separate securities fraud complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of Arizona.165 
The class action continues, but the mutual funds have since 
settled their suits. In June 2018, VEREIT announced that it had 
settled the Vanguard litigation for $90 million.166 A few months 
later, in October 2018, VEREIT settled with BlackRock and six 
other funds that together held 11 percent of the REIT for $85 mil-
lion.167 In September 2019, the class action announced a billion-
dollar settlement, pending judicial approval and the claims ad-
ministration process.168 
4. Tyco. 
In a notorious example of corporate greed, Tyco CEO Dennis 
Kozlowski, along with the company’s CFO, looted hundreds of 
 
 159 In re American Realty Capital Properties Inc. Litigation (Cohen Milstein), archived 
at https://perma.cc/4FWJ-7LEN. 
 160 See Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, In re American Realty Capital Properties, Inc Litigation, No 1:15-mc-00040-
AKH, *19, 31, 75 (SDNY filed Sept 30, 2016) (American Realty Third Amended Class Ac-
tion Complaint). See also In re American Realty (cited in note 159). 
 161 American Realty Third Amended Class Action Complaint at *2 (cited in note 160). 
 162 See Letter, Scott A. Edelman to Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, In re American Realty 
Capital Properties, Inc Litigation, No 15-mc-00040-AKH, *1 (SDNY filed Oct 10, 2018). 
 163 Bruce Kelly, Former Schorsch REIT Reaches $90 Million Settlement with  
Vanguard (Pensions & Investments, June 12, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/WLE6 
-PMYX. 
 164 Konrad Putzier, Vereit Pays Vanguard $90M over 2014 Accounting Scandal (Real 
Deal, June 11, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/2S4P-K8LC. 
 165 See Vanguard Specialized Funds v Vereit Inc, 2016 WL 5858735, *1–2 (D Ariz). 
 166 Putzier, Vereit Pays Vanguard $90M (cited in note 164). 
 167 Form 10-Q Filing for the Quarter Ending Sept 30, 2018 *40 (VEREIT, Inc, Nov 5, 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/US7S-XG2N; Bautista, VEREIT Pays $85M (cited in 
note 158). 
 168 See Bruce Kelly, ARCP Class Action Investors Get 50 Cents on the Dollar: Attor-
neys (Investment News, Oct 7, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/2E69-ATRB. On diffi-
culties encountered in the claims administration process, see generally Jessica Erickson, 
Automating Securities Class Action Settlements, 72 Vand L Rev 1817 (2019).  
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millions of dollars from the company in the early 2000s. Notable 
expenditures included a $15,000 umbrella stand, a $6,000 shower 
curtain, and a $2 million Roman-orgy themed birthday party, all 
paid for by Tyco shareholders.169 Kozlowski was eventually ac-
cused of stealing $170 million from the company, in addition to 
securing $430 million by artificially inflating the value of the com-
pany’s stock and then selling it.170 He was convicted of fraud and 
sent to prison.171 But as his criminal trial waged on, Tyco share-
holders pursued civil claims against the company. Specifically, a 
class of shareholders alleged that Tyco made false and misleading 
statements that artificially inflated the stock price and failed to 
disclose related party transactions and payments made to  
Kozlowski and other insiders.172 The subsequent revelation of 
these facts caused the company’s stock price to fall more than 
40 percent, resulting in potentially more than $100 billion in 
losses.173 Tyco eventually settled these claims for more than $3 
billion—at the time, the largest payment made by a corporate de-
fendant in the history of securities class action litigation.174 But a 
group of institutional plaintiffs, including BlackRock, decided to 
opt out of the class settlement. Approximately a year later, the 
opt-out claimants announced a $54 million settlement.175 
5. Valeant. 
Once a large holding of hedge fund and mutual fund investors 
alike, the Canadian drugmaker’s stock lost almost all of its value 
after its deceptive and abusive business practices came to light. 
At the company’s peak, investors were unaware that Valeant’s 
business strategy relied on price gouging—by its own eventual 
 
 169 Catherine S. Neal, Former Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski Was One of the Great All-
Time Value Creators (Forbes, Dec 9, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/4Z6D-B7K7; Tyco 
Wants Its Money Back (CNN Money, Sept 17, 2002), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
B5EF-823P. 
 170 Andrew Ross Sorkin, 2 Top Tyco Executives Charged with $600 Million Fraud 
Scheme (NY Times, Sept 13, 2002), archived at https://perma.cc/6T7E-9MGY. 
 171 Ex-Tyco Executives Get up to 25 Years in Prison (NBC News, Sept 20, 2005),  
archived at https://perma.cc/92VE-FYRT. 
 172 See Case Summary: Tyco International Ltd (Stanford Law School Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse, July 10, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/49ZY-7UKU. 
 173 See id; Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam, BlackRock Opts Out of Tyco Class-Action; 
Files Suit (Bloomberg News, Mar 4, 2008), archived at https://perma.cc/3RQ4-BWYQ. 
 174 Case Summary: Tyco (cited in note 172). 
 175 Tyco International (Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein), archived at 
https://perma.cc/W4WL-LNLB. 
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admission, Valeant would buy a company and immediately raise 
prices by an average of 66 percent.176 To implement this strategy, 
Valeant “created a secret network of specialty pharmacies” that 
would raise pharmaceutical prices and engage in other deceptive 
practices to defraud drug purchasers.177 One of these pharmacies 
was Philidor, which purported to be independent but was actually 
created and controlled by Valeant.178 
By 2015, however, Valeant’s pricing strategy was under in-
vestigation by Congress, and various media outlets had exposed 
its deceptive practices.179 Soon after, Valeant’s true relationship 
with Philidor, as well as its secret network of pharmacies, was 
exposed. By October 2015, it was announced that Philidor would 
shut down, and by February 2016, Valeant admitted to fraudu-
lent accounting and had announced that it was under investiga-
tion by the SEC.180 As each scandal unfolded, Valeant’s stock price 
declined precipitously. 
In June 2016, Valeant investors brought a class action in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleg-
ing violations of the Exchange Act as a result of Valeant’s false 
and misleading statements, as well as its failure to disclose infor-
mation about its true business practices.181 Shortly thereafter, 
T. Rowe Price filed its own direct action against Valeant, on be-
half of dozens of its mutual funds, that contained similar charges. 
Up until April 2016, T. Rowe Price had been Valeant’s third- 
largest shareholder182 and a steadfast proponent of the company: 
in March 2016, even after Valeant’s misconduct had come to light, 
T. Rowe Price’s top Valeant analyst reassured investors that 
“many of Valeant’s strengths have been overlooked.”183 But by 
May, T. Rowe had sold most of its Valeant shares, which had 
 
 176 In re Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc Securities Litigation, 2017 WL 
1658822, *3 (D NJ). 
 177 Id, quoting Consolidated Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, 
In re Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc Securities Litigation, No 3:15-cv-07658-
MAS-LHG, ¶ 82 (D NJ filed June 24, 2016). 
 178 Valeant Pharmaceuticals, 2017 WL 1658822 at *3. 
 179 See id at *4–5. 
 180 See id. 
 181 Case Summary: Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc Securities Litigation 
(Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, Sept 10, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/CJQ9-VCRB. 
 182 Nathan Vardi, T. Rowe Price, Valeant’s Longest Supporter, Alleges Company Com-
mitted Fraud (Forbes, Aug 18, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/8ZCV-L6PF. 
 183 Nathan Vardi, The Investor Who Keeps Sticking by Valeant Pharmaceuticals Longer 
Than Anyone Else (Forbes, Mar 14, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/6SPC-T4R7. 
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continued to fall in price.184 And by June, T. Rowe Price had sued 
Valeant and six of its executives directly, alleging that Valeant 
had engaged in fraud and securities violations.185 
In January 2018—about a year and a half after T. Rowe filed 
its complaint—BlackRock brought a direct lawsuit against  
Valeant, on behalf of eighty of its mutual funds, in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey.186 Like 
T. Rowe and the class plaintiffs, BlackRock’s suit alleged that the 
company had violated the securities laws by materially misstat-
ing or omitting material facts that caused Valeant’s price to be 
artificially inflated.187 The two direct actions, as well as the class 
action, are still pending. 
* * * 
These cases demonstrate that mutual funds could participate 
actively in shareholder litigation if they chose to do so. Indeed, 
these examples are encouraging, as they demonstrate instances 
in which mutual funds took an active approach to litigation in 
order to secure additional compensation for investors, as well as 
deterrence. But the puzzle remains as to why there are so few 
examples. Many other egregious instances of fraud or misconduct 
occurred over these past ten years and the ten largest mutual 
fund families ignored them.188 Moreover, in each of these in-
stances of obvious misconduct that attracted lawsuits, none was 
pursued by more than three of the ten mutual fund families in 
our sample. 
B. Mutual Fund Participation in Appraisal Actions 
The docket search described in the prior Section found only 
one appraisal case involving any of the ten largest mutual fund 
families. Recall, however, that although appraisal actions are 
brought by a petitioner, who appears in the docket as the named 
claimant, they are often prosecuted on behalf of a larger group of 
 
 184 See Vardi, Valeant’s Longest Supporter (cited in note 182). 
 185 See id. 
 186 Jennifer Bennett, Between BlackRock and a Hard Place: Valeant Faces Fraud Suit 
(Bloomberg Law, Jan 10, 2018), online at https://bnanews.bna.com/pharma-and-life- 
sciences/between-blackrock-and-a-hard-place-valeant-faces-fraud-suit?context=article- 
related (visited Feb 24, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 187 See BlackRock Global Allocation Fund, Inc v Valeant Pharmaceuticals Interna-
tional, Inc, 2018 WL 4401727, *1 (D NJ). 
 188 See notes 199–201 and accompanying text. 
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dissenting shareholders.189 Hence, docket searches under party 
names will retrieve the names of the petitioners but not the 
names of other dissenting shareholders. Thus, insofar as a mu-
tual fund does not file as the appraisal petitioner but rather par-
ticipates as an unnamed dissenting shareholder, their role would 
not have been captured by the empirical methodology employed 
in the prior Section. Nevertheless, when an appraisal action is 
filed, the law requires the defendant to provide a “verified list” of 
all shareholders eligible for appraisal so that the petitioner can 
coordinate with other dissenting shareholders.190 The verified list 
is filed in the public docket of appraisal suits and is thus the key 
to determining whether unnamed dissenters were involved in 
seeking appraisal. 
In redesigning our search procedures to identify any ap-
praisal suits in which our mutual funds may have participated as 
nonpetitioning dissenting shareholders, we began by compiling a 
dataset of appraisal suits. To do so, we started with a list main-
tained by an appraisal arbitrage hedge fund of appraisal petitions 
filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery over a ten-year period, 
2004–2013. The list contained a total of 189 appraisal suits. We 
then looked up these suits on Bloomberg Law and searched for 
the verified list in the docket. We found the verified list for 157 
appraisal suits. We then searched these lists for any reference to 
our mutual funds. We found none. Next, to make the time period 
of the appraisal sample match our sample of shareholder suits, 
2009 through 2018, we searched in the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery Dockets on Bloomberg Law for the term “verified list” for that 
time period. We found 303 total filings, many of which also ap-
peared on the hedge fund’s list.191 But again, apart from the 
T. Rowe Price appraisal petition involving Dell, we found no ref-
erence to our mutual funds on the verified lists. 
This does not mean that mutual funds never engage in ap-
praisal. It is possible that mutual funds have an alternative 
method of seeking appraisal. For example, perhaps they contrib-
ute their shares into a special LLC with no reference to the fund 
name in order to seek appraisal anonymously.192 If so, their par-
ticipation would have escaped our empirical methodology. Having 
 
 189 See Part I.B.3. 
 190 8 Del Code Ann § 262(f). 
 191 Data on file with authors. 
 192 Doing so would enable them to avoid conflict with management. See Part III.D.1. 
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read ten years’ worth of verified lists, however, we can state that 
such anonymous entities are rarely involved. The most common 
dissenters are appraisal hedge funds, individuals, and family 
trusts. Of course, it is also possible that mutual funds invest in 
appraisal by investing capital with these specialized appraisal 
hedge funds. If so, again, they would have escaped our notice. 
Nevertheless, we have no reason to believe that mutual funds 
participate in appraisal in this way. And a hedge fund manager 
we spoke with on this subject noted that, in his experience, this 
did not occur. 
However, there is the well-publicized counterexample of 
T. Rowe Price’s botched attempt to seek appraisal rights in Dell’s 
2013 management buyout. Along with other shareholders, 
T. Rowe Price was a vocal opponent of the buyout, in which  
Michael Dell and his consortium of buyers offered to pay $13.75 
per share to take the company private.193 T. Rowe Price had in-
tended to vote against the merger so that it could preserve its ap-
praisal rights, but mistakenly voted in favor due to an adminis-
trative error.194 This mistake ended up costing T. Rowe Price 
investors dearly. In the appraisal action, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery determined that that the fair value of Dell’s shares was 
about 25 percent higher than the amount paid in the buyout, 
meaning that T. Rowe Price’s investors lost $194 million.195 To 
avoid the prospect of investor lawsuits (and the concomitant bad 
publicity), T. Rowe Price decided to pay their investors the money 
that they would have been eligible to receive from Dell.196 
This example demonstrates that mutual funds are willing 
and able to participate in appraisal actions—at least, when the 
deal appears obviously bad for shareholders. In the Dell case, the 
 
 193 See Guhan Subramanian, Deal Process Design in Management Buyouts, 130 Harv 
L Rev 590, 608 (2016). 
 194 See id at 609, citing In re Appraisal of Dell Inc, 143 A3d 20, 22–23, 32 (Del Chanc 
2016); Matt Chiappardi, Chancery Knocks T. Rowe Price Funds out of Dell Appraisal 
(Law360, May 11, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5DQG-UQVK. Shares must be voted 
against the transaction in order to have the right to sue for appraisal. See 8 Del Code  
Ann § 262(a). 
 195 See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc, 2016 WL 3186538, *51 (Del Chanc); H. Adam 
Prussin, Huge Appraisal Remedy Awarded in Dell Merger Case (Pomerantz LLP Monitor, 
July/Aug 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/6LYK-S6F3; Antoine Gara, T. Rowe Price to 
Take $194 Million Charge Due to Voting Error on Dell LBO (Forbes, June 6, 2016),  
archived at https://perma.cc/BRP8-RKDU. 
 196 Stephen Gandel, Here’s Why This Investment Fund Had to Refund $194 Million 
(Fortune, June 8, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/DSB8-ECU3. 
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price appears to have been low enough that T. Rowe Price would 
have been comfortable scuttling the deal—a genuine risk when a 
large shareholder perfects its appraisal rights. This sentiment 
seemed to be validated by the Delaware Court of Chancery’s con-
clusion that the deal price “shortchanged shareholders by more 
than $6 billion.”197 It seems unlikely, however, that Dell is the 
only bad deal in which a mutual fund owned shares.198 
* * * 
Our results reveal that mutual funds almost never partici-
pate in shareholder litigation: The mutual funds in our set—the 
largest mutual funds in the world, with a combined $24 trillion in 
assets under management—participated in a total of eleven law-
suits, based on only six distinct claims, over a ten-year period. All 
but one of these ten suits involved securities claims. To put this 
litigation record in perspective, consider that studies find over 
four hundred securities class actions were filed in 2018 alone, 
nearly half of which constituted merger claims filed under federal 
causes of action.199 Excluding merger claims, Cornerstone finds 
1,620 securities class actions filed from 2008 to 2017,200 and 
NERA finds 1,863 over a similar time period.201 Whichever de-
nominator you choose, the ten securities lawsuits pursued by mu-
tual fund plaintiffs amount to less than 1 percent of the total 
claims available. And that is counting only securities claims, not 
the many state fiduciary duty claims that could have been 
 
 197 Liz Hoffman, Judge Finds Michael Dell, Silver Lake Underpaid for Dell in 2013 
(Wall St J, June 1, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/PDF9-WGZM. 
 198 Appraisal litigation changed following Delaware decisions deeming the merger 
price to be the best evidence of fair value. See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd v Aruba 
Networks, Inc, 210 A3d 128, 135–36 (Del 2019); DFC Global Corp v Muirfield Value Part-
ners, LP, 172 A3d 346, 374 n 145 (Del 2017); Dell, Inc v Magnetar Global Event Driven 
Master Fund Ltd, 177 A3d 1, 19 (Del 2017). However, appraisal claims remain viable in 
situations indicating a flawed sales process or breach of fiduciary duty. In any event, these 
changes to appraisal litigation occurred toward the end of our collection period and likely 
had little or no influence on our findings. 
 199 Boettrich and Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation at *1 
(cited in note 76) (counting 441 securities class action filings in federal courts in 2018); 
Securities Class Action Filings at *5 (cited in note 76) (counting 412 securities class action 
filings in federal courts in 2018, 198 of which were merger claims). 
 200 Securities Class Action Filings at *5 (cited in note 76) (counting only “core” securi-
ties class actions, most often cases under Rule 10b-5). 
 201 Boettrich and Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation at *5 
fig 3 (cited in note 76) (counting all federal securities filings except merger objection 
claims). 
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brought during the same period, of which mutual funds brought 
none. In sum, this evidence reveals that the largest and most in-
fluential mutual funds have essentially forfeited their use of a 
principal lever to protect investors. 
C. Compared to the Litigation Efforts of Other Shareholder 
Plaintiffs 
To put mutual fund litigation into perspective, we compare 
the litigation record of other shareholder plaintiffs. In the sec-
tions that follow, we first compare the litigation conduct of pen-
sion fund plaintiffs. Then we compare the litigation conduct of 
hedge funds and individual repeat plaintiffs. This study is not in-
tended to provide an apples-to-apples comparison; instead, we 
seek only to provide additional evidence that mutual funds liti-
gate much less often than other investors in spite of the fact that 
they hold large investments in a broad swath of companies. We 
also highlight interesting differences in litigation patterns be-
tween these classes of investors. 
1. Public pension funds. 
Much of the literature on institutional plaintiffs in share-
holder suits focuses on pension funds, especially public pension 
funds and labor union funds, both of which have established rep-
utations as especially active shareholder litigants.202 The reputa-
tion is not entirely positive. Some of this literature identifies ways 
in which pension fund managers’ incentives in shareholder suits 
depart from the interests of their investors.203 Furthermore, stud-
ies document ways in which pension fund involvement has led to 
the transfer of pay-to-play emoluments between plaintiffs’ law-
yers and pension fund managers.204 We acknowledge these prob-
lems but nevertheless ask: How does the record of pension funds 
in shareholder litigation compare with that of mutual funds? 
 
 202 See David Webber, The Rise of the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best 
Weapon xii (Harvard 2018). 
 203 See, for example, Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate 
Governance Reconsidered, 93 Colum L Rev 795, 796 (1993) (recognizing that “public pen-
sion funds face distinctive investment conflicts that limit the benefits of their activism”). 
 204 See, for example, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, and A.C. Pritchard, 
The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J Empirical Legal Stud 650, 678 
(2011) (finding that pay-to-play imposes a cost on investors in class actions). 
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We ran a series of docket searches for the ten largest pension 
funds by assets under management parallel to the searches we 
had run for the ten largest mutual funds. We searched Bloomberg 
Law, for a period running from January 2009 through December 
2018, for all cases in federal district courts and in the Delaware 
Court of Chancery in which any of the ten largest public pension 
funds appeared as a named party. The pension funds we searched 
included: CalSTERS, CalPERS, New York State Common Retire-
ment Fund, New York City Retirement, Florida SBA, Texas 
Teachers, New York State Teachers, State of Wisconsin Invest-
ment Board, North Carolina Retirement, and Washington State 
Investment Board. These funds were more active than mutual 
funds, bringing a combined total of thirty-one shareholder suits—
three times as many as the ten largest mutual fund investors—
over the period, against a total of twenty-two defendants. That is 
so despite managing smaller portfolios—for example, CalPERS, 
the largest US pension fund, manages $354 billion in assets,205 
compared to BlackRock, which manages nearly $6 trillion.206 
In addition to higher overall numbers, there was a greater 
diversity in the type of shareholder suits brought by pension 
funds. Like the mutual fund cases we found, the pension fund 
suits were skewed toward securities claims, and the securities 
claims were predominantly 10b-5 class actions. But three pension 
fund suits were based on state law causes of action, as compared 
to zero for mutual fund litigants. Many of these suits resulted in 
large settlement payments,207 as well as corporate governance re-
forms. As an example of the latter, the pension fund CalPERS 
 
 205 Facts at a Glance for Fiscal Year 2017–18 *1 (CalPERS), archived at 
https://perma.cc/7HWF-K2L2. 
 206 Christine Williamson, BlackRock’s AUM Down for the Quarter, Year (Pensions & 
Investments, Jan 16, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/MNE9-29Y6. 
 207 As a few examples, pension fund litigants won large settlement payments in suits 
filed against the following companies: Big Lots, Inc ($3.5 million payment to the company 
in addition to governance and compliance reforms); Green Mountain Coffee Roasters 
($36.5 million payment); and CBOT Holdings ($475 million in additional deal compensa-
tion). See Opinion and Order, In re Big Lots, Inc Shareholder Litigation, No 2:12-cv-00445, 
*2 (SD Ohio filed Aug 28, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/D4RV-8UMD; Notice of 
(I) Pendency of Class Action and Class Certification; (II) Proposed Settlement; (III) Motion 
for an Aware of Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses; and 
(IV) Settlement Fairness Hearing, Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement Sys-
tem v Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc, No 2:11-CV-00289-WKS, *1 (D Vt filed Sept 
10, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/UWZ9-X6U5; CBOT Holdings, Inc. Shareholder 
Litigation (Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/4HTS-TEU9. 
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successfully convinced IAC to abandon its plan to issue nonvoting 
stock that would have solidified the controlling shareholder’s con-
trol over the company.208 
Although we limited our analysis to the ten largest pension 
funds, a pension fund’s incentives to litigate may not increase 
with size. A public-employee pension fund’s board members are 
appointed by politicians or directly elected by voters.209 Accord-
ingly, litigation activity may provide a way for the fund’s board to 
demonstrate alignment with investors and politicians—regard-
less of the size of the pension fund’s investment in the underlying 
company. For these reasons, earlier studies that looked beyond 
the ten largest pension funds reported even starker differences in 
litigation patterns. For example, in a study of shareholder deriv-
ative and class action lawsuits challenging M&A transactions 
filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery from November 1, 2003 
to December 31, 2009, Professor David Webber finds that public 
pension funds and labor union funds dominate the litigation pro-
cess, while mutual funds play a minimal role.210 Specifically, of 
the 137 claims involving an institutional lead plaintiff in his da-
taset, Webber found only seven in which a mutual fund served as 
lead plaintiff. By contrast, pension and union funds served as a 
lead plaintiff for sixty cases, and private nonmutual funds (which 
include private equity funds and hedge funds) were lead plaintiffs 
for the remainder. Mutual funds have more assets under manage-
ment than public pension funds do, and they have substantial 
stakes in the transactions that were subject to litigation. They 
would appear to be excellent lead plaintiff candidates, but they do 
not apply for the job.211 Another study found similar results with 
regard to securities class actions. Of 1,811 securities class actions 
from 1996 to 2005, 97 were led by public pension funds, 61 had 
 
 208 In Response to CalPERS Lawsuit, IAC Abandons Plan to Issue Non-Voting Stock 
(CalPERS, June 23, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/89RR-N9RU. 
 209 Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in Jeffrey N. 
Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Govern-
ance 363, 367 (Oxford 2018). 
 210 Webber, 38 Del J Corp L at 932, 935 tbl 2 (cited in note 15). 
 211 See id at 940 (“[Mutual funds] are sophisticated and credible, and Delaware judges 
would likely be eager to appoint them if they applied. But they don’t.”) (citations omitted). 
See also Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U Pa L Rev 1021, 1048–56 (2007) (discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages that mutual funds might have in monitoring corporate governance). 
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union pension fund lead plaintiffs, but only 12 featured mutual 
funds as lead plaintiffs.212 
We ran an additional docket search for the litigation activity 
of the Louisiana Municipal Police Employee Retirement Fund 
(LAMPERS), which is not among the largest but is reputed to be 
one of the most active institutional plaintiffs. Our results confirm 
this reputation. LAMPERS was involved in ninety-three share-
holder claims over the ten-year period we studied. These claims 
included a large number of both state law fiduciary duty claims 
as well as federal securities class actions, predominantly under 
Rule 10b-5 but also including a small number of claims brought 
under §§ 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act as well as 
§ 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
Why are pension funds much more active participants in lit-
igation than their mutual fund counterparts? In addition to their 
political motivations, there are other factors at play. Public pen-
sion funds, unlike mutual funds, do not count on corporations as 
a source of revenue.213 Furthermore, there may be less network 
overlap between the boards of public pension funds—which may 
consist of firefighters, police officers, and teachers—and corporate 
boards of directors, which may more closely resemble mutual fund 
boards.214 Each of these factors may contribute to greater willing-
ness, on the part of public pension funds, to pursue litigation 
against corporate defendants. Additionally, public pension funds 
do not compete with each other for cash inflows. Instead, all 
 
 212 C.S. Agnes Cheng, et al, Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 
95 J Fin Econ 356, 364 (2010). There is also evidence that some institutional-investor lead 
plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions, notably public-pension funds, provide better 
shareholder outcomes in the form of higher settlements, lower attorneys’ fees, and im-
proved board independence. See id at 357–58; Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, and A.C. 
Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 Wash U L Q 869, 897 (2005) (finding that public pen-
sion funds pay approximately 5 percent less than individuals); James D. Cox, Randall S. 
Thomas, and Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical 
Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 Vand L Rev 355, 379 (2008)  
(demonstrating a positive impact on settlement size from the presence of a public pension 
or labor union fund as lead plaintiff); Michael Perino, Institutional Activism Through  
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class 
Actions, 9 J Empirical Legal Stud 368, 381–84 (2012) (finding that cases with public  
pension funds as lead plaintiffs settle for greater amounts and lower fees). 
 213 Which is to say they are unaffected by Corporate Client Conflict, discussed in 
Part III.D.1. See also Webber, 38 Del J Corp L at 941–42 (cited in note 15). 
 214 See Webber, 38 Del J Corp L at 942 (cited in note 15). 
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covered employees contribute.215 Because pension funds do not 
compete with each other for pension assets, any reluctance on the 
part of pension funds to engage in conduct that might also benefit 
their competitors—the collective action problem we describe be-
low—is nonexistent. As state-sponsored monopolists, public pen-
sion funds are free to make litigation decisions without regard to 
the effect on their (nonexistent) competitors. 
None of this is to say that public pension funds engage in the 
optimal amount of litigation. As discussed, they have their own 
agency problems, including heightened vulnerability to political 
influence.216 Our point here is simply to demonstrate the different 
approaches that pension funds and mutual funds take to share-
holder litigation. Pension funds are far more likely to assert 
claims against portfolio corporations. They are more likely to as-
sert these claims in class action form. And they are more likely to 
seek appointment as lead plaintiff. 
2. Hedge fund plaintiffs. 
We also gathered data on the litigation record of hedge funds. 
We ran the same Bloomberg docket search—January 2009 
through December 2018, for all cases in federal district courts and 
the Delaware Court of Chancery—for the ten largest activist 
hedge funds (by equity assets) that had been involved in at least 
twenty-five campaigns: Icahn Associates Holding LLC, Elliot 
Management Corp, GAMCO Asset Management, Inc, ValueAct 
Capital Management LP, Trian Fund Management LP,  
Southeastern Asset Management, Inc, Third Point LLC, Pershing 
Square Capital Management, Carlson Capital LP, and Starboard 
Value LP.217 
The hedge funds in our sample did not file a vast quantity of 
claims. We found twenty-one distinct investor suits filed by the 
 
 215 See id at 941 (explaining that public pensions and labor union funds have “no  
true competitors” because “[i]f a fund beneficiary is unhappy with the fund’s performance, 
the beneficiary’s only option is to change jobs, not move one’s retirement savings to a  
competitor”). 
 216 Note that this political influence may lead to too little or too much litigation, de-
pending on the political alignment of the politicians who appoint them. For example, po-
litical contributions from large corporations may reduce incentives to sue, whereas contri-
butions from the plaintiffs’ bar would likely increase them. See Choi, Johnson-Skinner, 
and Pritchard, 8 J Empirical Legal Stud at 655, 678 (cited in note 204). 
 217 See SharkWatch 50, Key Activists (on file with the authors). 
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ten hedge funds over a ten-year period.218 But a relatively small 
number of intensely litigated cases is commensurate with an ac-
tivist hedge fund’s investment strategy—hedge funds are not 
broadly diversified, and instead make large, concentrated invest-
ments in a small number of companies.219 As such, we would ex-
pect that their overall litigation record would involve a much 
smaller number of companies than that of broadly diversified mu-
tual funds. 
In addition, the cases pursued by hedge funds are qualita-
tively different from the cases brought by mutual funds. For one, 
the hedge fund cases are more often state law fiduciary duty 
claims than federal securities claims. We found only four investor 
lawsuits filed in federal district court by the hedge funds in our 
sample.220 By contrast, recall that apart from a single appraisal 
claim, the mutual funds in our study brought claims exclusively 
 
 218 This number represents distinct causes of action, not necessarily distinct claims. 
For example, funds controlled by Third Point filed six separate appraisal claims involving 
Petsmart, which were later consolidated into a single action. See Stipulation and (Pro-
posed) Consolidation Order, Third Point Reinsurance (USA) Ltd v PetSmart, Inc, 
No 10782-VCN, *4–5 (Del Chanc filed Apr 30, 2015). Likewise, Icahn Partners filed two 
different fiduciary duty suits involving Amylin Pharmaceuticals, one seeking books and 
records and another for breach of fiduciary duty relating to board conduct in connection 
with an acquisition offer. See Verified Complaint Pursuant to 8 Del C § 220, Icahn Part-
ners LP v Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc, No 7418-CS, *1 (Del Chanc filed Apr 12, 2012) 
(Icahn Partners § 220 Complaint) (books and records); Verified Complaint, Icahn Partners 
LP v Amylin Pharmaceuticals Inc, No 7404-VCN, *1–2 (Del Chanc filed Apr 9, 2012) 
(Icahn Partners Verified Complaint) (breach of fiduciary duty). We counted these claims 
as one and counted all claims involving the same plaintiff against the same defendant for 
the same underlying conduct a single time. Two fiduciary duty claims brought by Icahn 
Enterprises against Dell for different underlying conduct were counted separately. See 
Verified Complaint Pursuant to 8 Del C § 220, High River Limited Partnership v Dell 
Technologies Inc, No 2018-0790-AGB, *19–20 (Del Chanc filed Oct 31, 2018) (High River 
§ 220 Complaint) (requesting inspection of corporate books and records); Verified Com-
plaint, High River Limited Partnership v Dell Inc, No 8762-CS, *23 (Del Chanc filed Aug 
1, 2013) (suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with Michael Dell’s manage-
ment buyout). 
 219 See Kahan and Rock, 155 U Pa L Rev at 1070 (cited in note 211). 
 220 Three of these were Rule 10b-5 cases filed as individual actions (two by Elliott, one 
by GAMCO). See Elliott Associates v Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F Supp 2d 469, 
470 (SDNY 2010); Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, Gamco Global 
Series Funds, Inc v Vivendi SA, No 1:09-cv-07962-SAS, *82 (SDNY filed Sept 16, 2009). 
One was a 10b-5 class action filed by GAMCO. See Class Action Complaint for Violation 
of the Federal Securities Laws, Joshi Living Trust v Akorn, Inc, No 1:18-cv-01713, *16 
(ND Ill filed Mar 8, 2018). The fifth case was a federal court case brought by Pershing 
Square in the wake of the financial crisis claim alleging that the US Treasury Department 
illegally deprived them of the value of their investment in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
See Complaint, Rafter v Department of the Treasury, No 1:14-cv-01404-RCL, *39, 42 (DDC 
filed Aug 15, 2014). 
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under Rule 10b-5 of the federal securities laws. They did not bring 
a single state fiduciary duty suit.221 
In addition, the hedge fund cases in our sample often directly 
related to the funds’ governance interventions in portfolio compa-
nies. Four cases involved petitions for appraisal.222 But most of 
the hedge fund cases we found were state corporate law claims 
relating directly to activist interventions. Several of the suits in 
our sample involve books and records requests, seeking infor-
mation that will either help the activists challenge management 
or simply provide access to the shareholder list so that the activist 
can lobby shareholders directly.223 Several claims seek to compel 
shareholder meetings in connections with proxy fights.224 Other 
suits allege breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with specific 
transactions.225 In other words, the majority of the hedge fund 
claims we found were motivated by deterrence or governance ob-
jectives, not the desire to win compensation in the lawsuit itself. 
Hedge funds litigate for leverage to support their interventions. 
 
 221 See text accompanying notes 127–28. 
 222 See Petition for Appraisal of Stock, Third Point Reinsurance (USA) Ltd v 
PetSmart, Inc, No 10782-VCN (Del Chanc filed Mar 12, 2015). The other three appraisal 
cases were all brought by GAMCO. See Verified Petition for Appraisal, Gabelli Small Cap 
Growth v Federal-Mogul Holdings LLC, No 2017-0330, *1 (Del Chanc filed May 1, 2017); 
Petition for Appraisal, Gabelli Securities, Inc, v Crown Media Holdings, Inc, No 12680, *1 
(Del Chanc filed Aug 23, 2016); In re Zale Corp Appraisal Litigation, 2015 Del Ch LEXIS 
249, *19. 
 223 See, for example, High River § 220 Complaint at *19 (cited in note 218); Verified 
Complaint Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220, High River Ltd Partnership v Forest Laboratories, 
Inc, No 7663-ML, *1–2 (Del Ch filed June 28, 2012); Icahn Partners § 220 Complaint at *1 
(cited in note 218); Verified Complaint Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220, High River Ltd Part-
nership v Forest Laboratories, Inc, No 6614-CS, *13 (Del Chanc filed June 28, 2011). 
 224 See, for example, Verified Complaint Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 225, High River Ltd 
Partnership v Biogen Idec Inc, No 4642-VCS, *5 (Del Chanc filed June 3, 2009); Verified 
Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief, PS Fund 1, LLC v Allergan, Inc, 
No 9760-CB, *29–30 (Del Chanc filed June 12, 2014); Verified Complaint Pursuant to 8 
Del. C. § 211, Starboard Value and Opportunity Master Fund Ltd v comScore, Inc, 
No 2017-0533-AGB, *1 (Del Chanc filed July 25, 2017); Verified Complaint Pursuant to 8 
Del. C. § 211, Starboard Value and Opportunity Master Fund Ltd v Office Depot, Inc, 
No 8640-VCL, *1 (Del Chanc filed June 12, 2013). 
 225 Icahn brought cases against Dell (for books and records and breach of fiduciary 
duty), AmTrust Financial (to halt an IPO), and Amylin Pharmaceuticals (for breach of 
fiduciary duty). See, for example, Verified Class Action Complaint, Employees Retirement 
System of St. Louis v Ruprecht, No 9497-VCP, *2 (Del Chanc filed Apr 1, 2014); Verified 
Complaint, Icahn Partners LP v Zyskind, No 2018-0358-AGB, *31 (Del Chanc filed May 
21, 2018); High River Verified Complaint at *23 (cited in note 218); Icahn Partners Verified 
Complaint at *1–2 (cited in note 218). 
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To paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz, their lawsuits are govern-
ance by other means.226 
Finally, it is worth noting that the hedge funds’ claims were 
generally not brought in a class or other representative capacity. 
Third Point’s breach of fiduciary duty claim to invalidate  
Sotheby’s poison pill was ultimately joined by class action plain-
tiffs (two pension funds: LAMPERS and the Employees Retire-
ment System of the City of St. Louis) and consolidated into a sin-
gle action.227 None of the other hedge fund cases we found was 
litigated as a class action. Instead, all were direct actions filed by 
the hedge fund as named plaintiff. 
3. Individual plaintiffs. 
As a final comparison, we examined the litigation patterns of 
repeat-play individual plaintiffs. One of us has recently studied 
litigation filed by seven individuals who regularly appear as 
named plaintiffs in shareholder suits—Robert Berg, Stephen 
Bushansky, Natalie Gordon, Paul Parshall, Matthew Sciabacucchi, 
John Solak, and Shiva Stein.228 Over a five-year period, from 2014 
through 2018, half the time period of our mutual fund study, 
these seven plaintiffs filed 282 shareholder suits. The vast major-
ity of these lawsuits (76 percent) involve challenges to mergers 
and acquisition transactions, which are typically settled for non-
pecuniary relief or for mootness fees.229 
Initially, these plaintiffs filed the bulk of their lawsuits in 
state court, but this trend has now reversed, with most of their 
claims now being filed in federal court. The transformation took 
place over our collection period. In 2014, 82 percent of these plain-
tiffs’ claims were brought in state courts. In 2015, the percentage 
of their claims brought in state court fell to 68 percent, then fell 
even more dramatically in 2016 to 41 percent. By 2017 and 2018, 
the relationship had flipped completely, with 96 percent and 
87 percent of their claims being brought in federal rather than 
 
 226 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War 87 (Princeton 1989) (Michael Howard and Peter 
Paret, eds and trans) (“War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”). 
 227 See Third Point LLC v Ruprecht, 2014 WL 1922029, *2 (Del Chanc). 
 228 Sean J. Griffith, Class Action Nuisance Suits: Evidence from Frequent Filer Share-
holder Plaintiffs, in Brian Fitzpatrick and Randall Thomas, eds, Cambridge International 
Handbook of Class Actions *6 (forthcoming 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/Z9KL 
-7JPS. 
 229 Id at *8. 
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state court.230 This reversal is likely a direct response to the  
Delaware Court of Chancery’s opinion in In re Trulia, Inc Stock-
holder Litigation,231 which made it more difficult to settle merger 
cases for nonpecuniary relief.232 Such cases are the bread-and- 
butter claims of these plaintiffs. Rather than dropping the claims, 
these plaintiffs merely shifted them to federal court, bringing 
them under § 14a of the Exchange Act, to which Trulia does not 
apply.233 
The litigation activity of repeat-play individual plaintiffs and 
hedge fund plaintiffs can be seen as polar opposites. Individual 
plaintiffs bring a great many merger claims on a class or other 
representative basis and settle them for nonpecuniary relief. 
Hedge funds, by contrast, bring a small number of lawsuits, typi-
cally on a nonrepresentative basis, often for injunctive relief 
aimed at increasing leverage in their governance interventions. 
The indicia of litigation agency costs are high for claims brought 
by individual repeat-play plaintiffs, who are often controlled by 
repeat-player attorneys,234 and low for claims brought by hedge 
fund activists. Interestingly, both litigate differently from mutual 
funds, which most often bring federal securities claims for mone-
tary relief on a nonrepresentative basis. 
III.  WHY DON’T MUTUAL FUNDS PARTICIPATE IN  
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION? 
The most striking outcome of the empirical analysis above is 
the simple finding that mutual funds generally do not participate 
in shareholder litigation. Over the ten-year time period we stud-
ied, mutual funds filed a single appraisal case, rarely pursued se-
curities claims, and never participated in state law fiduciary duty 
suits. By contrast, pension funds litigated frequently across a va-
riety of claims; hedge funds used state fiduciary duty suits as lev-
erage in activist interventions; and repeat-play individual claim-
ants filed a mass of claims. While we do not mean to suggest that 
all of these suits would have benefitted mutual fund investors if 
pursued, there are many examples of missed opportunities. Most 
 
 230 Id at *8–10. 
 231 129 A3d 884 (Del Chanc 2016). 
 232 See id at 896. See also Part I.B.2. 
 233 Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia at 293, 300–01 (cited in note 102). 
 234 See Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation, 
65 Fla L Rev 1089, 1107 (2013). 
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obviously, the claims against Valeant, Countrywide, Tyco, 
Petrobras, and American Realty attracted the attention of only a 
few fund families in our sample; other funds with standing to sue 
missed out on potentially large opt-out settlements. 
Nor do the data suggest that mutual funds are merely free 
riding, letting others do the hard work of litigation, while they 
stand to collect the benefits. Mutual funds have a history of fail-
ing to claim settlement proceeds at the end of class action cases.235 
Furthermore, mutual funds exert no apparent effort to channel 
the conduct of such litigation or to prevent litigation agency costs 
from wasting corporate assets. In other words, with rare excep-
tions, mutual funds participated in shareholder litigation in es-
sentially the same way as rationally apathetic shareholders—by 
staying out of it.236 
These results are surprising given the large blocks held by 
the mutual funds in our sample. For example, as of March 2016, 
Vanguard had at least a 5 percent stake in 1,855 publicly traded 
companies.237 A stake of that size should provide a powerful in-
centive to participate in litigation that might lead to shareholder 
compensation. It would also provide the fund with the ability to 
shape litigation outcomes and contain litigation agency costs if it 
was interested in doing so. 
Furthermore, mutual funds tend to be diversified across the 
market, which makes them repeat players in litigation and gov-
ernance. Because they can anticipate that similar issues will 
 
 235 See James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your 
Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institu-
tions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 Stan L Rev 411, 424 (2005) 
(finding that only 28 percent of eligible institutional investors filed claims to collect settle-
ment proceeds, effectively leaving substantial sums of money unclaimed). See also Glater, 
Suits Contend Mutual Funds Fail to Collect (cited in note 122) (noting lawsuits filed in the 
wake of this discovery). More recent work suggests not much has changed in this regard. 
See 10 Years Removed from Cox & Thomas: A Survey of the Claims Filing Landscape for 
U.S. and Non-U.S. Securities Litigation Recoveries (Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, 
Nov 5, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/BY5N-SMRY (citing research estimating that 
35 percent of eligible institutional investors claim settlement proceeds). See also Jessica 
Erickson, Automating Securities Class Action Settlements, 72 Vand L Rev 1817, 1830 
(2019) (reporting conversations with claims administrators who estimate that “approxi-
mately twenty to twenty-five percent of claim forms will be returned”). 
 236 See John C. Coffee Jr, Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 
Colum L Rev 288, 304 (2010) (stating that “the same apathy that confounds the opt-in 
class action at the outset also arises at the back end of the opt-out class action when claims 
must be filed”). 
 237 Fichtner, Heemskerk, and Garcia-Bernardo, 19 Bus & Polit at 312 tbl 2 (cited in 
note 4). 
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recur across their portfolio, they ought to have strong incentives 
to use litigation to achieve portfolio-wide deterrence and govern-
ance benefits. If a shareholder lawsuit will deter bad behavior, 
the mutual fund will accrue benefits across their broad portfolio. 
Additionally, mutual funds’ limited exit options should increase 
the desirability of using litigation to implement deterrence and 
governance reform. This is especially true for the large index fund 
providers. As Bill McNabb, the former CEO of Vanguard put it: 
“Index fund managers must care as much as—if not more than—
anybody else. We essentially own shares forever, because we can’t 
sell out of an equity listed on an index.”238 Index funds have an-
other reason to pursue shareholder litigation that results in com-
pensation: the inflow of settlement proceeds can be a source of 
income for funds, allowing them to reduce fees to investors, 
thereby attracting greater fund inflows.239 
Yet we have found that mutual funds—actively managed and 
indexed alike—generally do not use the lever of litigation to in-
fluence the governance of portfolio companies. Why not? This Part 
evaluates potential explanations for the failure of mutual funds 
to participate in shareholder litigation. It considers legal barriers, 
structural obstacles, agency costs and conflicts, the circularity 
problem, and finally, the possibility that nonparticipation in 
shareholder litigation is a revealed preference of mutual funds. 
A. Legal Barriers 
It is possible that some kinds of shareholder claims present 
substantive legal barriers that prevent mutual funds from taking 
a leading role. For example, 10b-5 claims require both that the 
claimant be a “purchaser or seller” of the underlying security and 
that the claimant relied upon the defendant’s misrepresentation 
in transacting in the security, both of which may present difficul-
ties for index funds in particular.240 As long-term investors, most 
of an index fund’s investment in the relevant company will have 
been acquired prior to the defendant’s false statements and held 
 
 238 McNabb, The Ultimate Long-Term Investors (cited in note 11). 
 239 In this way, settlement proceeds could serve a function much like mutual funds’ 
securities lending activities, providing a source of revenue to mitigate the cost of lower 
fees. See generally John Waggoner, Securities Lending Adds Return, Risk for Funds (In-
vestmentNews, May 16, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/P2NE-FA6L (explaining that 
index funds are significant lenders of shares because returns from securities lending help 
offset losses due to declining fees). 
 240 See Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723, 737–38, 749 (1975). 
2020] A Mission Statement for Mutual Funds 1205 
 
through to the revelation of truth. Index funds, in other words, 
will generally be holders, not buyers or sellers, and the bulk of 
their portfolio may thus be ineligible to bring a 10b-5 claim. 
Nevertheless, even index funds engage in significant trading 
activity.241 Index funds regularly rebalance their portfolios to 
bring their holdings in line with the index they track, and buy 
and sell shares to manage flows of capital into and out of the fund. 
As a result, although a large portion of their assets under man-
agement may not trade during the relevant period, it is highly 
likely that large index funds will engage in at least some trading 
during the period. As a result, index funds likely have standing 
to be involved in virtually every claim. 
What about reliance? If an index fund does trade to rebalance 
its portfolio or to accommodate investors buying into or selling out 
of the fund, it may have difficulty establishing that it did so in 
reliance upon a portfolio company’s underlying misstatement. 
The claim might be that any such trading is motivated by the 
company’s proportional representation in the index, not by any-
thing the company has said or done. Such an argument might 
seem to have the effect of systemically rebutting reliance, at least 
for index funds. 
While we acknowledge that this argument renders reliance 
contestable, we also think index funds have a powerful reply, 
based upon the dynamics of fraud on the market.242 The price of a 
portfolio company’s shares determines its proportional represen-
tation in an index.243 As a result, if fraud inflates prices, it will 
often lead to a security’s overrepresentation in the index. Hence, 
in buying shares based upon a security’s proportional representa-
tion in an index, the fund may buy more (or less) of the security 
than it otherwise would as a result of the fraudulent inflation (or 
deflation) of the security’s price.244 This is just a further link in 
 
 241 See Davidson Heath, et al, Passive Investors Are Passive Monitors *3 (unpublished 
manuscript, Mar 15, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/Y4A2-JPXQ (documenting trad-
ing by passive and indexed mutual funds). 
 242 See Basic Inc v Levinson, 485 US 224, 247 (1988) (adopting the fraud on the mar-
ket theory); Halliburton Co v Erica P. John Fund, Inc, 573 US 258, 274–77 (2014) (reaf-
firming the fraud on the market theory). 
 243 See Chad Langager, How Is the Value of the S&P 500 Calculated? (Investopedia, 
June 28, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/L4J4-DAV5. 
 244 For indices that weight companies based on their market capitalization, the in-
flated price may not require the company to buy more shares—holding the same number 
of shares valued at a higher price will increase the weight of the company in the index. 
But even in these cases, if funds rebalance because of inflows or outflows of investor cash, 
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the chain of reliance. Funds may not trade in direct reliance on 
price, but they do buy in reliance on the security’s proportional 
representation in the index, which is determined by price. Fraud 
thus affects an index fund’s investment much as it does an active 
investor who trades based on price. The reliance requirement 
likely does not pose a meaningful barrier. 
Furthermore, contrary to what we have just argued, if either 
reliance or the purchaser/seller requirement were the primary 
barrier to mutual fund participation in shareholder litigation, we 
would expect active funds to be more involved in shareholder lit-
igation than index funds.245 Yet this is not the case. None of our 
empirical investigations into the litigation activity of mutual 
funds suggested any difference between active and index funds, 
or more specifically, mutual fund companies that predominantly 
offer index funds (such as T. Rowe Price and Fidelity) and those 
that predominantly offer passive funds (such as Vanguard and 
State Street). Their participation in shareholder litigation is es-
sentially indistinguishable. This suggests that substantive legal 
rules are not the problem. 
Finally, not only are mutual funds eligible plaintiffs in secu-
rities suits, they are ideal plaintiffs in derivative suits. Because 
they are paradigmatic long-term investors, index funds easily sat-
isfy the requirement that derivative plaintiffs hold shares from 
the time of injury through conclusion of the suit (the “contempo-
raneous ownership” requirement).246 The contemporaneous own-
ership requirement may pose an obstacle to active traders who 
prefer exit to litigation, but because long-term shareholding is the 
core of index funds’ investment strategy, it poses no obstacle to 
them. Yet we could not find a single derivative suit filed by an 
index fund (or any of our mutual funds) over a ten-year period. 
The explanation must be something other than substantive legal 
barriers. 
 
the increased price will cause the fund to buy or sell too many shares of the fraudulent 
company, which would likely satisfy the reliance requirement. 
 245 Active funds seek to overweight well-performing companies and underweight poorly 
performing companies. See Bernard S. Black and John C. Coffee Jr, Hail Britannia?: Insti-
tutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 Mich L Rev 1997, 2048, 2063–64 
(1994) (“Overweighting means that the institution owns a greater share of the specific 
company than it owns of the market generally. An overweighted firm has a greater incen-
tive to intervene, because it will gain more from success than its competitors.”). 
 246 See J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement, 
33 Del J Corp L 673, 674–76, 694 (2008) (discussing the contemporaneous ownership re-
quirement, and recommending that it be eliminated). 
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B. Structural Obstacles 
A second possibility is that the structure of ownership rights 
and decision-making authority allocated to mutual funds pre-
sents an obstacle to active participation in shareholder litigation. 
As discussed, the power to bring litigation on the basis of portfolio 
company holdings is a default feature of the standard mutual 
fund investment contract.247 But not every mutual fund investor 
gets the standard contract. Approximately 10 percent of mutual 
fund investors are institutions—funds, corporations, and finan-
cial institutions—not individuals.248 Those institutional investors 
may have different contractual relationships with the mutual 
fund family than the individuals who invest in managed accounts. 
For example, some institutional clients contract for investment 
advisory services only.249 Pursuant to these arrangements, insti-
tutional clients may retain their voting and litigation rights. 
This division of rights can present problems for the mutual 
fund family, which will not be able to sue on behalf of the clients 
that have retained their litigation rights. In general, mutual fund 
families opt to solicit consent from those institutional clients be-
fore bringing a shareholder suit. Some investors might never con-
sent to litigate,250 and administrative difficulties associated with 
soliciting and obtaining investor consent might deter mutual 
funds from bringing shareholder suits in the first place. While we 
recognize that this administrative difficulty exists, we do not view 
it as a substantial impediment to shareholder litigation. For ex-
ample, funds could issue different shares to institutional and in-
dividual clients in order to separate those on whose behalf they 
do or do not have the right to litigate.251 
 
 247 See note 122 and accompanying text. 
 248 Investment Company Fact Book at *60 (cited in note 3) (showing that institutions 
held 10 percent of mutual fund assets in 2017). 
 249 See, for example, Vanguard Institutional Advisory Services: Partnering with Your 
Organization *1 (Vanguard, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/6HUP-8R27 (explaining 
that institutions can secure Vanguard as a cofiduciary and retain investment advice for 
assets that remain under institutional management). 
 250 For example, a corporate pension fund (for example, the Apple 401(k) plan) seems 
unlikely to consent to litigation against the corporate issuer (Apple). See Part III.D.1. 
 251 The practice would be similar to issuing different classes of shares to track differ-
ent fee arrangements, a practice currently followed by several mutual funds in order to 
reward (and encourage) larger investors. For example, Vanguard offers lower expense ra-
tios with its “Admiral” class shares, which have eligibility requirements that differ from 
“Investor” class shares only in their minimum investment thresholds. See Admiral Shares 
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Perhaps the obstacle is not the organization of the fund’s in-
vestors, but rather the organization of fund management. The 
mutual fund representatives that we spoke to informed us that 
litigation decisions are often siloed in the general counsel’s office 
and made without input from either the stewardship group 
charged with overseeing portfolio company governance or the 
portfolio managers charged with making investment decisions. 
Insofar as a fund’s litigation activities are housed in the general 
counsel’s office, distinct from fund management, then those with 
the best information and expertise—that is, portfolio managers 
with intimate knowledge of the companies in which they invest—
may be unable to influence whether and how litigation proceeds. 
Note too that legal departments are generally seen as cost rather 
than profit centers, suggesting incentives—remaining within 
budget and mitigating risk—that are inconsistent with entrepre-
neurial litigation. As a result, the general counsel’s office may dis-
favor bringing even those claims that are suggested by portfolio 
managers.252 
Still, while we acknowledge that organizational obstacles can 
pose a challenge, such problems are entirely within the power of 
fund families to solve. The siloing of legal and operational depart-
ments can be solved by reorganizing reporting lines within the 
firm and empowering fund managers or stewardship groups to 
consider at least some kinds of shareholder claims. Moreover, 
funds could hire outside law firms to assist in these efforts; they 
could also hire in-house attorneys to assist fund managers and 
members of the stewardship team in evaluating and monitoring 
claims.253 These costs would more than pay for themselves if they 
resulted in just one additional recovery each year.254 The fact that 
funds have generally not made these changes suggests that some 
 
Help Keep Your Costs Under Control (Vanguard), archived at https://perma.cc/MVV3 
-98YC. 
 252 Portfolio managers may have their own reasons for avoiding litigation, such as a 
fear of having their access to management cut off as a result of bringing a claim. See  
Bebchuk and Hirst, 119 Colum L Rev at 2062–65 (cited in note 14). We consider these 
incentive conflicts below. See Part III.D.1. 
 253 Many mutual fund families are in the process of expanding their stewardship 
groups. See, for example, Ning Chiu, BlackRock’s Annual Letter to CEOs Focuses on Doing 
Good and Continues to Emphasize Governance and Strategy (Davis Polk, Jan 17, 2018), 
archived at https://perma.cc/TU83-LKL3 (explaining that BlackRock plans to double the 
size of its corporate governance group). 
 254 As Part II.A reveals, mutual funds can reap tens of millions of dollars when set-
tling claims against portfolio companies. 
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factor other than structural obstacles explains the failure to par-
ticipate in shareholder litigation. 
C. Circularity 
Perhaps it is the structure of mutual fund holdings, not the 
organizations that hold them, that inhibits shareholder litigation. 
Mutual funds are broadly diversified. Index funds, in particular, 
own essentially all publicly traded securities. As a result, some 
shareholder suits instigated by a mutual fund will be paid by the 
fund itself, as a shareholder of the corporate defendant.255 This, of 
course, is a version of the circularity problem reviewed above.256 
In our conversations with mutual fund representatives, they 
emphasized the circularity problem in answering why they are 
not more active participants in shareholder litigation. And they 
have a point. The circularity critique applies against several of 
the forms of shareholder litigation we reviewed above. Circularity 
suggests that compensation from successful securities class ac-
tions and even derivative suits are unimportant to long-term di-
versified shareholders. Circularity would also apply in the rare 
merger cases that recover additional deal compensation, provided 
that both the buyer and the target are represented in the fund’s 
portfolio. In such cases, broadly diversified long-term sharehold-
ers would not necessarily prefer that the buyer pay more for the 
target company because they are effectively paying themselves.257 
However, in this context, the extent of the circularity problem de-
pends on the relative weight of a fund’s holdings. For example, a 
fund that owns a substantially larger fraction of the target than 
 
 255 See, for example, Amanda M. Rose and Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 
105 Nw U L Rev 1679, 1688 n 32 (2011). 
 256 See text accompanying notes 110–13. 
 257 Because broadly diversified shareholders are as sensitive to overpayment as they 
are to underpayment, they would have a preference for passivity in takeover defenses. See 
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161, 1177–78 (1981). See also Ronald J. 
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Ten-
der Offers, 33 Stan L Rev 819, 831–48 (1981). For index funds, however, the incentives 
may be slightly different. Index funds are likely to own a proportionally greater interest 
in large market cap companies than in small market cap companies due to their weighting 
in the index. See text accompanying notes 243–44. Their interest in M&A thus depends 
on who is buying whom. If the deal is one in which a large company buys a smaller one, as 
is often the case, the index fund may prefer to pay the smallest possible premium because 
they are more exposed to overpayment than underpayment. This will be a systematic pref-
erence. Index funds will be indifferent to premia only in deals in which companies of sim-
ilar size (and therefore similar weight in the index) acquire each other. 
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the acquiring company may still have incentives to pursue merger 
litigation or seek appraisal. 
More fundamentally, however, compensation is not the only 
goal of shareholder litigation. Shareholder suits can also provide 
deterrence and governance enhancements. Lawsuits that actively 
police managerial misconduct will benefit the fund across its hold-
ings not only by punishing misconduct when it occurs but also by 
discouraging misconduct at other firms in the portfolio. Likewise, 
governance enhancements extracted through litigation may im-
prove the performance of firms in the portfolio, leading other 
firms to copy these innovations, and enhancing the value of the 
portfolio as a whole. Of course, litigation is an expensive way  
to accomplish these goals, but in certain cases, such as those  
involving egregious industry-wide fraud, litigation could pay off 
for investors. 
Moreover, not all shareholder suits are intraportfolio. Share-
holder suits may also arise against firms as they exit the portfolio. 
In some cases, the mutual fund may be able to exit from the in-
vestment by selling down shares: for example, T. Rowe Price’s ac-
tively managed funds unloaded the bulk of their Valeant shares 
before commencing litigation against the drug company.258 But 
not all funds will be able to exit by selling their shares. In those 
circumstances, a company can still exit the fund’s portfolio 
through bankruptcy or acquisition, in which case compensation 
paid to shareholder plaintiffs would not be funded by other public 
shareholders. For example, a severe fraud may push a company 
into bankruptcy, in which case shareholder recoveries from secu-
rities or fiduciary duty lawsuits come not from other public share-
holders but from assets otherwise available to creditors of the 
firm.259 Shareholder suits against Enron and WorldCom, firms 
driven into bankruptcy by managerial misconduct, were not 
funded by public company shareholders and therefore do not pre-
sent the circularity problem. 
Likewise, acquisitions of public companies by nonpublic enti-
ties, such as private equity funds, also do not invoke circularity 
concerns. Because a company that is taken private does not by 
 
 258 See Vardi, Valeant’s Longest Supporter (cited in note 182) (noting that T. Rowe 
Price sold most of its Valeant shares just months before filing suit). See also Part II.A.5. 
 259 They likely come from D&O insurance proceeds. See Baker and Griffith, 95 
Georgetown L J at 1802–03 (cited in note 117) (discussing how D&O policies fund litigation 
recoveries against insolvent companies). 
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definition have a public company buyer, public company investors 
are not on both sides of the transaction. The Dell transaction we 
discussed above is a good example of this—the mutual fund plain-
tiffs with investments in Dell did not need to worry that the ap-
praisal litigation would affect the share price because they were 
no longer shareholders of the new privately held company.260 As a 
result, shareholder suits that cause additional consideration to be 
paid in take-private transactions, whether these suits are 
brought as fiduciary duty claims or appraisal actions, are not sub-
ject to the circularity critique. Mutual funds would benefit from 
such suits. 
D. Agency Problems 
Mutual funds’ lack of engagement in shareholder litigation 
may be explained by a principal-agent problem: the interests of 
the institution charged with making the litigation decisions may 
diverge from the interests of the institution’s investors. Agency 
cost issues are frequently raised to account for perceived defects 
in how mutual funds exercise their voting rights.261 They may 
thus also play a role in explaining how mutual funds exercise lit-
igation rights.262 In discussing these issues, we will distinguish 
between three distinct agency cost problems. First, mutual fund 
complexes are for-profit institutions and suffer from conflicts of 
interest that may affect litigation decisions. Second, intermedia-
tion creates collective action problems that may cause mutual 
funds to engage in a suboptimal amount of litigation. Third and 
relatedly, a mutual fund’s fee structure may lead to suboptimal 
incentives to litigate. We address each of these agency problems 
in turn below. 
1. Corporate client conflict. 
Mutual funds’ incentives to cater to the interests of their cor-
porate clients may lead them astray from acting as faithful stew-
ards of their investors’ capital, a situation we have elsewhere 
 
 260 See text accompanying notes 193–97. 
 261 See Bebchuk and Hirst, 119 Colum L Rev at 2043–75 (cited in note 14); Gilson and 
Gordon, 152 U Pa L Rev at 789 (cited in note 83); Lund, 43 J Corp L at 498–506 (cited in 
note 14); Rock and Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Governance at *16 (cited in note 5). 
 262 See, for example, Webber, 38 Del J Corp L at 923 (cited in note 15) (discussing 
agency problems that may compromise mutual funds’ efforts in litigation). 
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referred to as “Corporate Client Conflict.”263 The most obvious—
but by no means only—such conflict is corporate 401(k) accounts. 
Insofar as fund families derive profits from assets under manage-
ment and corporate 401(k) accounts are a large source of potential 
assets under management, fund families have a strong incentive 
not to sue the corporations that direct 401(k) assets to them.264 In 
this way, corporate client conflict may undermine mutual funds’ 
efforts in litigation. 
Consider BlackRock, one of the world’s largest asset manag-
ers with over $6 trillion assets under management (AUM).265 Ap-
proximately two-thirds of BlackRock’s AUM comes from corpo-
rate pension plans.266 Investors pay a fee that is calculated as a 
percentage of these assets, and that fee accrues to BlackRock, ra-
ther than the fund.267 In total, these fees make up about 83 per-
cent of BlackRock’s revenue.268 
Recently, however, BlackRock—like all mutual fund fami-
lies—has faced pressure to lower fees. This is in part because com-
petition over fees has become more intense, especially for the pas-
sively managed mutual funds in which BlackRock specializes.269 
Hence, BlackRock has focused on diversifying its revenue sources, 
primarily by providing other services to corporations and institu-
tional clients.270 BlackRock is not unique in this respect—large 
mutual fund complexes often provide a range of client services, 
including brokerage, underwriting, insurance, or banking 
 
 263 Griffith and Lund, 99 BU L Rev at 1157 (cited in note 14). 
 264 This conflict results in problems for investors in other contexts as well. See  
William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the 
Mutual Fund Industry, 80 Tulane L Rev 1401, 1441–42 (2006); Tamar Frankel, Advisory 
Fees: Evolving Theories, 10 Investment Lawyer 21, 21–23 (2003); John P. Freeman and 
Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J Corp 
L 609, 639–40 (2001); Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 
J Econ Persp 161, 172 (2004). 
 265 This example also appears in our recent publication, Griffith and Lund, 99 BU L 
Rev at 1176–79 (cited in note 14). Note that by choosing BlackRock as an example, we do 
not suggest that it experiences more severe conflicts than other mutual fund complexes. 
Similar conflicts likely exist at all institutional investors. 
 266 See Fiduciary for You: 2017 Annual Report *6 (BlackRock, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/3P48-3YU3. 
 267 Fisch, Hamdani, and Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street at *9 (cited in 
note 14). 
 268 Q4 2017 Earnings: Earnings Release Supplement *9 (BlackRock, Jan 12, 2018), 
archived at https://perma.cc/UM7S-U839. 
 269 Jason Zweig and Sarah Krouse, Fees on Mutual Funds and ETFs Tumble Toward 
Zero (Wall St J, Jan 26, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/2NWR-R6HZ. 
 270 See Fiduciary for You at *35 (cited in note 266). 
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services. But insofar as BlackRock and other funds depend upon 
corporate revenue lines, they may be less likely to oppose corpo-
rations, in either voting or litigation. 
Evidence supporting this view comes from findings that mu-
tual fund complexes are very likely to vote for management pro-
posals, especially when they hold a large percentage of assets un-
der management in passive investment vehicles.271 Likewise, 
mutual funds almost never bring shareholder proposals or proac-
tively engage in shareholder activism.272 If voting against man-
agement likely threatens the mutual fund business, suing man-
agement certainly does.273 Any suit that requires the mutual fund 
to take a position contrary to management—which is to say all 
shareholder suits—would threaten to disrupt the fund’s ability to 
retain or win 401(k) assets or other business from management.274 
These incentives are compounded by reputational effects. For ex-
ample, if BlackRock were known in the market to litigate against 
managers, regardless of whether they in fact managed assets or 
had other business from that particular corporate client, it might 
discourage other corporate clients from placing business with 
BlackRock. 
Nevertheless, Corporate Client Conflict does not necessarily 
dampen funds’ incentives to bring all forms of shareholder litiga-
tion. For one, challenging egregious instances of fraud is not as 
likely to result in blowback from chastened management teams 
or other companies. Indeed, the examples of misconduct described 
in Part II.A all involved instances of headline-making fraud and 
misconduct and generated litigation from dozens of defendants. 
 
 271 Alon Brav, et al, Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fights: How Mutual Fund 
Voting Shapes Proxy Contests *3 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Finance 
Working Paper No 601/2019, Mar 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/5DNZ-KYQZ; Ryan 
Bubb and Emiliano Catan, The Party Structure of Mutual Funds *3, 23 (unpublished man-
uscript, Mar 8, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/3KGT-MVJJ. 
 272 Bebchuk and Hirst, 119 Colum L Rev at 2103 (cited in note 14); John Morley, Too 
Big to Be Activist, 92 S Cal L Rev 1407, 1413–14 (2019). 
 273 See Gerald F. Davis and E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual 
Funds, 85 J Fin Econ 552, 554 (2007) (noting Vanguard founder Jack Bogle’s statement in 
a letter to the SEC that “[v]otes against management may jeopardize the retention of cli-
ents of 401(k) and pension accounts’’). 
 274 In theory, a fund’s promise to control litigation agency costs would be desirable 
from management’s perspective. For example, were a fund to commit ex ante to helping 
the company avoid meritless litigation, it could possibly attract clients, rather than alien-
ate them. But the practical reality is that screening often requires intervening and object-
ing to meritless settlements—which necessitates taking an adversarial position against 
management. 
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In such cases, the decision to participate in litigation might be 
viewed as inevitable, rather than an opportunistic decision to 
challenge a particular management team warranting cutting off 
a business relationship. 
Similarly, a company exiting the portfolio through bank-
ruptcy will not be able to punish mutual funds for litigating 
against it nor will managers who, like Dennis Kozlowski, are sent 
to prison for committing fraud.275 Corporate Client Conflict may 
therefore operate as a weaker constraint with regard to bankrupt 
defendants, especially when misconduct suggests the end of the 
managers’ careers as well. Likewise, Corporate Client Conflict 
may not constrain funds from bringing shareholder suits against 
target companies that have been acquired. However, insofar as 
the managers of these companies do not themselves exit the mar-
ket but go on to manage other firms (or continue to work at the 
company that acquired the defendant company), Corporate Client 
Conflict may still exert some deterrent effect on merger suits 
brought by mutual funds. Managers who are in jail or otherwise 
out of the C-suite are in no position to retaliate, but managers 
who go on to serve as managers at other firms are. 
2. Collective action problems. 
The reluctance of mutual funds to participate in shareholder 
litigation may also be related to the collective nature of lawsuit 
recoveries. Compensation paid in a securities class action, for ex-
ample, is awarded pro rata to the class, meaning that a mutual 
fund that sues secures benefits according to its proportional stake 
in the company, but so too do mutual fund competitors whose 
portfolios also include the corporate defendant. Likewise, any 
benefits from deterrence or governance enhancements won 
through litigation will also be enjoyed not only by the fund bring-
ing the lawsuit but also by every other fund (and every other in-
vestor) that also owns the underlying company. Insofar as mutual 
funds compete for capital inflows on the basis of their perfor-
mance relative to other funds, they have little incentive to use 
litigation to improve performance on a pro rata basis.276 This is 
 
 275 See text accompanying notes 169–71. 
 276 Professor Edward Rock was one of the first to draw attention to this phenomenon 
as a barrier to institutional investor engagement in corporate governance. See Edward B. 
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 
Georgetown L J 445, 453–57, 461–62 (1991) (discussing the free-rider problem created by 
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especially true if lawsuits are costly, in which case litigious funds 
bear all the costs while sharing the benefits with rival funds. The 
collective nature of lawsuit recoveries thus inhibits mutual funds 
from participating in litigation to bring them about. 
Several scholars have recently focused on the collective action 
problem arising from mutual funds’ measurement of their perfor-
mance on a relative basis.277 As one of us has pointed out, this 
problem is most pronounced for index funds.278 Active funds, by 
contrast, may be able to increase their relative performance by 
using the levers of corporate governance, including litigation.279 
Our point here is not to claim that collective action problems 
are insurmountable, but to acknowledge their role in shaping mu-
tual funds’ incentives to litigate. In particular, collective action 
problems may explain the failure of mutual funds to serve as lead 
plaintiffs.280 Many forms of shareholder suits seek to reduce the 
cost of participating as plaintiff—for example, taking attorneys’ 
fees out of the recovery, taxing them to the corporate defendant 
rather than the plaintiff, and, in some cases, providing an incen-
tive payment to lead plaintiffs to offset costs incurred in monitor-
ing class counsel.281 But none of these strategies addresses the 
problems created by the sharing of the benefit. This incentive 
problem is compounded by the Corporate Client Conflict 
 
the fact that the fruits of any such efforts at disciplining management will be shared with 
the rest of the class, while the costs will be borne by the mutual fund alone). 
 277 See, for example, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst, 31 J Econ Persp at 97–98 (cited in note 
14); Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum L Rev 863, 890 (2013). 
 278 See Lund, 43 J Corp L at 510–11 (cited in note 14). 
 279 Id at 512. Others contest that passive index funds’ incentives will lead to too little 
stewardship. Professors Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani, and Steven Solomon claim that index 
funds compete with active funds for capital inflows which may give them an incentive to 
engage with corporate governance. See Fisch, Hamdani, and Solomon, The New Titans of 
Wall Street at *12–20 (cited in note 14). Professors Edward Rock and Marcel Kahan, mean-
while, acknowledge that performance benefits must be shared with other investors but 
emphasize the direct benefits in fees that the largest index funds stand to gain from im-
provements in portfolio company performance. See Rock and Kahan, Index Funds and 
Corporate Governance at *26–28 (cited in note 5). 
 280 See Webber, 38 Del J Corp L at 940–41 (cited in note 15) (“For mutual funds that 
compete with one another . . . serving as a lead plaintiff means incurring costs while con-
ferring free benefits on your competitors.”). 
 281 See Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action 
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L Rev 1303, 1320 (2006) (finding that incentive 
fees were reported in 104 of 374 cases). The PSLRA generally bars incentive awards in 
securities class actions. See 15 USC § 78u-4(a)(4). However, Delaware courts have occa-
sionally awarded incentive fees. See, for example, Chen v Howard-Anderson, 2017 WL 
2842185, *17 (Del Chanc) (awarding $1.25 million in incentive fees to plaintiffs). 
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discussed above—a litigious fund may not be able to find  
corporate clients. Better, then, to free ride on the efforts of other 
investors. 
Nevertheless, the collective action problem does not apply to 
non–pro rata recoveries. Not all shareholder suits are class ac-
tions. As noted above, mutual fund plaintiffs can and occasionally 
do opt out of shareholder class actions in order to bring their own 
claims. For example, each of the shareholder suits brought by 
fund families against Countrywide, Petrobras, Tyco, Valeant, and 
American Realty were individual actions and therefore not sub-
ject to the collective action problem.282 Whatever funds BlackRock 
recovered in these claims were retained by BlackRock alone and 
not shared with Vanguard or State Street. The fact that the col-
lective action problem does not apply to these claims may explain 
why they were brought in this way, but it does not explain why 
there were only five of them over a ten-year period. Likewise, the 
collective action problem does not apply to appraisal actions 
which, like individual securities suits, are not shared with a 
broader class that necessarily includes a funds’ competitors. 
Therefore, the fact that funds do not bring appraisal actions can-
not be attributed to collective action problems. 
3. Diminished incentives due to fee structure. 
Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst observe that mu-
tual funds may underinvest in stewardship because they receive 
only a small percentage of any gains.283 As discussed, mutual fund 
fees are set at a percentage of assets under management. As such, 
the mutual fund family will not be interested in investing in stew-
ardship if it is unlikely to increase assets under management, and 
therefore, the amount of fees that the fund complex collects. The 
same incentive problem affects litigation decisions as much as 
other forms of stewardship. In other words, the problem might 
not be that the benefit from participating in litigation is shared, 
but that the benefit to the fund family is small or negligible. 
However, as the examples in Part II.A demonstrate, steward-
ship litigation can generate many benefits for mutual fund inves-
tors. And mutual fund portfolio managers owe fiduciary duties to 
their investors. They are therefore obligated to pursue litigation 
 
 282 See Part II.A. 
 283 See Bebchuk and Hirst, 119 Colum L Rev at 2052–56 (cited in note 14). 
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in the best interests of their investors even when it does not result 
in a substantial benefit to the institution itself. 
E. A Revealed Preference on Stewardship 
Finally, focusing on the parallel between voting and litigation 
as alternative stewardship techniques gives rise to a further pos-
sibility—that mutual funds’ failure to participate in shareholder 
litigation reveals their actual preferences with respect to stew-
ardship generally. According to this view, the difference between 
their willingness to vote in shareholder elections and their reluc-
tance to litigate comes from the simple fact that voting is empha-
sized and, in some cases, required by regulators while litigation 
is not. Under these circumstances, the failure to engage in litiga-
tion thus can be read to suggest that if voting were not the subject 
of regulatory attention, mutual funds would not vote either. 
Mutual funds almost always vote,284 but this was not always 
so. Indeed, Jack Bogle, the inventor of the index fund, recalled a 
time when mutual fund managers believed that they should leave 
the performance of the companies in their portfolios to “the invis-
ible hand of the marketplace.”285 But as investor dollars continued 
to flow into mutual funds, rendering them a powerful force in cor-
porate governance, the SEC made their fiduciary obligations 
clear—at least with respect to voting. Specifically, in 2003 the 
SEC adopted rules stating that investment advisors are required 
by fiduciary duty to cast votes in the best interests of their inves-
tors and requiring mutual funds to disclose how they vote.286 
 
 284 See 2018 Proxy Season Review *4 (ProxyPulse, Oct 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/2WPH-7X78 (reporting institutional investor voting participation at 
91 percent, compared to 28 percent for retail investors). For discussion of the reasons why 
mutual funds are now actively voting, see Part II.B. Further, mutual funds increasingly 
boast about their voting. See 2018 Investment Stewardship Report at *3 (cited in note 13) 
(emphasizing “four pillars” of engagement: board composition, executive compensation, 
oversight of risk and strategy, and governance structures); Asset Stewardship (cited in 
note 10) (“Our approach to stewardship is designed to have an impact through thought 
leadership, engagement, proxy voting and client disclosure.”); Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 
2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose (BlackRock, 2018), online at https:// 
www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (visited Feb 
24, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (noting that “our responsibility to engage and vote 
is more important than ever”). 
 285 Krouse, Benoit, and McGinty, Meet the New Corporate Power Brokers (cited in  
note 4). 
 286 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, 
68 Fed Reg 6585, 6586 (2003), codified at 17 CFR § 275.206(4)-6(a)–(b). See also Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records 
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Overlaying these obligations are regulations created by the  
Department of Labor (DOL) that strongly encourage funds man-
aging ERISA assets to vote.287 Although many mutual funds do 
not manage ERISA assets, fund advisors may reason that given 
the lack of an obvious distinction between pension fund fiduciary 
duties and mutual fund fiduciary duties, they are likewise com-
pelled to vote.288 Although there are good reasons to question this 
legal interpretation, it may nevertheless be followed by fund man-
agers to mitigate compliance risk.289 As a result, funds now em-
ploy third-party proxy advisors and in-house stewardship teams 
to manage the voting of their massive portfolios.290 And they do so 
largely because regulators have told them to. 
Regulators have made no such pronouncement with regard 
to litigation. Neither the SEC nor the DOL has ever adopted rules 
suggesting that fund advisors’ duties to their investors compel 
them to litigate. Nor are we suggesting that they should. But the 
obvious parallel between the benefits attainable through voting 
and the arguably greater benefits attainable through participat-
ing in litigation suggest that if mutual fund stewardship 
 
by Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed Reg 6564, 6564 (2003), codified 
at 17 CFR §§ 239, 249, 270, 274. 
 287 The Department of Labor articulated its position first in a set of letter rulings. See 
Letter of Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary, US Department of Labor, Feb 23, 
1988, reprinted in 15 Pension Rptr (BNA) 391, 392 (1988) (“[T]he decision[s] as to how 
proxies should be voted . . . are fiduciary acts of plan asset management.”); Letter of Alan 
D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Program Operations, Department of Labor, 
Jan 23, 1990, reprinted in 17 Pension Rptr (BNA) 244, 245 (1990) (“[T]he fiduciary act of 
managing plan assets which are shares of corporate stock includes the voting of proxies 
appurtenant to those shares of stock.”). These rulings were later reaffirmed in guidelines 
stating that “[t]he fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock 
includes the management of voting rights appurtenant to those shares of stock.” Employee 
Benefits Security Administration, Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Exercise of Share-
holder Rights, 73 Fed Reg 61731, 61732 (2008). 
 288 See Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J Corp L 217, 219 n 4 (2018) 
(noting that the effect of the DOL’s ruling “has been that investment advisers to mutual 
funds routinely vote the shares of those mutual funds”). 
 289 See Griffith, 98 Tex L Rev at *54 (cited in note 14) (arguing that voting is not 
necessarily compelled by mutual fund advisors’ fiduciary duties). 
 290 A deeper look at mutual funds’ voting records leaves much to be desired. For ex-
ample, mutual fund complexes—and especially the large passive ones—support manage-
ment much more often than other investors. See Bubb and Catan, The Party Structure of 
Mutual Funds at *3 (cited in note 271). They also follow their proxy voting guidelines 
closely, achieving impressive uniformity in voting across vastly different funds. See  
Griffith and Lund, 99 BU L Rev at 1179–82 (cited in note 14); Lund, 43 J Corp L at 517 
(cited in note 14). Therefore, the regulatory pressure may be alleviating the symptom of 
the problem—the lack of voting—rather than resolving the underlying agency problems 
that compromise mutual fund voting. 
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programs were driven by the desire to secure benefits for inves-
tors, such programs would also include litigation. 
What would happen if neither were required? One possibility 
is that mutual funds would neither vote nor litigate. This may be 
going too far. We have shown, after all, that mutual funds rarely 
engage in litigation, not that they never do. Moreover, the fact 
that mutual funds generally do not litigate need not imply that 
funds are indifferent to providing benefits for their investors but 
perhaps only that they are unaware of the benefits that they 
might provide through litigation. The question thus becomes 
whether and how mutual funds could create value for their inves-
tors by engaging in shareholder litigation. This is our central fo-
cus in the next Part. 
IV.  A MISSION STATEMENT FOR MUTUAL FUNDS IN 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
In considering how mutual funds should approach share-
holder litigation, we begin by recognizing the unique position that 
mutual funds occupy in the market. Many mutual funds are mar-
ket investors. They hold a broadly diversified portfolio that puts 
them on both sides in many shareholder suits. Index funds in par-
ticular, by owning essentially all publicly traded equities, are par-
adigmatic market investors. 
Adopting the market investor’s perspective on shareholder 
litigation invokes circularity concerns, at least with respect to 
lawsuits seeking compensation. However, it does not render funds 
indifferent or hostile to shareholder litigation as a whole; market 
investors should be interested in pursuing extraportfolio suits, as 
well as suits that result in improved deterrence or governance en-
hancements. Furthermore, adopting the perspective of the mar-
ket investor suggests an important role for mutual funds in con-
taining litigation agency costs. Because the cost of wasteful 
litigation is distributed throughout the market portfolio, mutual 
funds have an opportunity to exert a gatekeeping role, refusing to 
participate in suits and objecting to settlements that fail to create 
meaningful benefits for shareholders. 
These considerations allow us to frame a mission statement 
for mutual funds in shareholder litigation. In it, we elaborate four 
key principles to guide mutual funds in evaluating and pursuing 
shareholder claims. First, mutual funds should litigate extraport-
folio for compensation. Second, mutual funds should litigate 
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intraportfolio to increase deterrence or, third, to enhance corpo-
rate governance. Fourth, mutual funds should intervene to mini-
mize litigation agency costs. We discuss each of these principles 
in the sections that follow and also suggest how mutual funds 
might overcome obstacles to implementing the mission state-
ment—including the structural impediments and agency prob-
lems described above. As we will show, it is possible for mutual 
funds to implement the mission statement without unduly bur-
dening either the institution or its investors. In fact, we argue 
that by adopting a few simple changes, mutual funds will be able 
to reap litigation benefits without substantially increasing their 
costs. 
A. Litigate Outside of the Portfolio for Compensation 
The circularity critique suggests that it will generally be self-
defeating for mutual funds to seek compensation against intra-
portfolio defendants because the funds will be on both sides of 
such cases and thus pay themselves in the event of a recovery. 
But as discussed, not every instance of shareholder litigation pre-
sents an intraportfolio problem. In these cases, mutual funds 
should litigate for compensation because any amount recovered 
would increase overall portfolio returns, benefitting the fund’s in-
vestors. In the sections that follow, we describe examples of cases 
that would not present an intraportfolio problem for mutual funds 
and thus should be a primary focus for mutual fund litigation. 
1. Exit cases. 
When a company exits the mutual fund’s portfolio, the mu-
tual fund may be able to litigate for additional compensation 
without running into the circularity problem. In particular, when 
a company is acquired or goes bankrupt, the mutual fund may be 
able to challenge misconduct without worrying that it will fund 
its own recovery. We address each exit scenario in turn. 
In the acquisition context, shareholders can bring derivative 
or securities claims challenging the merger, as well as appraisal 
suits, in order to increase the amount they receive in the deal. 
Note again that when mutual funds stand on both sides of the “v,” 
the desirability of participating in shareholder litigation chal-
lenging the merger will often depend on the relative size of those 
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investments.291 From the mutual fund’s perspective, litigating to 
increase the consideration paid in connection with the acquisition 
of one portfolio company by another is typically pointless and, 
once litigation costs are taken into account, wasteful. Such claims 
benefit only those mutual funds with a significantly larger stake 
in the target than in the acquirer. 
But mutual funds should favor merger claims when the ac-
quiring company is not in the fund’s portfolio. This will typically 
be the case in a going-private transaction, but it may also be true 
in cases where the acquirer is not in the index for other reasons. 
In such cases, mutual funds should consider filing derivative or 
direct claims seeking additional consideration. 
Appraisal actions are also possible, but they present a special 
challenge for mutual funds. Appraisal suits are a potentially pow-
erful mechanism to increase consideration paid in acquisitions.292 
But the mechanics of appraisal suits raise the specter of destroy-
ing the deal. Because appraisal rights arise only when the share-
holder has voted against the transaction,293 a large blockholder 
looking to perfect its appraisal rights may cause the deal not to 
be approved. Additionally, even if seeking appraisal does not 
cause the transaction to be voted down, many acquisition agree-
ments contain a term allowing the buyer to terminate the agree-
ment if a sufficiently large group of shareholders seeks ap-
praisal.294 A large blockholder seeking appraisal may thus be 
enough to scuttle the deal. Mutual funds should therefore weigh 
the appraisal option carefully, seeking it only when there are  
indicia of wrongdoing—a cursory process infected with self- 
interest—and when their opposition will not lead to the failure of 
the deal or when they do not mind if it does. 
Second, apart from acquisition, firms may also exit the port-
folio through bankruptcy. When this occurs, shareholders may be 
able to bring derivative or securities law claims against managers 
whose misconduct caused the corporation to fail. Because the 
shareholders’ interest is generally extinguished when firms fail, 
these may not seem to be a promising setting for investor 
 
 291 See text accompanying notes 257–58. 
 292 But see note 198 (describing a trio of decisions from the Delaware Supreme Court 
recognizing the deal price as a market measure of fair value). 
 293 See 8 Del Code Ann § 262(a). 
 294 See Boone, Broughman, and Macias, 62 J L & Econ at 312–13 (cited in note 92) 
(discussing “appraisal out” clauses and finding that they are less common as the likelihood 
of appraisal rises). 
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compensation. However, when the firm failure is caused by fraud 
or mismanagement, there may often be a derivative suit or secu-
rities claim against the individual managers that perpetrated the 
fraud. These cases are typically funded by D&O insurance and, 
on occasion, by contributions from the managers themselves.295 As 
a result, such claims present an opportunity for the mutual fund 
to secure compensation without funding the recovery through the 
portfolio.296 
2. Extraportfolio defendants. 
Not every lawsuit will involve a portfolio company as defend-
ant, and mutual funds should aggressively pursue monetary re-
coveries in those that do not. Such claims arise in two basic con-
texts: (1) derivative suit recoveries funded by individual 
managers, and (2) securities claims against non-issuer defend-
ants. We address each of these contexts in turn. 
In a paradigmatic derivative suit, the shareholder sues on be-
half of the company to force a culpable manager to pay funds back 
into the corporation. Because such recoveries are funded by indi-
vidual managers, not the corporation itself—corporations are 
barred by state law from indemnifying mangers in such cases297—
they do not present the same circularity problem as other  
compensation-based claims. Insurance, however, complicates this 
dynamic. Most D&O policies provide coverage for derivative 
suits.298 As a result, derivative suit recoveries may be largely 
 
 295 For example, the former directors of Enron contributed funds to settle the securi-
ties class actions involving that firm. See Rebecca Smith and Jonathan Weil, Ex-Enron 
Directors Reach Settlement (Wall St J, Jan 10, 2005), archived at https://perma.cc/WB56 
-Q489 (noting that ten former Enron executives agreed to contribute a total of $18 million 
to the settlement). 
 296 Even when the recovery is funded wholly by insurance, because the companies are 
exiting the portfolio, the insurer will not be able to collect future premiums to recoup the 
losses. However, the fund may have to consider whether the insurer is likely to raise pre-
miums for other companies—if so, the market investor will bear these costs across the 
portfolio. Further complications may be introduced into this analysis if the insurer is itself 
a portfolio company. But even in such cases, the structure of D&O coverage, involving 
multiple insurers and reinsurers, not all of which are public companies and therefore 
within the portfolio, suggests that at least some of this cost will fall outside of the portfolio. 
 297 8 Del Code Ann § 145(a)–(b). 
 298 See Baker and Griffith, 95 Georgetown L J at 1803 (cited in note 117). Moreover, 
the deductibles for derivative suit recoveries are substantially lower than the deductibles 
for other forms of loss under most D&O policies, such as the company’s indemnification 
obligations or its own liabilities in securities claims. Id at 1804 n 38. 
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funded by D&O insurance, which again raises the specter of cir-
cularity because corporations pay for D&O policies. 
There is an exception, however, for cases establishing actual 
fraud, either through settlement or adjudication. Policies exclude 
actual fraud from coverage.299 This suggests a narrow way out of 
the circularity problem. The market investor’s incentive to bring 
derivative suits is strongest when the evidence suggests actual 
fraud, in which case recoveries will be funded by individual de-
fendants, not by the company either directly or indirectly through 
insurance. Such claims will likely be rare—the cost of litigation, 
often funded by the corporation through the D&O policy, may of-
ten exceed the potential recovery from individual defendants. But 
even if they are rare, such suits may provide some compensatory 
benefit and, as discussed below, an even greater benefit through 
deterrence. 
The second form of extraportfolio litigation arises in connec-
tion with securities cases against non-issuer defendants. For ex-
ample, cases under § 11 of the Securities Act may be brought 
against a range of non-issuer defendants including individual di-
rectors and officers, underwriters, and accountants.300 Although 
seeking compensation from individual directors and officers in 
such claims may again raise circularity problems through the 
D&O policy, claims against underwriters and accountants may 
not. Because some underwriting firms—for example, Goldman 
Sachs—are publicly traded and therefore present in the market 
investor’s portfolio, compensation-based claims against such de-
fendants do effectively suffer from a circularity problem.301 Nev-
ertheless, some underwriters and most accounting firms are not 
publicly traded and therefore not present in the market portfolio. 
Mutual funds might therefore pursue compensation-based claims 
against such defendants.  
In sum, litigating for compensation will be a beneficial strat-
egy for mutual fund plaintiffs when the defendant is exiting the 
funds’ portfolio or is not a portfolio company. And although a mu-
tual fund plaintiff can participate in litigation as a member of the 
class, opting out will likely provide additional benefits for inves-
tors: namely, the ability to litigate for higher rewards and faster 
payment, when appropriate. In the mutual fund suits against 
 
 299 Id at 1804–05. 
 300 See 15 USC § 77k(a). 
 301 See Rose and Squire, 105 Nw U L Rev at 1687–89 (cited in note 255). 
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Countrywide, Petrobras, Tyco, American Realty, and Valeant, the 
decision to opt out likely resulted in a higher payment, and cer-
tainly a faster one.302 In cases where compensation is the primary 
goal, therefore, we imagine that opting out will be the fund’s best 
strategy. 
B. Ensure that Litigation Inside the Portfolio Provides 
Effective Deterrence 
The circularity critique also does not reach the deterrence ra-
tionale for shareholder suits. The basic goal of deterrence in civil 
litigation is to make the wrongdoer internalize enough of the cost 
of her activity to induce her not to engage in socially harmful con-
duct.303 By pursuing deterrence goals, mutual funds would act as 
“private attorneys general,” policing their portfolio for miscon-
duct.304 There are two ways for mutual funds to serve in this role: 
either as lead plaintiffs, bringing claims themselves, or as overse-
ers of shareholder suits brought by other plaintiffs, using their 
influence to ensure that the suits accomplish meaningful deter-
rence. We address each in turn. 
First, mutual funds should seek to serve as lead plaintiffs for 
strong shareholder claims.305 As lead plaintiffs, mutual funds 
would be in the best position to ensure that the lawsuit accom-
plished meaningful deterrence. Most obviously, mutual funds 
could insist on personal liability for responsible managers as a 
condition to resolving shareholder suits. Or, in cases of severe 
managerial misconduct, mutual funds could insist upon the ter-
mination of top managers and, by precommitting to vote against 
any board employing these managers in the future, effectively 
ban them from the management of publicly traded corporations. 
 
 302 See Part II.A. See also John C. Coffee Jr, Accountability and Competition in Secu-
rities Class Actions: Why “Exit” Works Better than “Voice”, 30 Cardozo L Rev 407, 409 
(2008) (“That ‘exit’ may work better than ‘voice’ is evidenced by the striking disparity that 
has recently arisen between the modest payouts to class members who remain in the class 
versus the much higher returns to institutional investors who opt out and sue in individual 
actions.”); Platt, 53 UC Davis L Rev at 1488 (cited in note 15) (calculating hypothetical 
opt-out recoveries for Vanguard’s S&P 500 fund and estimating that had the fund opted 
out in three cases in 2016, it could have increased investor returns by several basis points). 
 303 On the problem of setting sanctions to promote optimal deterrence, see Steven 
Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 473–91 (Harvard 2004). 
 304 See John C. Coffee Jr, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the 
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md L Rev 215, 216, 227–30 (1983) (discussing 
virtues and vices of the private attorney general model in securities litigation). 
 305 See Weiss and Beckerman, 104 Yale L J at 2096 (cited in note 39). 
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Mutual funds can thus enhance deterrence by imposing a credible 
threat of punishment through civil litigation. 
Mutual fund participation in merger litigation can also en-
hance deterrence. When mutual funds are on both sides of public 
company deals, their principal interest in merger litigation will 
be to deter serious misconduct in the deal process more than it 
will be to extract additional consideration from the buyer. By 
serving as the class representative in cases where misconduct 
may be present, mutual funds can insist that managers bear per-
sonal responsibility for the deal process, again threatening per-
sonal liability or portfolio-wide bans of managers that engage in 
serious misconduct. Likewise, in a derivative suit, mutual funds 
could pursue claims to extract genuine deterrence against specific 
corporate managers and refuse to settle for corporate therapeu-
tics that offer little or no value.306 
Serving as lead plaintiff or class representative comes at a 
cost. However, given the willingness of attorneys to litigate share-
holder suits on a contingency fee basis, the cost will principally be 
one of time and attention. Furthermore, some forms of share-
holder suits offer fees to offset such costs borne by lead plaintiffs 
and class representatives.307 This would seem to be an ideal role 
for mutual fund stewards, with the availability of fees offsetting 
the costs of stewardship. 
Still, mutual funds cannot bring every shareholder suit. The 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act308 (PSLRA) limits the 
number of times a single plaintiff can serve as lead plaintiff in a 
private securities class action to five times in three years.309 Nor, 
we expect, would they want to bring every claim. As a result, even 
if mutual funds were to become more involved in shareholder lit-
igation, we expect that other plaintiffs would continue to bring 
many suits on a class or other representative basis. Nevertheless, 
mutual funds retain a critical role in these suits as well. Their 
blockholdings put large mutual funds in an excellent position to 
oversee shareholder suits brought by other plaintiffs.310 This leads 
 
 306 On the debate over therapeutic relief in the settlement of derivative suits, see text 
accompanying notes 53–64. 
 307 See text accompanying note 281. 
 308 Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737 (1995), codified as amended in various sections of 
Title 15. 
 309 15 USC § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi). 
 310 Compare Rose, 108 Colum L Rev at 1354–64 (cited in note 109) (suggesting that 
the SEC be given oversight authority to prescreen 10b-5 complaints to protect against 
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us to our second point: Mutual funds should actively oversee 
shareholder suits brought by other plaintiffs and use their influ-
ence to ensure that these suits achieve meaningful deterrence. 
In an oversight role, mutual funds can use their leverage as 
class members to avoid both underdeterrence and overdeterrence. 
If the class representative and her legal team disregarded their 
input, large mutual funds could mount a leadership challenge, al-
leging inadequacy of the class representative, seeking sanctions 
for inadequate representation of counsel, and offering to take con-
trol of the litigation effort. The ability of mutual funds to credibly 
threaten to do so in virtually every shareholder suit would have 
a feedback effect on the incentives of class counsel. Understand-
ing that mutual funds will countenance intraportfolio litigation 
only when it produces meaningful deterrence, class counsel would 
pursue litigation only in appropriate cases. In sum, by actively 
engaging in an oversight role, mutual funds could improve the 
deterrence effect of shareholder suits on the whole. 
Nevertheless, a major obstacle to accomplishing deterrence 
goals through shareholder litigation arises from D&O insurance 
policies that indemnify managers and the corporations they serve 
for losses incurred in shareholder litigation.311 Insofar as D&O in-
surance holds companies and their managers harmless for the 
kind of conduct leading to shareholder claims, we cannot expect 
liability in shareholder suits to adequately deter managerial mis-
conduct. This leads us to the third priority for mutual funds: if 
funds are to use shareholder litigation to create meaningful de-
terrence, they should first consider encouraging portfolio compa-
nies to realign their D&O policies to be consistent with deterrence 
objectives. 
Most D&O policies include two basic types of coverage. First, 
individual-level coverage protects individual managers against 
covered losses.312 Second, entity-level coverage protects the corpo-
ration itself from losses arising from its indemnification obliga-
tions to individual managers and from losses it incurs as a named 
defendant in shareholder suits.313 The vast majority of losses 
 
overdeterrence), with Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at 216 (cited in note 304) (noting society’s reli-
ance on private institutions to enforce certain laws). 
 311 See Baker and Griffith, 95 Georgetown L J at 1832–33 (cited in note 117112). 
 312 This is referred to as “Side A” coverage under most D&O policies. Id at 1802. 
 313 Losses incurred as a result of corporate indemnification obligations are covered 
under “Side B” of the D&O policy, and losses directly incurred by the corporation as a 
defendant are covered under “Side C.” Id. 
2020] A Mission Statement for Mutual Funds 1227 
 
incurred under D&O policies are incurred under entity-level cov-
erage.314 Entity-level coverage effectively means that, apart from 
the deductible, the corporation suffers no harm from managerial 
misconduct provided the settlement is within the limits of the in-
surance policy. When corporate losses are indemnified by an in-
surance company, the corporation therefore has less of an incen-
tive to police the conduct of its managers to prevent misconduct 
ex ante. In this way, the principal effect of entity-level coverage 
is to render corporations less sensitive to managerial misconduct. 
In prior coauthored work, one of us argued that there is no good 
explanation for this form of coverage, only a bad one—that is, 
agency costs.315 Managers use D&O insurance to sever share-
holder litigation from its deterrence function. 
Mutual funds could reestablish the deterrence function of 
shareholder litigation by minimizing the distortions introduced 
by entity-level coverage. One way of doing this would be simply 
to eliminate entity-level D&O coverage, insisting that policies 
cover only individual directors’ liabilities.316 Restructuring poli-
cies in this way would protect against managerial risk aversion 
while at the same time leaving corporate assets exposed in share-
holder suits. Corporate losses in shareholder suits would be ren-
dered more salient. Uninsured losses would have a greater impact 
 
 314 See id at 1803 (“Our participants confirmed that the vast majority of D&O insur-
ance losses are incurred under Side B and C—that is, entity-level coverage. Thus, to a 
substantial extent, D&O insurance is corporate insurance.”) (citations omitted). 
 315 See Baker and Griffith, 95 Georgetown L J at 1841 (cited in note 117) (citation 
omitted), arguing:  
In order for shareholders to benefit from entity-level D&O coverage, there must 
be some benefit to the coverage other than pure risk distribution, which share-
holders could accomplish more efficiently through portfolio diversification.  
Although some plausible explanations have been suggested . . . [n]one . . .  
accounts for the pure risk distribution form of D&O insurance that we  
observed. . . . 
 We are therefore left with only one satisfactory explanation for the form of 
D&O insurance that we observed: agency costs. Managers do not want insurers 
monitoring their decisions ex ante and they do not want them managing their 
defense ex post. Both monitoring and defense management would reduce  
managers’ autonomy and, relatedly, their ability to profit at the shareholders’ 
expense. 
The authors conclude that “our research strongly suggests that the prevailing form of D&O 
insurance benefits management at the shareholders’ expense.” Id at 1842. 
 316 This form of coverage exists. It is referred to in the industry as “Side-A only” cov-
erage. Side-A only coverage benefits firms by addressing the risk aversion of individual 
directors, thereby encouraging directors to serve without distorting their incentive to mon-
itor. See id at 1804 n 38. 
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on share price and on incentive compensation packages. As a re-
sult, the corporation would likely take greater care to avoid them 
ex ante. Eliminating entity-level D&O coverage would thus im-
prove the deterrent effect of shareholder litigation. 
If their appeals to restructure D&O coverage fall on deaf ears, 
mutual funds might be able to achieve a similar effect by insist-
ing, either as lead plaintiffs or as prospective objectors, that a sig-
nificant portion of any recovery not be funded by insurance. Forc-
ing the corporate defendant or, in extreme cases, individual 
managers, to fund losses would have the same effect as eliminat-
ing entity-level coverage but on an ad hoc basis. Another way to 
accomplish the same thing would be to plead actual fraud in the 
complaint, thereby triggering the fraud exclusion and eliminating 
D&O coverage from the recovery.317 However they do it, mutual 
funds should work to improve the deterrent effect of shareholder 
litigation by limiting the role of D&O insurance. 
C. Litigate to Implement Meaningful Governance Reforms 
Shareholder litigation can produce governance enhance-
ments, for example, by dismantling obstacles to acquisitions or 
activism and also by improving corporate compliance programs.318 
Given that mutual funds advertise their interest in improving 
corporate governance, it seems natural that they should consider 
using litigation as a tool for doing so. Furthermore, given the sys-
temic improvement that governance enhancements promise 
across portfolios, it seems reasonable to expect mutual funds to 
litigate for improved governance much as they might litigate for 
improved deterrence. 
But the same issue that compromises index fund voting also 
affects stewardship litigation—mutual funds are unlikely to 
know how to improve governance at a given firm in the portfolio. 
Although it is possible to understand the basic effect of govern-
ance terms and to know their average effect on firm perfor-
mance—staggered boards, for example, make it harder to replace 
 
 317 See id at 1804–05. Because most D&O policies exclude actual fraud from coverage, 
pleading actual fraud and insisting upon an admission of fraud in settling the claim would 
void the insurer’s obligation to cover the resulting loss. Most shareholder suits are care-
fully pleaded to avoid triggering the fraud exclusion, thereby retaining access to insurance 
proceeds. However, insofar as mutual funds press shareholder claims more for their de-
terrence than for their compensation value, they may prefer to plead their claims inten-
tionally to trigger the fraud exclusion. 
 318 See text accompanying notes 28–30. 
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the board of directors and may have a negative average effect on 
firm performance319—it is much harder to say what the optimal 
governance arrangement for a particular firm will be.320 There is 
no one-size-fits-all governance arrangement.321 Even staggered 
boards may enhance performance for some firms.322 Hence, know-
ing what is best for a particular firm requires a high degree of 
company-specific information.323 
Mutual funds are generally in a poor position to evaluate the 
company-specific effects of a given governance arrangement. In-
dex funds in particular lack the incentive to invest in acquiring 
company-specific information because their business model is es-
sentially to hold the market as a whole and drive down the costs 
of investing.324 Active funds may have more of an incentive to in-
vest in acquiring this information and, in such cases, may share 
their information with index funds in the same family of funds.325 
But information sharing of this type will not always be effective. 
Active funds typically hold a much narrower slice of the market 
than index funds.326 They may not price the effect of governance 
 
 319 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian, The Pow-
erful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan L Rev 
887, 898, 939 (2002). 
 320 See Miroslava Straska and H. Gregory Waller, Antitakeover Provisions and Share-
holder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature, 49 J Fin & Quant Analysis 933, 950 (2014) 
(surveying the literature on the effects of antitakeover provisions on shareholders, and 
concluding that in spite of a large volume of studies, “the net effects of these provisions on 
shareholder wealth remain uncertain”). 
 321 See Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corpo-
rate Law and Governance, 117 Colum L Rev 767, 826 (2017). 
 322 See, for example, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov, and Simone M. Sepe, 
Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J Fin Econ 422, 440–41 
(2017) (showing that staggered boards increase value at firms with greater research and 
development needs and a higher proportion of intangible assets); K.J. Martijn Cremers 
and Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 Stan L Rev 67, 
103–04 (2016) (showing that firm value tends to increase after the adoption of a staggered 
board). See also Seoungpil Ahn and Keshab Shrestha, The Differential Effects of Classified 
Boards on Firm Value, 37 J Bank & Fin 3993, 4000 (2013) (finding that in complex firms 
the benefits of staggered boards may outweigh the costs). 
 323 See Gilson and Gordon, 113 Colum L Rev at 891 (cited in note 277) (“Effective use 
of governance rights requires firm-specific investigation and firm-specific activism, both 
of which are costly and will be undersupplied by institutional investors.”). 
 324 See Lund, 43 J Corp L at 510–12 (cited in note 14). 
 325 See Kahan and Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance at *43–44 (cited in 
note 5) (arguing that “spillover knowledge” of this type is what enables index funds to play 
a meaningful role in corporate governance). 
 326 See Lund, 43 J Corp L at 496 (cited in note 14). 
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in their analyses of portfolio companies.327 And they often get it 
wrong.328 Free riding on the efforts of active funds will not always 
provide index funds with sufficient information to intelligently 
analyze governance arrangements. 
The decision to use litigation to secure governance reforms, 
however, is different than relying on voting and engagement. One 
key difference is the involvement of a lawyer, which can be both 
helpful and harmful. On the one hand, a trusted attorney can seek 
out opportunities for governance litigation and present them to 
the mutual fund complex. Although the mutual fund tends to lack 
firm-specific information, cases involving gross misconduct may 
present enough red flags to justify the decision to proceed.329 And 
as the suit progresses, the litigation process itself will uncover 
additional information that can help the attorneys and mutual 
fund governance staff craft a settlement that addresses the spe-
cific problem. 
Consider again the examples we highlighted above. Govern-
ance litigation proved to be an effective tool in undoing the harms 
of the stock option backdating scandal.330 Likewise, the CalPERS 
intervention at IAC successfully prevented management from so-
lidifying its control over the company through the issuance of non-
voting stock.331 Finally, the settlement of the derivative suit 
against Twenty-First Century Fox in the wake of sexual harass-
ment claims against the company resulted in the establishment 
of a “Workplace Professionalism and Inclusion Council” aimed at 
correcting the deficiencies of the compliance program and improv-
ing the workplace environment.332 While we take no position on 
whether such programs achieve their goals, we note that this gov-
ernance reform emerged only after the litigation process produced 
 
 327 See Griffith, 98 Tex L Rev at *47 (cited in note 14) (arguing that the cost of valuing 
governance arrangements may often exceed the benefit of doing so). 
 328 J.B. Heaton, N.G. Polson, and J.H. Witte, Why Indexing Works, 33 Applied Sto-
chastic Models Bus & Indust 690, 693 (2017) (arguing that “the much higher cost of active 
management may be the inherently high chance of underperformance that comes with 
attempts to select stocks, since stock selection itself increases the chance of underperfor-
mance relative to the chance of overperformance in many circumstances”). 
 329 The decision to sue is similar to the decision to vote for the dissident slate in a 
proxy contest—for the latter, the activist hedge fund will have generated information in 
the campaign, reducing the likelihood of an uninformed vote. See Griffith, 98 Tex L Rev 
at *34–36 (cited in note 14). 
 330 See text accompanying note 58. 
 331 See text accompanying note 208. 
 332 See text accompanying note 57. 
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information concerning the specific deficiencies then existing at 
the company, giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to target re-
forms to the company’s specific needs. This process might not be 
perfect, but it operates on better information and offers more 
carefully tailored solutions than the one-size-fits-all governance 
reforms typically offered in shareholder proposals.333 
Nevertheless, the use of litigation to achieve governance re-
forms comes with the risk that attorneys will use lawsuits to push 
worthless reforms merely to extract fees from the defendant cor-
poration. If the cost in fees is greater than the benefit of the re-
forms, then investors are harmed, not benefited, by the litigation. 
This suggests that mutual funds’ role in policing governance liti-
gation for indicia of litigation agency costs, a subject we address 
in greater detail below, may be as important as litigating to pro-
duce governance reforms. Because the critical question is whether 
contingency fee attorneys are tempted to litigate (and settle) 
when their clients would prefer that they not, mutual funds 
should consider using in-house counsel, whose compensation does 
not depend on the outcome of the claim, to evaluate whether to 
bring the claim and to monitor the conduct of any litigation ulti-
mately brought. Because in-house counsel have no incentive to 
continue litigation beyond the point that it provides a legitimate 
benefit to the company (or the plaintiff class), they can be trusted 
to voluntarily dismiss nonmeritorious claims. 
D. Intervene to Contain Litigation Agency Costs 
Most shareholder suits are not brought by mutual funds but 
rather by others suing in a class or other representative capacity. 
Yet even if mutual funds are not directly involved as plaintiffs, 
they may still be adversely affected by the outcome of these suits. 
When corporations pay to settle nonmeritorious cases334 or agree 
to pay attorneys’ fees in settlements that produce no value for the 
plaintiff class,335 all shareholders are affected. As holders of the 
market portfolio, mutual fund investors bear the costs of such 
 
 333 See Griffith, 98 Tex L Rev at *46–47 (cited in note 14). 
 334 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J Legal 
Stud 437, 440 (1988); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of 
Litigation, 10 Intl Rev L & Econ 3, 25–26 (1990); D. Rosenberg and S. Shavell, A Model in 
Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ 3, 4–5 (1985). 
 335 See Coffee, 48 L & Contemp Probs at 23–26 (cited in note 40); Romano, 7 J L Econ 
& Org at 61 (cited in note 48). 
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suits. As a result, an important role for mutual funds in share-
holder litigation lies in intervening to reduce litigation agency 
costs. 
Mutual funds should oversee shareholder litigation in order 
to avoid both overdeterrence and underdeterrence. Part of their 
role in this oversight capacity is to ensure that good claims pro-
duce good results—that is, meaningful deterrence. Another part 
of their role, however, is to ensure that bad claims are not pur-
sued. Because attorneys’ fees fuel the filing and settlement of  
nonmeritorious claims, mutual funds acting in an oversight role 
should intervene to prevent attorneys from recovering fees for 
nonmeritorious claims. One way of doing this is by objecting to 
settlements. 
Class and derivative suit settlements require a fairness hear-
ing before they can become binding on unnamed shareholders.336 
If the judge does not approve the settlement, the settlement does 
not bind the class.337 The trouble with fairness hearings, however, 
is that there is no adversarial interest to frame the problem for 
the judge.338 Instead, “[t]he contending parties have struck a bar-
gain, and have every interest in defending the settlement and in 
convincing the judge that it is in accord with the law.”339 
 
 336 See Rubenstein, 53 UCLA L Rev at 1467–71 (cited in note 74). At the fairness 
hearing: 
If class action attorneys sell out their clients, the judge should perceive that the 
settlement does not live up to the value of the claims and reject it accordingly. 
Conversely, if class action attorneys file a frivolous case, the judge should per-
ceive that the settlement is merely a nuisance payment, reject it for that reason, 
and dismiss the case. 
Id at 1444. See also Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Govern-
ance, 37 Ind L Rev 65, 128 (2003) (advocating for an active adversarial process during 
fairness hearings as “a kind of trial on the merits of the settlement”); Hillary A. Sale, 
Judges Who Settle, 89 Wash U L Rev 377, 402–03 (2011) (advocating for a larger gatekeep-
ing role for judges in settlement). 
 337 Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 Geo Wash L Rev 
951, 968–69 (2014) (“What binds the class is not the agreement between the defendant and 
the lead plaintiffs or class counsel, but rather the court’s judgment approving that agree-
ment. The binding effect of a class settlement, in other words, must be understood as a 
function of judicial power.”) (emphasis in original), citing William B. Rubenstein, Alba 
Conte, and Herbert B. Newberg, 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 1.6 (Thomson Reuters 5th 
ed 2011). See also Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 
90 Wash U L Rev 1015, 1020–25 (2013). 
 338 See Griffith, 56 BC L Rev at 20 (cited in note 64) (emphasizing information asym-
metries in the settlement hearing). 
 339 Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L J 1073, 1082 (1984). See 
also Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 
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Questionable assertions of fact and law are not scrutinized by op-
posing counsel. Experts are not cross-examined or even ques-
tioned, and opposing views are not presented. A judge who ques-
tions the value of the settlement must do so on her own, in the 
face of all of the evidence presented by the parties before her.340 
Given the apparent weight of the evidence before them and their 
otherwise crowded dockets, judges can perhaps be forgiven for 
generally rubber-stamping settlements to which the named par-
ties have, after all, agreed. Settlements need, and frequently lack, 
a motivated gatekeeper.341 
Mutual funds can act as gatekeepers by objecting to nonmer-
itorious class settlements and presenting adversarial evidence at 
the fairness hearing. Courts would very likely take the arguments 
offered by mutual fund objectors very seriously were they to ap-
pear in this role.342 There is evidence that such objections can in 
fact succeed in causing judges to throw out settlements and refuse 
to approve fee awards.343 Moreover, the mere potential for objec-
tion may deter the filing of nonmeritorious claims. Unlike ration-
ally apathetic shareholders who lack the information to object to 
 
U Chi L Rev 1, 46 (1991) (referring to settlement hearings as “pep rallies jointly orches-
trated by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel”). 
 340 See Trulia, 129 A3d at 894 (“The lack of an adversarial process often requires that 
the Court become essentially a forensic examiner of proxy materials so that it can play 
devil’s advocate in probing the value of the ‘get’ for stockholders in a proposed disclosure 
settlement.”). 
 341 Rubenstein, 53 UCLA L Rev at 1452–67 (cited in note 74) (examining various pro-
posals for reducing agency costs at the settlement stage). 
 342 Courts have said so. See, for example, In re Riverbed Technology, Inc Stockholders 
Litigation, 2015 WL 5458041, *6 (Del Chanc). 
 343 One of us has been active in bringing objections to settlements and in providing tes-
timony to judges evaluating settlements of shareholder suits. See, for example, Bushansky v 
Remy International, Inc, 262 F Supp 3d 742, 744 (SD Ind 2017) (rejecting a settlement after 
objection by Sean Griffith); Stein v Blankfein, 2018 WL 5279358, *4 (Del Chanc) (rejecting 
a settlement objected to by Griffith); Brief of Sean J. Griffith as Amicus Curiae, In re 
Trulia, Inc Stockholders Litigation, No 10020-CB, *1–4 (Del Chanc filed Oct 16, 2015) (op-
posing a settlement, ultimately rejected by the court); Letter of Sam Glasscock III, Vice 
Chancellor, Court of Chancery of the State of Del to Counsel, In re Riverbed Technology, 
Inc Stockholders Litigation, No 10484-VCG, *7 (Del Chanc filed Dec 2, 2015) (reducing 
attorneys’ fees after objection by Griffith); Stipulation and (Proposed) Order of Dismissal, 
In re PMFG, Inc Stockholder Litigation, No 11223-VCS, *4 (Del Chanc filed Sept 1, 2016) 
(rejecting a settlement after objection by Griffith); Griffith v Quality Distribution, Inc, 
2018 WL 3403537, *7 (Fla App) (adopting Trulia and reversing a settlement after objection 
by Griffith); Vergiev Statement of Reasons at *9 (cited in note 73); Gordon v Verizon Com-
munications, Inc, 2014 WL 7250212, *8 (NY Sup) (rejecting a settlement after Griffith’s 
testimony), revd, 148 AD3d 146 (NY App). 
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such settlements,344 mutual fund blockholders bear the cost of 
such suits across their portfolio.345 Furthermore, as market inves-
tors, funds have standing to appear in every case, threatening to 
object to challenge the adequacy of counsel, or even to file sanc-
tions motions.346 Through interventions such as these, mutual 
funds could calibrate the deterrent effect of shareholder suits by 
controlling litigation agency costs. 
In sum, mutual funds should act to minimize litigation 
agency costs and thereby control both underdeterrence and over-
deterrence. Tools at funds’ disposal include interventions and ob-
jections to settlement, as well as insisting on meaningful deter-
rence when participating in litigation. 
E. Implementing the Mission Statement 
We have now identified several ways in which mutual funds 
could benefit their investors by engaging in shareholder litiga-
tion. Funds should view litigation as a component of stewardship. 
The failure to participate in shareholder suits should, in some cir-
cumstances, be considered a failure to act in the best interests of 
their investors. 
But this leaves the questions of how the decision to litigate 
should be made and who should be the one to make it. We imagine 
that, ex ante, stewardship groups could promulgate litigation 
guidelines along the lines we have suggested, similar to those 
 
 344 See Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors 
in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 Vand L Rev 1529, 1548–
50 & tbl 3 (2004) (showing that the objection rate is low across case types). 
 345 Mutual funds can distinguish themselves from hold-up objectors by refusing to 
settle their objection in exchange for a fee. Compare Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Ob-
jector Blackmail?, 62 Vand L Rev 1623, 1633–42 (2009) (highlighting concerns of objector 
“blackmail” and the use of quick-pay provisions used by class action counsel), with Sean 
J. Griffith and Anthony A. Rickey, Objections to Disclosure Settlements: A How-to Guide, 
70 Okla L Rev 281, 315 (2017) (noting that “an objector can offer to assuage concerns on 
this point by providing an affidavit attesting that he or she will not sell or settle an objec-
tion without court approval”). 
 346 The PSLRA requires courts to make Rule 11 findings in class action securities lit-
igation, a requirement that is often disregarded in practice. See 15 USC § 77z-1(c); 
M. Todd Henderson and William H.J. Hubbard, Judicial Noncompliance with Mandatory 
Procedural Rules Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 J Legal Stud S87, 
S100–01 (2015). Mutual fund class members could intervene to demand Rule 11 sanctions 
against attorneys who engage in misconduct or who simply pursue shareholder suits when 
the benefits are outweighed by their costs. The threat of Rule 11 sanctions would create 
an important downside from the pursuit of securities class actions and again deter unac-
countable conduct in litigation. 
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used to guide voting and engagement decisions.347 Authority to 
generate litigation consistent with the guidelines could then rest 
with portfolio managers (or a committee composed of portfolio 
managers and members of the stewardship team). Ultimately, the 
individuals controlling litigation should have input from the fidu-
ciaries who control the investment decisions for the funds’ inves-
tors, rather than displacing that decision by individuals who are 
not fiduciaries (as mostly occurs now). 
In addition, the board of directors could continue to play a 
role in ensuring that the fund pursued only worthwhile cases. 
Specifically, any decision to litigate would be subject to approval 
from the mutual fund’s board of directors, who would certify that 
the litigation addresses a serious issue of corporate governance, 
is likely to secure compensation for investors, and/or is likely to 
defeat a transaction adverse to investors. In addition, the fund’s 
board could also encourage the institution to implement systems 
designed to bring beneficial litigation opportunities to the portfo-
lio managers’ attention. Mutual fund directors are not subject to 
the same conflicts of interest or collective action problems as port-
folio managers and are therefore well positioned to encourage 
beneficial investments in litigation. 
We recognize that these adjustments may somewhat increase 
costs for the mutual fund family. For example, the institution 
would likely need to bring additional lawyers in house to guide 
their litigation decisions, and devote some time and resources to 
monitoring those lawyers. In addition, participating in litigation 
can subject fund managers to discovery requests. For index fund 
portfolio managers, those costs should not be overly burdensome; 
however, actively managed fund portfolio managers may have 
more to lose.348 In particular, active fund managers may be wary 
 
 347 Nearly every mutual fund family promulgates voting guidelines and follows them 
closely. See Bioy, et al, Passive Fund Providers at *11 (cited in note 8). By contrast, none 
has adopted any policies with regard to shareholder litigation. 
 348 The fear of being subjected to burdensome discovery requests may explain why the 
Big Three mutual funds have participated somewhat more aggressively in litigation in 
Europe, which does not allow for pretrial discovery. See Platt, 53 UC Davis L Rev at 1503 
(cited in note 15). See also Lukas Holub, Discovery Abroad: An Overview of European 
Blocking Statutes and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Outside the U.S.—
Part One of Two (National Institute for Trial Advocacy), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/3KVL-PM8E (“The use of the term ‘discovery’ is not appropriate, because the 
pre-trial discovery as understood in the U.S. practically does not exist.”). 
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of disclosing confidential information about their trades.349 Active 
fund managers will have to weigh these costs with the expected 
benefits when deciding whether to pursue litigation. We imagine 
that in many cases, these costs will be offset by the benefits pro-
vided by successful claims.350 
In addition to bringing lawyers in house, funds could out-
source the process of identifying valuable claims to a portfolio 
monitor—a law firm—that would track litigation and potential 
litigation across the portfolio, recommending cases in which the 
fund might participate as a plaintiff or intervene as an objector. 
For example, three out of the five shareholder suits that we dis-
cuss in Part II—Countrywide, American Realty, and Valeant—
involved the plaintiffs’ firm Bernstein Litowitz Berger &  
Grossman LLP.351 Mutual funds could continue to develop rela-
tionships with repeat-play firms, communicating their guidelines 
in advance, and ensuring that portfolio managers, as well as the 
board of directors, keep a careful eye on litigation agency costs 
over the life of the relationship. 
We leave the internal business dynamics to the funds them-
selves, noting only that implementing the mission statement need 
not be unduly burdensome or costly. But this, of course, raises 
another question: If stewardship litigation is not burdensome or 
costly, why do funds not do it already? And given that they do not, 
what other barriers remain in the way? 
This brings us back to the problem of agency costs—in par-
ticular, Corporate Client Conflict. Insofar as mutual funds fear 
that participating in shareholder litigation would lead to a loss of 
corporate revenue, we should not expect them to challenge man-
agement in the absence of pressure from their investors—which 
often include other institutional investors, such as pension 
funds—or their board of directors, which is tasked with oversee-
ing the management and operations of the fund on behalf of the 
 
 349 Active fund managers may also be concerned about losing access to management 
that would help them glean useful trading information. However, the passage of Regula-
tion FD, which prohibits selective disclosure of information by publicly traded companies, 
should ameliorate this concern. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Fair Disclo-
sure, Regulation FD (Oct 27, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/G7LB-BAMN. 
 350 As an example, Vanguard’s successful settlement of the American Realty litigation 
netted it $90 million. See Part II.A.3. A single settlement of this size each year would fund 
the hiring of several new litigation employees—and then some. 
 351 See Current Cases (Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP), archived at 
https://perma.cc/82UG-587W. 
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fund’s investors.352 Given the potential interference of Corporate 
Client Conflict, mutual fund investors or directors could insist on 
internal separation—a “fire wall”—between litigation decisions 
and the sales and marketing apparatus. Alternatively, investors 
and directors could demand that stewardship groups refer certain 
litigation decisions to an outside decision-maker independent of 
the sales and marketing department.353 
If mutual funds fail to redesign their approach to litigation, 
their investors might be able to bring fiduciary duty litigation 
against the funds themselves. Recall that T. Rowe Price paid its 
investors $194 million to avoid investor lawsuits when it acci-
dentally forfeited their appraisal rights.354 Mutual funds have also 
faced litigation for failing to collect settlement proceeds in share-
holder class actions.355 Therefore, investor suits might also be 
 
 352 See Frequently Asked Questions About Mutual Fund Directors (Investment Com-
pany Institute), archived at https://perma.cc/GUJ2-2AKX. 
 353 There is a possible first-mover problem: the first fund family to adopt these 
changes may face backlash from their clients, and the prospect of this backlash may in-
hibit change. For that reason, investor advocacy and/or litigation should target multiple 
firms within an industry in the hopes of shifting the industry-wide default position on 
litigation. 
 354 See text accompanying notes 193–96. 
 355 See James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Insti-
tutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 Wash U L Q 855, 
875–77 (2002) (showing that on average, financial institutions file claims in fewer than 
half of their eligible securities fraud settlements). In the wake of the Cox and Thomas 
study dozens of lawsuits were filed against mutual funds alleging that the failure to collect 
settlement proceeds was a breach of the funds’ fiduciary duties. These suits were brought 
under state corporate law, as well as § 36 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub L 
No 76-768, 54 Stat 789, codified as amended at 15 USC § 80a-1 et seq. To our knowledge, 
none of these suits has been successful, but they did provide a reason for mutual funds to 
focus on the problem. And we expect that under certain circumstances, the failure to make 
litigation decisions in investors’ best interests could constitute a breach of the fund’s fidu-
ciary duty. By this, we do not mean that the failure to participate in litigation would al-
ways or even often constitute a duty breach—as discussed, most shareholder litigation 
does not benefit the company or its investors, and even pursuing beneficial litigation might 
not be worth the fund’s time and resources. But perhaps a fiduciary claim would have 
more luck in situations where the failure to participate in litigation left real investor 
money on the table. In addition, if investors could show that a fund has not focused on 
litigation at all, that fact could support a Caremark claim. See Cox and Thomas, 58 Stan 
L Rev at 413 (cited in note 235) (discussing duties of care under In re Caremark Interna-
tional Inc Derivative Litigation, 698 A2d 959 (Del Chanc 1996)). In an analogous context, 
the DOL has explained that a pension plan’s fiduciary duties include determining whether 
the plan should serve as a lead plaintiff in litigation. See Steven W. Stone and Ryan F. 
Helmrich, The Role of Investment Advisers in Client Class Action Claims, 12 Investment 
Lawyer 17, 19 (2005), archived at https://perma.cc/NF95-8LFM. Here, we expect that an 
investment manager would have a duty to consider whether to participate in litigation, 
rather than a blanket policy of sitting by the sidelines. 
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possible when mutual funds fail to exercise shareholders’ litiga-
tion rights. For example, BlackRock is a Petrobras investor.356 Yet 
BlackRock did not bring a direct suit against Petrobras, even 
though Vanguard did.357 While we would not want to see investor 
litigation against mutual funds for failure to bring every claim—
a safe harbor deferring to the decision of a properly constituted, 
independent litigation committee strikes us as appropriate—
some form of investor pressure seems necessary, given the  
potential of Corporate Client Conflict to influence mutual fund 
decision-making. 
The collective action problem raises a second substantial ob-
stacle to mutual fund participation in shareholder suits. Many of 
the benefits we described above in producing deterrence, enhanc-
ing governance, and reducing litigation agency costs redound to 
the market as a whole.358 Insofar as funds measure their perfor-
mance relative to that of their rivals, they may have little incen-
tive to expend resources to produce benefits in which their rivals 
will share. 
A partial answer to the collective action problem is that mu-
tual fund involvement in shareholder litigation need not cost 
much. Attorneys’ fees can be contingency based. Moreover, in a 
given year, there are likely to be many fewer plausible share-
holder claims, at least in comparison to the tens of thousands of 
elections and proposals in which stewardship groups currently 
participate.359 The cost of screening litigation can be minimized by 
promulgating guidelines ex ante, as well as by designating out-
side counsel as a portfolio monitor to do much of the work in dis-
covering potential violations and framing the case. 
But containing the cost of becoming involved in litigation is 
only a partial solution. If mutual funds do not see the benefit due 
to collective action problems, they are unlikely to become involved 
however low the costs. It is important to emphasize, however, that 
the collective action problem does not occur when the mutual fund 
 
 356 PBR/Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras ADR - Institutional Ownership and Share-
holders (Fintel), archived at https://perma.cc/HM5G-PHAF. 
 357 See Part II.A.2. 
 358 Note, however, that collective action incentives do not inhibit funds from seeking 
compensation in nonclass suits. See Part III.D.2. 
 359 There were roughly four hundred securities class actions filed in 2018. See note 
199 and accompanying text. Compare this number to the five hundred–plus shareholder 
proposals, and the tens of thousands of management elections and other proposals on 
which mutual funds must vote annually. See Griffith and Lund, 99 BU L Rev at 1169–71 
& n 101 (cited in note 14). 
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opts out of class action litigation and pursues compensation on its 
own. In such a case, the mutual fund can secure an outsized ben-
efit that does not accrue to rival funds. In other situations, where 
the collective action problem distorts litigation decisions, the pos-
sibility of investor lawsuits alleging that the failure to litigate was 
a breach of the fund’s fiduciary duty to investors could provide an 
incentive to act. And here again, lest such claims overwhelm mu-
tual funds, we recommend a clear safe harbor, based on the in-
sights of the mission statement, and implemented by a properly 
constituted, independent litigation committee. 
Our hope is that these changes can be implemented through 
pressure brought to bear by mutual fund directors, as well as in-
vestors once they know what to ask for. Investors should insist 
upon a source of authority within the fund family that makes lit-
igation decisions independent of the institution’s own incentives, 
based upon the considerations outlined in the mission statement. 
Funds that implement such a structure in good faith should re-
ceive deference in any subsequent fiduciary duty claims relating 
to the choices they make in bringing (or not bringing) shareholder 
suits. Funds that fail to implement such a structure should not 
receive such deference and thus remain vulnerable to investor fi-
duciary duty claims. Although these changes can be implemented 
through private ordering, we observe that the failure to imple-
ment such structures may also render the industry subject to 
greater risk of regulation. Implementing the mission statement 
would allow mutual funds to avoid these consequences by  
demonstrating that they are in fact using all available levers of 
corporate governance in the best interests of their investors. 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly half of US households invest in mutual funds, and 
mutual funds have become one of the most significant players in 
corporate governance. Scholars have started to identify substan-
tial limitations in the way that mutual funds engage in corporate 
governance, but the principal focus of this literature to date  
has been on how mutual funds vote. We focus instead on how  
they sue. 
Our empirical study of the largest mutual funds’ conduct in 
shareholder litigation leaves little doubt that mutual funds are 
not using litigation as a tool to create value for investors. Mutual 
funds’ dismal litigation record sheds light on the broader debate 
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over mutual funds’ stewardship incentives. To the extent that mu-
tual funds take governance seriously, as many claim they do, mu-
tual funds must reform their approach to shareholder litigation. 
This Article shows them how. It articulates a mission state-
ment for mutual funds in shareholder litigation that would prior-
itize the interests of mutual fund investors. Our mission state-
ment embraces the market investor perspective on shareholder 
litigation and, we argue, could be implemented through minor re-
forms to existing stewardship programs. Indeed, the principal 
change is for funds to see shareholder litigation for what it is: a pil-
lar of corporate governance that can create real value for investors. 
